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Abstract
Educational systems are complex adaptive systems (CAS). The macroeffects of an
educational policy emerge from and depend on individual students’ reactions to the
policy. However, educational policymakers traditionally rely on equation-based models,
which are deficient in reflecting the work of microbehaviors. Using inappropriate tools
to make policies may be a reason why there were many unintended educational
consequences in history. A proper methodology to design and analyze policies for
complex educational systems is agent-based modeling (ABM). Grounded in the theories
of CAS and computational irreducibility, ABM is capable of connecting microbehaviors
with macropatterns. The purpose of this study was to contribute to the application of
ABM in educational policy analysis by constructing an agent-based overlapping
generations model with hypothesized inputs to qualitatively represent the environment of
the Taipei School District. Four research questions explored the effects of Taipei’s 2016
student-assignment mechanism and its free tuition policy on educational opportunity and
school quality under different assumptions of students’ school-choice strategies. The
simulated outputs were analyzed using descriptive statistics and paired samples t tests.
The findings, which could hardly be revealed by traditional models, showed that the
effects were complex and depended on students’ strategies along with the number of
choices students were allowed to make; the assignment outcomes for elite students were
robust to the mechanism, and the free tuition policy worsened school quality. Although
exploratory, these findings can serve as hypotheses and a guide for Taipei’s policymakers
to collect empirical data in evaluating their 2016 mechanism and tuition policy.
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1
Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Overview
Education systems are complex adaptive systems (CASs), in which the
distribution of educational opportunity and school quality emerge from the interactions of
students with the environments including admission policies. One of the most salient
features of CASs is emergence; that is, aggregate properties emerge from the
decentralized interactions among the rationally bounded and adaptive constituents, which
follow simple behavioral rules and do not have any properties similar to the aggregate
properties (Flake, 1998; Holland, 2006; Squazzoni, 2012). The classical methodology to
study macrolevel issues of CASs is equation-based modeling (Borrill & Tesfatsion, 2011;
Gilbert, 2004). However, equation-based modeling cannot easily reflect the connections
between the behaviors of microconstituents and the macropatterns (Heckbert, Baynes, &
Reeson, 2010). This weakness makes classical equation-based modeling a questionable
tool to assess an educational policy that involves students’ behaviors in its process of
influencing macrophenomena.
To change the aggregate properties of a CAS, “we must understand how the
aggregate behavior emerges from the interactions of the parts” (Holland, 1992, p. 20).
Individual behaviors may change to respond to the change of policy, which in turn
changes macrostructures of interest. Therefore, it is not possible to deduce or predict the
future states of a CAS a priori purely from the study of its structural characteristics, as
the classical equation-based analytical models are designed to do (Laughlin & Pines,
2000; Wolfram, 2002). Using the wrong tools to design policies for CASs may be a
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reason that history shows a myriad of cases where policies produced unexpected and
undesired consequences (Farmer & Foley, 2009; Groff, 2013; Maroulis et al., 2010).
The approach to studying CASs advocated by many scholars, including John
Holland, Duncan Foley, and Leigh Tesfatsion, is agent-based modeling (Farmer & Foley,
2009; Holland, 2006; Borrill & Tesfatsion, 2011). Agent-based modeling (ABM) is a
bottom-up approach to studying the micro-, meso-, and macroevolution of a CAS by
programming the constituent agents’ behavioral and interaction rules as well as their
environment and letting the aggregate patterns grow through simulations (Axelrod, 1997;
Chen, Yang, & Yu, 2011). ABM’s capability to connect micro- and macrobehaviors
makes it a better design than classical mathematical equations to study the dynamical
macroscopic problems in CASs (Chen, Chang, & Du, 2012; Epstein, 1999). While it has
been extensively applied to policy analysis in many CASs, particularly in the fields of
economics, management, and environmental studies, ABM is still new in the field of
educational research (Chen et al., 2011; Maroulis et al., 2010). Few agent-based models
are constructed to simulate distribution patterns in educational systems. The agent-based
model built in this study contributes to the development of ABM in educational policy
analysis.
The model is an overlapping generations model because there are three
generations of students (grades 10 -12) in each simulation year, and younger generations
make their school choices based on school qualities emerging from senior students’
performances. I constructed this model to represent the Taipei Senior High School
District (the Taipei School District) qualitatively and to simulate the possible effects of
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Taipei’s 2016 senior high school admission policies on the distributions of educational
opportunity and school quality. This agent-based simulation model is capable of running
experiments under different explicit hypotheses and showing the link between emergent
aggregate outcomes and individual behaviors. This study demonstrates to policymakers
and stakeholders that ABM can facilitate a disciplined and informative public discourse
on educational policies that have complex effects on the current and future generations.
In the following section, I discuss the background of Taipei’s senior high school
admission reform. I argue the lack of proper analysis of its policy implications in the
section of problem statement, followed by the sections in which I describe the purpose,
research questions, nature, conceptual framework, delimitations, assumptions, and
limitations of this study. This chapter ends with a discussion of the significance of this
study in agent-based educational research in general and research on school admission
policies in particular.
Background
Since the 1980s, Taiwan’s income inequality has been rising; the ratio of the
income earned by the top five percent to the income earned by the bottom five percent
has reached 96:1 (Chu, Chow, & Hu, 2015). Various educational reforms, in addition to
new social and economic policies, have been tried to tackle the inequality problem. One
of them was the massification of post-secondary education during the 1990s and the
2000s, which has resulted in more than 90% admission rate at Taiwan’s universities since
2005 (Chou & Wang, 2012). However, the massification of higher education does not
improve income equity; it reproduces the socioeconomic class stratification (Chu et al.,
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2015). The elite, most of whom are richer, attend elite universities while the poorer
attend lower ranked universities with much fewer resources. Moreover, since Taiwan’s
elite universities are all public and most public universities rank higher than the private
universities, on average, richer students pay less than poorer students. What makes the
situation worse is the shortage of demand for higher-educated labors due to the economic
downturn in the recent decade, forcing those non-elite university graduates to compete
for jobs with reduced starting salaries (Chou & Wang, 2012).
In 2014, Taiwan’s government started another large-scale educational reform, the
12-Year Basic Education Program (the 12-Year Education Reform), to tackle the
inequality problem in postsecondary education (Ministry of Education, 2013). This
reform aimed at equalizing educational opportunity and school quality in high school
education. The strategies of the reform were to extend the free-tuition policy to all
students in both public and private senior high schools and to overhaul the senior high
school admission mechanisms in all school districts (Ministry of Education, 2013). In
Taiwan, many school districts rely on the private senior high schools to provide enough
seats for all students. For example, in the Taipei School District, the private schools
provide about 50% of the places needed to accommodate all children in senior high
school ages (15 – 18). Those who attend private schools are generally poorer financially
and academically than those in public schools; therefore, the government had provided
full tuition subsidy for those who attended private vocational high schools (Ministry of
Education, 2013). This reform extended this free tuition policy to all high school
students. The government claimed that the extended free-tuition policy could ease the
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financial burden on poorer people and thus promote equal educational opportunity. The
government also overhauled the student-assignment mechanisms to change the school
systems from tracking (assigning students to schools according to their performances) to
mixing in the belief that a mixing system promotes equal educational opportunity in
comparison to a tracking system. This belief has been supported by many studies
(Ferreira & Gignoux, 2014; Van de Werfhorst & Mijs, 2010). If school quality is
measured by students’ scores, then mixing also promotes equality of school quality.
Unfortunately, the 2014 admission mechanisms of all school districts were
heavily criticized for their complicated student prioritization rules and the creation of
justified envy (Lin, 2014). Justified envy occurs when a higher ranked student loses the
seat in his or her preferred school to a lower ranked student (Abdulkadiroglu & Sonmez,
2003). The abundant occurrence of justified envy infuriated many parents of higher
performing students, who were relatively affluent and politically influential. Although no
parents complained about the free tuition policy, some scholars criticized this expensive
policy for its crowding-out effect on the programs that could directly benefit low-quality
schools and low-performing students (Sheu & Chang, 2014). Those scholars also argued
that this policy is unnecessary because Taiwan had a more than 93% of senior high
school attendance rate before the implementation of this policy (Sheu & Chang, 2014).
Compromising to the political influence of the richer parents, almost all school districts in
Taiwan, including the Taipei School District, revised their admission mechanisms in
2015 toward the original system of sorting students by academic performance, while
holding the free-tuition policy unchanged.
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As the capital of Taiwan, Taipei has the most competitive school district and
contains the top-ranked senior high schools in Taiwan. The Taipei School District
includes students from both Taipei City and its satellite cities (Suburban Taipei).
Taipei’s policymakers have to face the criticisms from the most politically influential
parents in Taiwan, who believe that mixing will lower the quality of the top-ranked
schools. With a total of 70 thousand senior high school applicants each year, the Taipei
School District took a more aggressive step to change its admission mechanism than
many other school districts in 2015, disregarding the central government’s objection (The
Central News Agency, 2014). The Taipei School District reported that its device reduced
a great deal of justified envy in 2015 (Taipei City Government Department of Education,
2015). This statement seemed to imply that the Taipei School District has moved more
back to the original tracking system.
In 2016, Taipei’s policymakers changed their student-assignment mechanism
again to solve two problems caused by the prioritization rules in the mechanism: too
many ties (too many students having the same priorities) and justified envy (New Taipei
City Government, 2015b). Justified envy is viewed as a problem only when a society
believes in a school system of tracking rather than mixing. This social belief is exactly
what the 12-Year Education Reform was designed to cope with. How well the capital
city reaches the goal of the 12-Year Education Reform serves as an index to the
performance of this reform. Regardless, Taipei’s policymakers seem to focus more on
complaints about justified envy than the goal of the reform.
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History has provided many examples of well-intended educational policies
creating adverse outcomes. One example is the cream-skimming effect observed in some
school voucher systems, in which better-performing students transfer to private schools,
leaving lower-performing students in public schools, which further lowers the quality of
the public schools and fails the purpose of school vouchers (Nechyba, 2003; Tabarrok,
2013; Walsh, 2009). Another example is the U.S. No Child Left Behind (NCLB) policy,
which was intended to improve student performance majorly by holding schools
accountable for having students achieve the proficient level of state assessment (WGBH
educational foundation, 2014). NCLB’s unintended consequences were identified and
commonly recognized before there was any consensus about its effect on school quality
and closing student achievement gap. NCLB’s side effects include: focusing only on
absolute scores without recognizing student’s achievement growth, evoking states to
lower their assessment standards, and driving schools and teachers to concentrate only on
high-stakes subject areas and short-term test-preparation skills (Berliner, 2009; Dee &
Jacob, 2011; Groff, 2013; Jennings & Sohn, 2014; Ladd & Lauen, 2010; Murnane &
Papay, 2010; The White House, 2014). Because of the unintended consequences, one
reform usually calls for another to fix them, such as the Every Student Succeeds Act
signed by President Obama to replace NCLB on December 10, 2015 (U.S. Department of
Education, n.d.).
South Korea’s High School Equalization Policy (HSEP) is another example.
Initially implemented in 1974 to reduce school inequality and shadow education, HSEP
randomly assigned students to high schools, whether public or private, (Byun, Kim, &
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Park, 2012). By comparing the socioeconomic statuses of high school students in the
HSEP and non-HSEP areas, Byun et al. (2012) concluded that HSEP had reached the
goal of reducing school inequality. However, the activities of shadow education (cram
schools) kept increasing in HSEP areas in comparison to non-HSEP areas (Byun et al.,
2012; C. J. Lee, H. Lee, & Jang, 2010). If the cost parents spent on cram schools is
considered, whether HSEP reduces educational inequality is still under debate (Lee et al.,
2010). In addition to its controversial effects, HSEP was criticized for depriving
students’ right to choose schools, restricting private schools’ autonomy, making teachers
hard to teach in mixed-ability classrooms, and lowering average student performance
(Byun et al., 2012). Therefore, some areas including Seoul have abolished or revised the
original HSEP, allowing more school choices and private school autonomy (Byun et al.,
2012).
The 12-Year Education Reform, NCLB, and HSEP are only some examples in the
large pool of the educational policies that received criticisms for their unintended effects
much earlier than their goal achievements could be confirmed. The effects of educational
policies depend on how students react to the policies. Inability to foresee and bring into
consideration of students’ heterogeneous reactions might be a common cause of those
unanticipated outcomes. The reductionist models commonly used to analyze the
educational policies, if the policies were ever analyzed, might also constrain researchers
and policymakers from exploring students’ heterogeneous behaviors and possible policy
outcomes emerging from students’ interactive behaviors. For tractability purpose,
reductionist models impose strict assumptions on agents, such as homogeneity and profit-
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maximization (Epstein, 1999; Macal & North, 2010). These restrictions make the
reductionist models, such as equation-based models, hard to deal with the issues in
human CASs, where macropatterns emerge from the interaction of the heterogeneous,
boundedly rational, adaptive agents between themselves and with the environment.
The policy implications of an admission mechanism design are complex because
the design involves anticipating how students will react to a new environment, and the
strategic behaviors of human beings are complicated (Roth, 2002). These complications
may prevent analyzing the design analytically, but computational simulations can
overcome these complications (Axtell, 2000; Roth 2002). Taipei’s policymakers claimed
that they had used the method of simulation to test their revised admission mechanism
based on students’ school-choice lists in the previous year (New Taipei City Government,
2015b). However, the result simulated in this way could hardly be used to understand the
potential macroimpacts of the new mechanism because students probably would submit
different school-choice lists under the new mechanism. When people change their
behaviors, they also change the structural relations in the environment (Lucas, 1976).
Therefore, as the Lucas critique states, if a new policy may cause a change in people’s
decision rules, it is inappropriate to predict the policy implications just based on historical
data (Lucas, 1976). Not using the proper method to design their new admission policies,
Taipei’s policymakers were accused by the parents of treating their children as
experimental subjects for the 12-year Education Reform (Center for Educational
Research and Evaluation, 2016).
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Problem Statement
Educational systems are CASs. The macroscopic effects of a school admission
policy, as well as many other educational policies, emerge from the behaviors and
interactions of the heterogeneous students and the policy. However, the methods used in
the mainstream educational policy analysis and Taipei’s new admission policy design
tend to ignore the impact of individual behaviors. Using the wrong methodology to make
educational policies may be one of the reasons why many policies, including Taiwan’s
12-Year Education Reform, produced unintended effects or failed to accomplish their
goals.
Many scholars contend that the better way, or even the only way, to study CASs
and their related policies is to build and run computer-based models and observe the
simulated aggregate results (Borrill & Tesfatsion, 2011; Holland, 2006). The computerbased modeling that many complex systems scholars advocate is ABM, because of its
capability to connect microbehaviors and macropatterns and its flexibility to run scenario
analysis (e.g., Borrill & Tesfatsion, 2011; Chen 2016; Chen et al., 2012; Duffy, 2006;
Epstein, 1999; Farmer & Foley, 2009). ABM is a bottom-up approach that generates
macropatterns by programming the behavioral and interaction rules of individual agents
and letting aggregate patterns grow through simulations (Axelrod, 1997; Chen et al.,
2011). Even if how agents will behave in a new environment is unknown or uncertain,
ABM is flexible to perform what-if analysis and investigate the possible best and worst
macroeffects of a new admission policy. Because of ABM’s advantages in studying
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CASs, Maroulis et al. (2010) urged researchers to apply ABM to educational policy
analysis to understand “not only what works but also how and why it works” (p. 39).
ABM has been extensively applied in many fields, particularly in economics,
management, and environmental studies (Chen et al., 2011). Unfortunately, up to today,
only a few agent-based models have been constructed to analyze macroeducational
policies (e.g., Harland & Heppenstall, 2012; Maroulis et al., 2014; Millington et al.,
2014). None has been applied to evaluate Taipei’s 2016 admission policies either. With
the advancement of the ABM technique and computing speed, it is time to solidify the
application of ABM to educational policy analysis and to explore the impact of Taipei’s
new admission policies on educational equality.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to answer Maroulis et al.’s (2010) call to contribute
to the complexity methodology for educational policy analysis. I built an agent-based
overlapping generations model to reflect the qualitative properties of Taipei’s senior high
school system. Although ABM is a quantitative methodology, I built an agent-based
model to explore and gain qualitative insights into the impacts of Taipei’s 2016
admission policies (the Taipei mechanism and the free-tuition policy) on the distributions
of educational opportunity and school quality. I also compared the results with those
under the following four prevalent student-assignment mechanisms: serial dictatorship,
deferred acceptance, the Boston mechanism, and the Chinese parallel mechanism. I
simulated the policy effects under different assumptions of students’ school-choice
strategies and the number of school choices a student is allow to make. A total of 60
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scenarios, described in Chapter 3, were simulated under each student-assignment
mechanism.
Research Questions
To have an in-depth understanding of the equality effect of Taipei’s 2016
admission policies, I collected and analyzed the simulated data to answer the following
research questions:
•

Does the Taipei mechanism help equalize educational opportunities?

•

Does the Taipei mechanism help school qualities converge upward?

•

Does the Taipei mechanism, combined with the free-tuition policy, help
equalize educational opportunities?

•

Does the Taipei mechanism, combined with the free-tuition policy, help
school qualities converge upward?
Theoretical Framework

The theories underpinning ABM are complex adaptive systems (or complexity
theory) and Wolfram’s (2002) theory of computational irreducibility. Complex adaptive
system is a term to describe not only a kind of system but also a paradigm to study this
kind of system, although there is still no universal definition of CAS. Holland (1992)
argued that a CAS has three characteristics: (a) evolution through adaptation, (b)
emergence of aggregate behavior, and (c) agents’ abilities to anticipate. Epstein (1999)
posited that the agents in a CAS have the following features: heterogeneity, autonomy,
explicit space, local interactions, and bounded rationality. From their descriptions, a
CAS can be described as a system comprising heterogeneous, autonomous, adaptive, self-
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organizing, boundedly rational agents, through whose interactions with each other and
their environment the system’s aggregate properties emerge (Epstein, 1999; Holland,
1992).
The most salient characteristics of CASs are emergence and adaptation.
Emergence implies that the aggregate behaviors are different from the components’
behaviors, and thus aggregate behaviors are not simply the sum of the parts (Archer &
Smeins, 1991). Adaptation means changing to fit the environment; adaptation makes a
CAS continuously evolve and rarely stay in a constant state (Holland, 1992; Keshavarz,
Nutbeam, Rowling, & Khavarpour, 2010). With these two features, CASs are
categorized as Wolfram’s (2002) Class 4 systems, which are computationally irreducible
(Borrill & Tesfatsion, 2011; Crockett, 1993; Darley, 1994). Wolfram (2002) posited that
a system or program is computationally irreducible when the only way to know its future
state is to simulate its evolution step by step, and this computational work cannot be
reduced by using any set of equations. The conventional reductionist paradigm or
equation-based models cannot study the features of CASs easily (Heusser, Scheffer,
Neumann, Tauschel, & Edelhäuser, 2012). Therefore, Borrill and Tesfatsion (2011)
argued that computer modeling, particularly ABM, is the only way to understand CASs.
An educational system consists of subsystems of nested hierarchies, including
schools, classrooms, educators, administrators, teachers, students, and parents (Keshavarz
et al., 2010). Its subsystems are autonomous, heterogeneous, adaptive, and selforganizing, even though some of their activities are subject to governmental regulations
(Burns & Knox, 2011; Keshavarz et al., 2010). Its aggregate properties, such as
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admission distribution and school quality, emerge from the interactions among its
subsystems. Therefore, educational systems are CASs. Research on educational systems
requires complexity methodologies. ABM is the right approach to understanding the
emergent properties of educational systems (Maroulis et al. 2010). The aim of this study
was to join the pioneering work of applying ABM to exploring the mesoscopic and
macroscopic impacts of Taipei’s new admission policies on Taipei’s senior high school
system.
Nature of Study
The purpose of this exploratory study was to understand qualitatively how school
admission policies would affect educational opportunity and school quality in the Taipei
School District from a CAS perspective. Although agent-based simulation per se is a
quantitative research, the parameters in this agent-based model were not calibrated to the
real data. Therefore, this study was exploratory. The simulated outcomes provide
qualitative, rather than quantitative, insights into the properties of Taipei’s 2016
admission policies.
Educational opportunity has been measured by the proxies of either educational
resources or the efficacy of the resources since the Coleman Report (Coleman et al.,
1966). The proxy for school quality used in most studies is either school resource or
student performance (Ladd & Loeb, 2013). Therefore, studies related to educational
opportunity and school quality largely call for quantitative research designs. The
classical quantitative methodology used for this type of macroeducational policy analysis
is equation-based modeling or statistical regressions, which cannot easily study CASs’
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properties of emergence and adaptation (Chen, 2015). On the other hand, ABM, a
quantitative computational approach, allows researchers to program the behaviors of
individual agents and let the macrophenomena emerge through the interaction of the
agents. This simulation methodology not only addresses CASs’ properties but also
shows the linkage between microbehaviors and macrophenomena (Chen, 2015; Epstein,
1999; Macal & North, 2010).
Educational opportunity and school quality are aggregate properties emerging
from the interactions of the hierarchical agents in a complex educational system. ABM
can be used to explore the dynamics of the distributions of educational opportunity and
school quality under different behavioral assumptions. ABM’s ability to perform
simulations of behavioral scenarios is essential in analyzing the design of a new
educational policy that involves anticipating agents’ behaviors in a new environment,
such as the Taipei mechanism. The reason is that how students will react to a new policy
is usually unknown. Although human-subject experiments can help acquire behavioral
knowledge, experimentation is often constrained due to factors like cost, time, space,
human fatigue, and ethical issues (Chen, 2015; Roth, 2002). New admission policies,
such as the reformed Taipei admission policies, often fall into this difficult-to-experiment
category and involve many significant uncertainties. In this situation, a methodology
easy to perform behavioral scenario analysis is critical (Hedstrom & Ylikoski, 2010).
Therefore, ABM is the right methodology to conduct this exploratory research and to
investigate the possible impacts of Taipei’s 2016 admission policies in the complex
Taipei School District.
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In this study, I built an agent-based overlapping generations model to simulate
and explore the outcomes of Taipei’s 2016 admission policies (the Taipei mechanism and
the free tuition policy) under different assumptions of student behaviors and admission
mechanism designs. There are three types of entities (students, schools, and the
governmental authority) and two neighborhoods with different average incomes in the
model. The submodel of matching process contains five matching mechanisms,
including the Taipei mechanism. In each simulation, student agents were assigned to
schools through the matching process, and the scores of the admitted students were
updated by a formula reflecting the effect of peer networks. During the simulations of
300 combinations of student behavioral rules and policy settings, the program
automatically collected the simulated data representing educational opportunity and
school quality. I then analyzed and compared the collected data by using descriptive
statistics and paired samples t-tests to answer the research questions.
Definitions
Agent-based modeling (ABM): is a bottom-up simulation approach characterized
by modeling the behavioral and interaction rules of a system’s constituents and letting the
collective phenomena of interests emerge through simulations (Axelrod, 2005; Gilbert,
2004; Macal & North; 2010).
Complex adaptive system (CAS): refers to a system consisting of heterogeneous,
autonomous, adaptive agents, through whose interactions with each other and their
environment complex systemic properties that are different from those of the agents
emerge (Epstain, 1999; Gell-Mann, 1994; Holland, 1992).
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Computational irreducibility: is a concept claimed by Stephen Wolfram (2002),
which mainly states that there are computationally irreducible questions in nature and in
human societies that cannot be answered by any mathematical shortcut but by simulating
the evolution of the system step by step.
Deferred acceptance: refers to the student-proposing deferred acceptance
mechanism first discussed in the literature of school choice by Abdulkadiroglu and
Sonmez (2003), which is a version of deferred acceptance originally designed by Gale
and Shapley (1962). The section of matching mechanism in Chapter 2 describes the
algorithm of this mechanism in detail.
Equality of educational opportunity: is defined from the input point of view as
that all junior high school graduates have the same opportunity to attend each of the
senior high schools in an educational system, regardless of their family income. This
definition is in line with the policy intention of Taiwan’s 12-Year Education Reform
(Ministry of Education, 2013).
Equality of school quality: is defined from the output point of view as equal
seniors’ mean scores across all schools (Ladd & Loeb, 2013).
Exploratory modeling: is to model a system and perform computational
experiments on the model under various assumptions and hypotheses to explore the
implications of research questions (Bankes, 1993). Exploratory modeling allows
researchers to conduct research through computational simulations without waiting for
the collection of all facts.
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Principle of maximum entropy: is a technique to select a probability density
distribution that does not imply any assumptions while satisfying all of the limited known
information (Penfield, 2014). Given the mean and the standard deviation, the distribution
selected under the principle of maximum entropy is normal distribution (Garrett &
Fisher, 1992).
Risk aversion level: refers to the extent to which a student will make a schoolchoice strategy to prevent the worst eventuality (Klijn, Pais, & Vorsatz, 2010).
Serial dictatorship: is a matching mechanism, in the context of school choice, that
allows students, in the sequence of their priorities, to choose their schools. Under this
mechanism, a student is assigned to his or her top choice of schools that still have seats
before students who have lower priority than this student are assigned (Pathak, 2011).
The Boston mechanism: refers to the centralized admission mechanism used by
the Boston School District to assign students to schools before 2005 (Abdulkadiroglu,
Pathak, Roth, Sonmez, 2005). The process of this mechanism is described in the section
of matching mechanism in Chapter 2.
The Chinese parallel mechanism: is the admission mechanism used in some
Chinese provinces and municipalities to assign students to universities. The section of
matching mechanism in Chapter 2 describes the algorithm of this mechanism in detail.
The free-tuition policy: refers to Taiwan’s new education policy that provides free
tuition to students enrolled in senior high schools, whether the school is public or private
(Ministry of Education, 2013).
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The Taipei mechanism: is the centralized admission mechanism used by the
Taipei Senior High School District in 2016 to match its students and schools (New Taipei
City Government, 2015b). See the section of matching mechanism in Chapter 2 for the
operational details of this mechanism.
Assumptions
Analysis for a new policy often involves significant uncertainties simply because
the society never experiences the policy. Thus, a model for such analysis unavoidably
has an exploratory nature and contains various assumptions and hypotheses (Bankes,
1993). I made the assumptions in this exploratory agent-based overlapping generations
model by reference to the literature and my observations in the Taipei School District and
summarize the significant assumptions underpinning the model below. The section of
model description in Chapter 3 provides a more detailed explanation of the model
assumptions.
In generating student agents’ school preferences, I assumed that student agents
had moderately to highly correlated school preferences for higher ranked schools. Chang
(2011) found that all students in Taiwan prefer higher quality schools to lower quality
schools; however, when low-quality schools are considered, distance is relatively more
important than quality. Most Taiwan students use publicly recognized school ranks as
the index for school quality (Chang, 2011; Lu, 2012; Shao, 2015; Yan, 2015). Therefore,
I assumed that student agents had moderately to highly correlated school preferences for
higher ranked schools and preferred nearby lower ranked schools to far-away lower
ranked schools. As to financial subsidy, only low-income students consider it an
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influential factor in making their school choice decisions (Chang, 2011). Therefore, I
further assumed that without the free-tuition policy, students with bottom 50% family
income would not choose fee-paying private schools.
Studies have found that students do not always report their school preferences as
their school choices; instead, students use strategies in response to the admission
mechanism to make their choices, aiming at improving their chances of attending more
preferred schools (Chen, Jiang, & Kesten, 2015; Pathak, 2011). In Taiwan, a commonly
advised strategy found on the internet states the following: (a) Students should refer to
each school’s past admission information, in comparison with their own scores or ranks,
to form the list of possible schools; (b) students should choose their schools from their
lists of possible schools; (c) students should arrange the order of the selected schools in a
way that they are confident to be admitted to a preferred school while gambling for the
admission to a more preferred school (e.g., Sun, 2015; Zhang & Wang, 2015). Similar
advice is also circulated in mainland China (e.g., H. Wang, 2015; R. Wang, 2015; Song,
2015). I designed two behavioral strategies founded on the above advice for the student
agents in the model to generate their school-choice lists. In this internet era, it is very
likely that admission candidates all learn about the popular strategy and use it in their
school-choice decision making. Therefore, when the two school-choice strategies were
simulated, I assumed that all student agents used the same strategy. For comparison
purpose, I also run simulations under the assumption that student agents used
heterogeneous strategies to make their school choices.
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By applying the central limit theorem, I assumed that students’ performances
were normally distributed. I also assumed that a high-performing student usually
performed well in all subjects and vice versa. The literature shows that the students’
performances in Taiwan are positively correlated with their incomes, and the income of
Taiwan follows a lognormal distribution (Chou & Wang, 2012; Hojo & Oshio, 2012;
Pinkovskiy & Sala-i-Martin, 2009). Therefore, I assumed that new admission candidates’
log family incomes and scores formed a multivariate normal distribution and could be
randomly generated from this distribution.
In generating students’ high school scores, I assumed that students’
socioeconomic statuses and personal factors remained the same throughout their high
school years and that the peer effect was the only factor that influences students’ scores
in high schools. Since the 1966 Coleman report, numerous studies have shown that once
students’ socioeconomic statuses are controlled, schools contribute little to the
explanation of the difference in student performance, although school factors, mainly the
composition of peers, do have different effects on different groups of students (e.g.,
Coleman et al., 1966; Burke & Sass, 2013; Jennings, Deming, Jencks, Lopuch, &
Schueler, 2015; Hojo & Oshio, 2012). However, it is not clear in the literature how
students are affected by their peers. Salgado, Marchione, and Gilbert (2014) argued that
peer effect emerges when students learn from their friends in the network formed by the
students and their peers. Salgado et al. (2014) assumed that socioeconomic status,
gender, and performance were the factors that determine whether a network would be
formed and found that most students have high tolerance toward performance difference,
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but different groups might have different levels of tolerance toward gender and
socioeconomic status. By reference to Salgado et al.’s study, I assumed that only the
scores of the high school students whose family incomes were within the tolerance level
of their peers would be influenced by the performance of their peers.
Scope and Delimitations
The purpose of this study was to contribute to the development of ABM in
educational policy analysis. The agent-based model constructed in this study focuses on
the centralized admission processes in school-choice systems and the designs of students’
decision rules which includes the consideration of students’ geographical and
socioeconomic differences. I used this model to explore the possible distribution results
emerging from the Taipei mechanism and the free tuition policy under different
behavioral assumptions. Since many the real data were not available, this study was
exploratory in nature. The input parameters and simulated outcomes were not calibrated
with real data.
I followed the prominent KISS (keep it simple, stupid) principle in the social
simulation field to construct this model. Under this principle, a model should be kept as
simple as possible; more complexity is added to the model only if required (Axelrod,
1997; Barth, Meyer, Spitzner, 2012). This principle helps researchers to understand
every element added into the model, which in turn helps researchers to analyze a
surprising emergence observed in the simulations (Axelrod, 1997). This principle also
helps other researchers to extend the model in a new direction (Axelrod, 1997). As a
result, this model only has two levels of hierarchy (schools and students). Therefore, it
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could not replicate the process of peer effect modeled by Salgado et al. (2014), which
needs the network structures in the level of classrooms. Nevertheless, this model design
was enough to show the qualitative influence of peer effect on high school scores.
Neither did this model contain other school-level factors that might affect high school
scores as argued by some scholars, such as teacher quality (e.g., Burke & Sass, 2013).
I set the values of the parameters in this model to represent qualitatively the
environment and culture of the Taipei School District, where students compete for highly
ranked schools. In CASs, different initial conditions often result in different patterns of
system evolutions (Borrill & Tesfatsion, 2011). Therefore, the simulation results of this
study could not be generalized to other educational systems with different cultures.
Limitations
ABM is a bottom-up approach, which starts with the design of individual agents’
behavioral rules and let global patterns emerge from agents’ interactions. This approach
relaxes the assumptions needed in most top-down approaches, such as fixed
macrostructures, rationality, optimization, and homogeneity (Epstein, 1999; Macal &
North, 2010). However, researchers usually have less microinformation needed for an
agent-based model than macroinformation needed for a top-down model. Consequently,
microspecifications must be hypothesized to construct an agent-based model. In this
model, I inferred agents’ school-choice strategies from the literature and my observation
in the Taipei School District. Without the support of experimental or empirical evidence,
the behavioral strategies designed in this model remain as candidate explanations for the
simulated macropatterns, even if these simulated macropatterns can correspond to real
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data collected in the future. The causal relationship between the hypothesized
microspecification and the emergent macrostructure cannot be established simply
because the microspecification can generate the macrostructure because other
microspecifications may also have the same explanatory power (Epstein, 1999).
Nevertheless, if the simulated macropatterns match the data, then the behavioral rules
programmed in this model serve as a reasonable causation hypothesis and can guide
empirical data collection (Bankes, 1993; Epstein, 2008). If otherwise, then this study
provides the information that this particular set of behavioral rules may not be a good
hypothesis for future empirical research. Therefore, with the flexibility to perform whatif analysis, an exploratory agent-based model like the one in this study can reveal
possible outcomes based on what we know and help make an informed policy decision,
even if it cannot predict the exact quantitative results of a new policy.
Significance of Study
Most models for macroeducational policy analysis are equation-based. Equationbased models are weak in explaining the relations between microlevel behaviors and
macrolevel patterns. However, the global effects of educational policies often depend on
students’ reactions. To know the micro-macro relations is essential in educational policy
analysis because the effects of those policies often depend on how students react to the
policies. Educational research needs an alternative tool to provide information about the
micro-macro relations, and ABM is the right approach for this need (Maroulis et al., 2010;
McClelland, 2014). Unfortunately, ABM is still new in the field of educational research.
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Few agent-based models have been built for educational policy analysis. The model in
this study enriches the application of ABM to educational policy analysis.
This model was the first agent-based model to qualitatively represent the
environment of the Taipei School District, including the operational details of its 2016
admission mechanism (the Taipei mechanism) and the free tuition policy. This model
was also one of the pioneering agent-based overlapping generations (OLG) school-choice
models to simultaneously observe students’ school-choice behaviors and
macroeducational phenomena under various real-world matching mechanisms. OLG
design is necessary when older generations’ behaviors affect the overlapping younger
generations’ decision making. In many educational systems, like the one in Taipei, older
students’ performances affect the reputations and rankings of the schools, which in turn
affects younger generations’ school preferences and school choices (Allen & Burgess,
2013; Lu, 2012; MacLeod & Urquiola, 2012). Therefore, to include the OLG design is
essential to study the effects of admission policies in these educational systems, whether
the effects of interest are microscopic, mesoscopic, or macroscopic.
Most simulation models for school choice research have the assumptions that
students always report their school preferences as their school choices without adapting
to the change in matching mechanism. However, literature has shown that students use
strategies to make their school choices, which may not be the same as their school
preferences (Chen et al., 2015; Pathak, 2011). To model students’ strategical behaviors,
researchers must distinguish students’ school preferences from students’ school choices.
Chen, Wang, and Chen (2017) were the first to make this attempt. However, in their
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model, student agents’ only consideration is score. I significantly expanded Chen et al.’s
(2017) design of students’ preferences and school-choice strategies by including the
consideration of distance and family income, which is in line with the findings in
literature and observations. This more realistic design of student preferences and
strategies helps explore the possible outcomes of the Taipei mechanism, especially when
there are still no empirical data to know its consequences. The model description in
Chapter 3 states in detail all assumptions, uncertainties, and calculations in this model,
which helps other researchers to replicate the simulation results or run further scenario
analysis under their perceived reasonable assumptions. Therefore, this model provides
not only the right tool for the analysis of Taipei’s admission policies but also a platform
for rigorous discussions on these policies.
Summary
Educational systems are CASs, where aggregate patterns emerge from the
interactions of individual agents. When the effect of an educational policy depends on
how students behave in a new environment, it is essential for policymakers to understand
the relation between macrophenomena and microbehaviors. However, the classical tools
used to analyze macroeducational policies, such as equation-based modeling, cannot
easily link macropatterns with microbehaviors. These classical models also were built
upon the assumption of fixed system structures, violating the Lucas critique (Lucas,
1976). Using the wrong tools may be one of the reasons why there are full of cases
where educational policies produced unexpected and undesired consequences.
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Education researchers need new tools to analyze policies in complex educational
systems. The complexity tool advocated by many CAS scholars is ABM, a bottom-up
simulation approach that generates global patterns by simulating the interactions of
individual agents (Farmer & Foley, 2009; Holland, 2006; Borrill & Tesfatsion, 2011).
ABM allows researchers to understand not only the micro-macro connection but also the
dynamic evolution of a system. ABM is also flexible to perform scenario analysis, which
is of particular importance when how people will react to a new policy is uncertain or
unknown (Roth, 2002; Schieritz & Milling, 2003). However, ABM is still new in the
field of education research. Only a few models have been built to analyze
macroeducational policies. Therefore, the purpose of the agent-based OLG model in this
study was to contribute to the development of ABM in educational policy analysis. Since
I built this model to represent the qualitative aspects of the Taipei School District, this
study also helps to understand qualitatively how Taipei’s new high school admission
policies affect the distribution of educational opportunity and school quality, in
comparison to other prevalent matching mechanisms.
Having evoked great objections, Taipei’s high school admission mechanism,
which was a part of Taiwan’s 12-Year Education Reform, has been modified twice since
its inauguration in 2014. The policymakers claimed that they had simulated their 2016
student-assigning mechanism (the Taipei mechanism) in their decision-making process.
However, they used students’ school-choice lists in the previous year to run the
simulation, ignoring the Lucas critique. Furthermore, the government did not analyze the
possible effects of the new mechanism on students in different performing and income
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quartiles, unable to know whether the new revision would reach or deviate from the
Reform’s goal of enhancing the equalities of educational opportunity and school quality.
The simulation results help Taipei’s policymakers and stakeholder to have a better
understanding of the possible effects of Taipei’s new admission policies on students in
different income and performing groups. Therefore, this study facilitates inclusive and
informative public dialogues on Taipei’s admission policies.
The next chapter contains a comprehensive literature review. It starts with a
review of the theoretical framework of ABM, followed by a discussion of the concepts
and measures of equality of educational opportunity and equality of school quality. A
large part of Chapter 2 is devoted to a thorough review of commonly used matching
mechanisms in school admission processes. The chapter concludes with a discussion of
the current development of ABM in the field of educational research.

29
Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
ABM is a computational approach to modeling a system composed of
autonomous agents and to studying the aggregate patterns emerging from agents’
interactive behaviors. This approach is an attempt to respond to traditional
methodologies’ inadequacy to deal with CASs (Gilbert, 2004; Tesfatsion, 2003). The
origin of ABM can be traced to cellular automata of John von Neumann and Stanislaw
Ulam in the 1950s (Chen, 2012). A cellular automaton is a theoretical self-reproducing
machine that consists of “cells” as its building blocks (Chen, 2012; “John von
Neumann's,” 2010). The states of the cells will change according to the previous states of
their neighboring cells under predetermined rules; the dynamics of the cellular automaton
exhibited by the cells’ state changes are similar to the self-reproduction or evolution
process of life (“John von Neumann's,” 2010). The concept of cellular automata is
fundamental in the fields of artificial intelligence and artificial life (Chen, 2012; “John
von Neumann's,” 2010). The expansion of ABM did not take off until the rapid growth
of computational power in the 1990s (Gilbert, 2004). A growing number of disciplines
have now adopted ABM to study complexity problems (Chen et al., 2011). Nevertheless,
it is still new to most educational policymakers and researchers and has rarely been
applied in educational policy research. Therefore, this chapter begins with a review of
the concepts underpinning ABM, followed by the general structure of an agent-based
model and a brief comparison between ABM and equation-based modeling.
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ABM is used to construct autonomous agents and their environment, followed by
simulating the interactions of the agents and letting macrolevel phenomena emerge
(Axelrod, 2005; Gilbert, 2004; Macal & North; 2010). This bottom-up simulation
methodology naturally integrates knowledge regarding individual behaviors and
macrostructures (Maroulis et al., 2010). Modelers must review the knowledge on both
micro- and macrolevels to construct a sensible model and draw meaningful insights from
the simulation results. In this study, I built an agent-based OLG model to explore the
systemic impacts of school admission policies on educational opportunity and school
quality. Therefore, this chapter continues with a review of two strands of the literature in
education: (a) educational equality and school quality, and (b) school choices and
admission mechanisms. A review of the former defines and operationalizes the
measurement of the macrophenomena that I focused on in this study while a review of
the latter helps to construct agents’ behaviors and the matching mechanisms that I used in
the model of this study.
Many studies have used equation-based models to investigate the impacts of
school choices on educational equality and school quality. A review of their mixed
findings provides a foundation for how to discuss the ways in which ABM can
complement a study on aggregate effects of education policies. A handful of attempts
has been made to apply ABM to explore the linkages between students’ behaviors and the
admission results in school-choice systems (e.g., Chen et al., 2017; Harland &
Heppenstall, 2012; Maroulis et al., 2014; Millington et al., 2014; Wang, Chie, & Chen,
2017). These agent-based educational models are relatively simple in comparison to the
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agent-based models in other fields, such as economics and finance. However, they serve
as the stepping stones to construct a comprehensive agent-based educational model that is
general enough for theoretical and exploratory discussions and flexible enough for
research on a specific educational system. This study is an additional stepping stone for
such a model. Therefore, a review of the extant agent-based educational models is
necessary to understand what these pioneering models have accomplished. The review
also concludes this chapter.
Literature Search Strategy
With the development of information technology in recent years, a literature
search is no longer limited to certain databases or libraries. Google Scholar now
consolidates almost all library databases in the whole world and provides direct links to
the articles in the libraries that the users have access to. Many articles are free through
Google Scholar. All the references in this chapter were collected through Google Scholar
and downloaded either directly from Google Scholar or from the libraries of Walden
University and National Chengchi University. Some articles related to Taiwan’s
education systems cited in this chapter are written in Chinese.
The original keywords used to search articles were complex adaptive systems,
computational irreducibility, agent-based, equation-based modeling, system dynamics,
general equilibrium, educational equality, educational inequality, school quality, school
choice, matching mechanism, and any combination of the above keywords. I also used
the snowball strategy to extend the search by reviewing the references in the articles
found from the above keyword search.
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As to the literature related to ABM, I did not limit the search to any specific
timeframe so that I could have a thorough understanding of ABM’s history and its
underpinning concepts. I also conducted an exhaustive search for all extant agent-based
school-choice models because these models were the ground on which I built this model.
As to the two strands of the literature on education mentioned in the previous section, I
focused on articles published in or after 2010, but the review includes some seminal
works in these fields, such as the initial argument about school choice made by Friedman
(1955) and the first discussion of school matching mechanism by Abdulkadiroglu and
Sonmez (2003).
Complex Adaptive System and Computational Irreducibility
ABM is grounded in the concept of complex adaptive system (Macal & North,
2010). The term complex adaptive system describes not only a kind of system but also a
new paradigm of thinking versus the conventional reductionist paradigm (Dodder &
Dare, 2000). Reductionists reduce a phenomenon into parts and focus on the analysis of
the parts, holding the view that the whole is equal to the sum of the parts and the whole
can be understood by understanding the working of its parts (Green, 2001; Holland,
2006). Researchers with the view of CASs challenge reductionist thinking by claiming
that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts because CASs have emergent global
macroscopic properties that are different from the properties of the components (Archer
& Smeins, 1991). Emergent properties can be seen only when the systems are studied as
a whole (Archer & Smeins, 1991). The advocates of CASs have provided myriad
examples of emergent properties in nature and in human societies to support their views,
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including the immune system’s ability to distinguish self from intruders, the formation of
a supply network in an economy, swarm intelligence of ant colonies, and school health
conditions (e.g., Holland, 1992; Keshavarz et al., 2010; Zimmerman, Lindberg, & Plsek,
1998).
CASs became a paradigm during the 1980s with the establishment of the Santa Fe
Institute in New Mexico, in the United States. The Santa Fe Institute was founded and
joined by many key figures in this new thinking, including George Cowan, Nobel
laureate Murray Gell-Mann, Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow, and John H. Holland
(Dodder & Dare, 2000). It has been playing a leading role in developing an
interdisciplinary platform and modeling methodologies to discuss problems in CASs
(Dodder & Dare, 2000; Santa Fe Institute, 2014). This new paradigm has now been
adopted by many researchers in various disciplines, including economics, epidemiology,
management, technology, and ecology (Bale, Varga, & Foxon, 2015; Levin et al., 2013).
However, there still has not been a universal term or definition for CASs (Keshavarz et
al., 2010). Some researchers use the term “complexity theory” to mean CASs, and some
use both terms interchangeably (The Health Foundation, 2010). As to the definition,
while Holland (2006) defined CASs as “systems that have a large numbers of
components, often called agents, that interact and adapt or learn” (p. 1), Nobel laureate
Murray Gell-Mann referred to the “agents” in Holland’s definition as CASs (Gell-Mann,
1994). This discrepancy in definition may be because CASs usually have a nested
hierarchy; that is, a system’s components (the agents) are themselves smaller-scaled
CASs (Keshavarz et al., 2010; Pathak, Day, Nair, Sawaya, & Kristal, 2007). In this
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study, I adopted Holland’s definition because it is now adopted by the majority of the
ABM society.
Characteristics of Complex Adaptive Systems
Although researchers in the field of CASs may have different opinions about the
terminology and the precise definition of such systems, they seem to agree that the most
distinguishing characteristics of CASs are emergence and adaptation. In CASs,
macroscopic, or collective, properties emerge from the simultaneous and parallel
interactions of more primitive parts with each other and with their environment (Choi,
Dooley, & Rungtusanatham, 2011; Damper, 2000; Holland, 1992, 2006; Levin et al.,
2013). The constituents in a CAS are mostly heterogeneous; an example is human
beings. Even if the massive heterogeneous individuals all follow a few simple behavioral
rules, or schemata as termed by Gell-Mann (1994), their interactions typically still form
nonlinear aggregate patterns and thus make the system complex (Choi et al., 2011).
Emergent properties, or emergent system behaviors, do not follow individual
agents’ behaviors (Newman, 2011). Emergent properties cannot be predicted simply
from the knowledge about the individual agents; they are irreducible to the sum of the
properties of the constituents (E. P. Odum, H. T. Odum, & Andrews, 1971). The whole
is more than the sum of the parts (Hiance, Doogan, Warren, Hamilton, & Lewis, 2012).
Birth rate, for example, is not an emergent property because it is just the
summation of individual births in a period expressed in the percentage format (Odum et
al., 1971). On the other hand, wealth inequality observed in many free economies is an
emergent property. This macrophenomenon emerges from individuals’ self-interested
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economic activities; it cannot be investigated only by studying individuals’ economic
behaviors. Another example is a stock market crash, which is a nonlinear property
emerging from the interactions of heterogeneous stock market players, who typically
pursue their own maximum profits (Levin et al., 2013). Emergence results from the
interactions of the self-organized constituent entities in the system without any central
control. Because of this nonlinear, irreducible, emergent feature, it is not easy to use
equations derived from the conventional reductionist thinking to study CASs (Heusser et
al., 2012). Therefore, researchers have explored new approaches, such as simulation
modeling, to deal with the emergent properties of CASs (Cioffi-Revilla, 2013).
The second distinguishing feature of CASs is agents’ abilities to adapt to the
problems and changes in their environments (Holland, 1992). All complex systems show
the feature of emergence while CASs show not only the characteristic of emergence but
also the characteristic of adaptation (Newman, 2011). Some examples of adaptation in
social CASs are children adapting to school lives, parents adapting to new job
requirements, and firms adapting to technological changes.
Adaptation involves the concepts of fitness and anticipation (Holland, 1992;
Newman, 2011). Agents anticipate the consequences of their reaction options in
comparison to competitions and choose the best available behavioral rules or strategies
that help them fit the changes in their environments (Holland, 1992; Newman, 2011).
The process of adaptations can be briefly described as follows: (a) agents store their
input-output experiences where inputs are their behaviors and outputs are the results of
these behaviors; (b) from their input-output experiences, agents identify perceived
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patterns or regularities; (c) agents compress these perceived patterns to form schemata for
actions; and (d) after receiving feedbacks regarding the outcomes of the schemata, agents
replace some schemata with new ones or enhance the standings of some schemata with
respect to other competitive ones (Arthur, 1994; Gell-Mann, 1994). Adaptation in social
CASs is a continuous process because agents’ interactions change the environment,
which in turn causes agents to adapt to fit the environmental changes (Keshavarz et al.,
2010).
In social CASs, adaptation by no means implies that agents always have complete
knowledge or information to choose the strategies that can maximize their interests as
assumed in classical economics (the Homo Economicus assumption); instead, agents
mostly act with bounded rationality (Arthur, 1994; Heckbert et al., 2010). There are
several reasons that agents cannot exercise perfect rationality in CASs: (a) human
rationality can cope with complexity only to a certain level; (b) agents have no way to
know but guess other agents’ actions in the interactive situations which agents frequently
encounter; and (c) to acquire complete information to make unboundedly rational
decision is costly, while less-expensive heuristics often provides adequate solutions
(Arthur, 1994; Conlisk, 1996). Since adaptation is mostly made with bounded rationality,
it can succeed or fail. Cioffi-Revilla (2014) argued that a successful adaptation needs to
go through a series of processes: (a) the agents are aware of the need to adapt, (b) the
agents have the intent to adapt, (c) the agents have the capacity to adapt, and (d) the
agents can overcome various challenges to implement the adaptation. Since agents in
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CASs are heterogeneous and autonomous, their adaptation decisions and results are also
heterogeneous (Epstein, 1999; Heckbert et al., 2010).
Because of the continuous adaptation of the agents and continuous emergence of
global phenomena, CASs can hardly reach the state of optimality, if optimality can even
be defined for CASs (Holland, 1992). Sometimes, a CAS may seem to stay at local
optima, but the stays are usually only temporary for live systems (Holland, 1992).
Morrison (2008) explained that “Change, disequilibrium and unpredictability are
requirements for survival: a butterfly that flies only in a straight line is soon eaten.” (p.
20). However, classical equation-based computational models, such as computable
general equilibrium models, concentrate on optimal fixed points and assume
representative agents. These models do not seem to be very useful to deal with CASs.
Instead, ABM, by allowing agents to self-organize their activities, is a better candidate
when heterogeneity, bounded rationality, and adaptation are involved (Heckbert et al.,
2010; Epstein & Axtell, 1996; Lansing, 2002).
Computational Irreducibility
Computational irreducibility is a concept claimed by Stephen Wolfram (2002),
who argued that there are computationally irreducible questions in nature and in human
societies that cannot be answered by any mathematical shortcut but must be analyzed by
simulating the system directly (Wolfram, 2002). From the study of cellular automata,
Wolfram concluded that systems could be categorized into four classes. Class 1 systems
refer to systems that will always have the same fixed or repetitive final patterns
regardless of their initial settings. Class 2 systems grow into several different final states,
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depending on their initial settings, but these states all appear to have either repetitive
patterns or nested structures. Class 3 systems produce random or chaotic final states, and
their initial conditions have long-lasting effects on the evolutions of the systems. Class 4
systems are systems between order and chaos.
In Class 4 systems, the cells organize themselves to form localized structures that
move around and sometimes interact with each other to form a cascade of new
complicated patterns. In the transition between patterns, the systems seem to be in
chaotic states but far from chaos. Waldrop (1993) named this state “edge of chaos”.
Cioffi-Revilla (2014) described Class 1 to Class 4 cellular automata as stable, oscillating,
chaotic, and complex, respectively. While mathematical equations (computational
shortcuts) can be used to describe the behaviors of Class 1 and Class 2 cellular automata,
Wolfram claimed that systems belonging to Class 3 and Class 4 are computationally
irreducible. There is no way to know the future states of Class 3 and Class 4 systems
with any computational shortcuts; the only way is “to simulate each step in their
evolutions explicitly” (Wolfram, 1988, p. 187). Figures 1 shows the graphical examples
of the four classes.
Cellular automata contain some popular models that demonstrate the emergence
of complex macrolevel patterns from microlevel interactions of agents who follow simple
behavioral rules (Chen, 2012). These popular models are used by social scientists to
describe the properties of CASs (Chen, 2012). Like Wolfram’s Class 4 systems, the
patterns in social CASs expand, contract, suddenly collapse, and transform into new
patterns. With this concept in mind, it is not surprising to see some large companies
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suddenly suffer enormous loss, or some ancient nations fell apart abruptly (Crockett,
1993). Because social CASs have the characteristics as shown in Class 4 cellular
automata, many researchers concluded that social CASs are computationally irreducible
(Borrill & Tesfatsion, 2011; Corckett, 1993). The traditional models using differential or
difference equations can hardly find out how these systems behave and evolve. The only
way to solve the problems in CASs is to use computational simulations, preferably ABM,
to compute every step of the systems’ possible evolutions (Borrill & Tesfatsion, 2011).

Figure 1. Graphical example of each class of cellular automata. This figure is adopted
from Wolfram, 2002, p. 231.
Educational Complex Adaptive Systems
Education systems involve learning, pedagogical strategies, resource allocations,
and interactions between and within all levels of hierarchy from policymakers, school
administrators, teachers, to students and parents. Education systems are CASs
comprising nested CASs (Burns & Knox, 2011; Groff, 2013). A school district has
schools as its subsystems while each school has classrooms as its subsystems;
meanwhile, school districts, schools, and classrooms are all CASs (Burns & Knox, 2011).
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Take schools as an example. A school is composed of administrators, teachers, students,
and their parents, all of whom are of different properties and constantly interact with each
other. The constituents of a school are autonomous even though laws, culture, and ethos
strongly affect their actions (Keshavarz et al., 2010). In addition to autonomy, schools
exhibit the characteristics of CASs: learning, adaptation, and emergence (Keshavarz et
al., 2010).
The ethos of a school is an example of an emergent phenomenon. It emerges
from the intertwining effects of many factors including principal’s leadership style,
teachers’ morale, student’s learning environment, parent’s participation, and so on
(Mason, 2008). To change the negative ethos of a school, it is often not enough to
implement just one intervention but interventions at many levels, including a job policy
to improve students’ family incomes, a school leadership reform to stimulate teachers’
commitment, a curriculum transformation project, a plan to develop a more efficient
learning environment for students, and a project to encourage parental involvement
(Mason, 2008).
Educational interventions cannot be blindly copied from one system to another
because autonomous agents in a different system may react to the same intervention
differently. Policymakers should estimate stakeholders’ possible reactions in designing a
new educational policy. Knowing not only what agents will do but also why they do it is
essential to have a better estimate of agents’ behaviors in a new environment (Lemke &
Sabelli, 2008). The findings of educators, psychologists, sociologists, economists, and
political scientists, to name a few, shall all be referenced to have a better knowledge
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about how students may respond to a new educational intervention. Even if students’
reactions are all the same, different initial settings of a CAS may generate different
interaction patterns and thus different emergent macrophenomena (Haggis, 2008).
Although educational systems exhibit all the features of CASs, educational
policymakers often pass legislation based on linear cause-effect models, ignoring the
nonlinear features of CASs (Groff, 2013). Many complexity researchers have urged
educational researchers and policymakers to apply the concepts of CASs and CASs tools
to studying educational issues and policies (e.g., Groff, 2013; Maroulis et al., 2010). The
concept of CASs requires researchers to study not only the variables in a CAS but also
the dynamic interactions between the variables in a holistic view (Radford, 2008). The
complexity thinking also requires researchers to expect possibilities and interdisciplinary
collaboration (Groff, 2013; Keshavarz et al., 2010). If complexity thinking and
simulation were applied to the decision-making process of, for example, California’s
mandated statewide class-size reduction in 1996, the supply shortage of qualified teachers
might have been considered a priori (Maroulis et al., 2010; Sklar, Davies, & Co, 2004).
Similarly, the reactions of the states, schools, and teachers to the NCLB policy might
have been simulated beforehand if complex systems tools were applied in the policy
analysis.
From the viewpoint of CASs, building an agent-based simulation model is the
right way, or even the only way, to analyze the design of new educational interventions.
As early as 2004, researchers attempted to construct agent-based models representing
hierarchical educational systems for educational policy analysis (e.g., Sklar et al., 2004).
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In 2008, Lemke and Sabelli began to define the conceptual framework of a complex
education system model. They argued that modelers should consider what levels of
hierarchies to be included in the model (students, teachers, classrooms, schools, district,
or up to states and central government), how these levels are related, the variables that
may drive changes, and the scale of the model. These considerations will guide the
collection of data needed for model construction (Lemke and Sabelli, 2008). As to the
modeling tool, Lemke and Sabelli found ABM promising for the study of the dynamic
changes in a complex education system.
The above pioneering works do not seem to lead the trend toward agent-based
educational research. Up to today, the application of ABM to educational policy analysis
is still in the exploratory stage, not to mention a fully calibrated agent-based educational
model capable of real-world quantitative prediction. The construction of an agent-based
educational model capable of prediction requires multidisciplinary collaboration among
educators, agent-based modelers, behavioral scientist, design economists, to name a few,
and intensive feedbacks between data collection, testing, and simulation (Farmer & Foley,
2009; Yu, 2015). More efforts are needed to produce a full-fledged agent-based
educational model. This study contributes to the continuing efforts needed to realize that
goal.
Agent-Based Modeling
ABM is a simulation approach characterized by modeling individual agents’
behaviors and interactions, from which, complex, dynamic macropatterns emerge
(Axelrod, 2005; Gilbert, 2004; Macal & North; 2010). In an agent-based model, the
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aggregate phenomena “grow” from the individual agents’ interactions. Therefore, ABM
is a bottom-up modeling approach, in contrast to equation-based modeling approaches,
such as computable general equilibrium modeling and systems dynamics, which model
the macrostructures of a system directly without addressing too much of its
microfoundation (Parunak, Savit, & Riolo, 1998).
Epstein (1999) argued that ABM is a generative approach to social science. ABM
does not accept the law of excluded middle, which accepts a hypothesis as long as its
negation is derived to be false. To claim the existence of a linkage between a
microspecification and a macroemergence, an agent-based modeler must generate the
emergence from the microspecifications, or the modeler does not explain the emergence
(Epstein, 1999). A famous saying of Epstein (1999) is: “If you didn’t grow it, you didn’t
explain its emergence” (p. 43).
The logic behind Epstein’s claim that ABM is a generative approach is abduction
(Richiardi, Leombruni, Saam, & Sonnessa, 2006). Abduction is a type of logic
introduced by Charles Sanders Peirce; different from deduction and induction, it is “the
process of forming explanatory hypotheses” (as cited in Frankfrut, 1958, p. 593). By
generating a causal relationship between a set of input and outputs, ABM provides an
explanatory hypothesis, which is to be verified by way of induction, with the aid of
deduction (Frankfurt, 1958). Without using the term “abduction”, Axelrod (1997)
regarded agent-based simulation as the third way of doing science, different from
deduction and induction. Like deduction, agent-based simulations start from a rigorous
set of assumptions. However, unlike deduction, agent-based simulation is not to prove
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theorems; instead, it is to produce data to be analyzed inductively (Axelrod, 1997).
Unlike induction, the data generated by agent-based simulation is from a rigorous set of
rules rather than empirical observations (Axelrod, 1997). Therefore, the data generated
from agent-based models will not have the problems of missing data or uncontrolled
variables as happened in social science experiments and observations (Axelrod, 1997).
The basic elements of an agent-based model are agents, agents’ interaction rules,
and agents’ environment (Macal & North, 2010). An agent is an identifiable autonomous
individual situated in an environment where it interacts with other agents (Macal &
North, 2010). Each agent has a state consisting of its attributes, and its state may change
over time. Agents’ attributes may include, for example, gender, socioeconomic status,
location, preference, performance score, ability to adapt (ability to change behavioral
rules), and goals to achieve. Agents can be heterogeneous in attributes and behaviors
(Macal & North, 2010). Additionally, agents are endowed with behavioral protocols and
mechanisms to interact with other agents in their spatial neighborhoods or social
networks. Agents’ behavioral rules usually are rather simple, reflecting the behavioral
patterns of humans, who mostly follow norms, habits, and protocols (Macy & Willer,
2002). Agents’ environment refers to the space where agents perform activities. The
environment may simply be used to tell the locations of the agents or may be constructed
in a way to constrain agents’ actions (Macal & North, 2010). Once an agent-based
modeler programs the three elements, all the modeler needs to do is to execute the model,
which generally runs in discrete time (in steps), and see how the observations emerge
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from agents’ interactions (Axtell, 2000). Figure 2 shows a conceptual example of an
agent-based model in which the environment simply is used to show agents’ positions.

Figure 2. A snapshot of an agent-based simulation in this study. The 10 rectangles
represent the 10 schools. The agents within each school are the newly admitted. The
agents below the rectangles (outside of the schools) are those who are unassigned to any
school.
Advantages of doing ABM
ABM as a right tool for CASs. ABM is a right methodology to study complex
systems and complex adaptive systems because its design embeds the features of these
systems: heterogeneity, decentralization, explicit space, interactions, bounded rationality,
and emergence (Borrill & Tesfatsion, 2011; Epstein, 1999; Macal & North, 2010). As in
the real world, agents can be heterogeneous in every attribute whether it is a character,
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background, or decision rule. There is no need to assume representative agent or to
group agents into several homogeneous groups as in classical equation-based models or
system dynamics. All agents can be autonomous in making decisions without a central
control although they may be constrained by social norms or institutions endogenously
generated by agents’ interactions in earlier steps (Epstein, 1999; Macal & North, 2010).
Agents interact with other agents according to their social networks that are explicitly
presented in the computational environment (space) and may be changed endogenously
when the artificial system evolves. Agents do not need to be rational with full
information or use optimizing strategy as assumed in equation-based models for
mathematical tractability. Agents can only have bounded information and bounded
computing power as most people in the real world (Epstein, 1999; Macal & North, 2010).
In an agent-based model, the macropatterns emerge from the interactions of individual
agents. Therefore, ABM allows researchers to link and map microbehaviors to
macroperformance, which is a function difficult to achieve by equation-based models.
(Chen, 2015; Epstein, 1999; Macal & North, 2010).
Equation-based modeling focuses on equilibria while ABM allows researchers to
collect and analyze the entire dynamical data in a process, not just equilibria if equilibria
exist (Axtell, 2000). Continuously changing and adapting is how a CAS survives; a CAS
will soon move out of an equilibrium even if there is an equilibrium, or the CAS will
probably die (Holland, 1992). Therefore, the focus of a CAS study shall be on dynamics
rather than equilibria. Although the approach of system dynamics is also used to handle
the dynamics of a system, it is under the assumption that the system structure is fixed
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(Schieritz & Milling, 2003). Under system dynamics, adaptation is either unconsidered
or assumed to have no effect on system structure (Schieritz & Milling, 2003). On the
contrary, ABM is flexible in handling adaptation either through learning at the individual
level or through the reproduction of fitter individuals at the population level (Schieritz &
Milling, 2003).
ABM also can easily handle dynamic networks, both spatial and social, because
networks (interaction topologies) are embedded in the programming of agent interactions
(Macal & North, 2010). On the other hand, equation-based models, including system
dynamics, have difficulties reflecting the function of networks, not to mention network
dynamics (Axtell, 2000). Since the interactions in complex social systems are mostly
non-linear, it is extremely difficult to deduce its emergences into equations, which makes
ABM the only existent candidate to study global properties of complex social systems
(Axelrod, 1997; Borrill & Tesfatsion, 2011; Macal & North, 2010). Borrill and
Tesfatsion (2011) further argued that it is not only impractical but also impossible
theoretically to study social systems by using equation-based models because social
systems are Wolfram’s Class 4 systems, which are computationally irreducible.
Therefore, the only option to understand the macroproperties of social systems is to build
and run agent-based models representing these systems and then observe the simulation
results (Borrill & Tesfatsion, 2011).
ABM as a complement to and an extension of human-subject experiments.
ABM can also be viewed as a complement to human-subject experiments (Duffy, 2006).
Experimenters face more constraints on what they can do than agent-based modelers
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(Duffy, 2006). For example, the cost and the size of the lab may constrain the number of
human subjects in an experiment. Another example is that human fatigue may limit the
time length of an experiment. That is why many agent-based models have been
calibrated with the experimental data to understand the laboratory findings or to scale up
the size of a human-subject experiment by, for example, increasing the number of
artificial agents or the periods of treatment (Chen, 2015). Nowadays, the findings in
ABM even inspire experimenters to redesign their human-subject experiments so that
they can examine the findings in ABM (Chen, 2015). ABM allows researchers to lift the
constraints in human-subject experiments and create an artificial system in which
parameters and variables can be changed one at a time to build the causal relationships
between microinputs and macrooutputs (Epstein, 2008; Montes, 2012). These simulated
causal relationships may not be available in literature yet and thus can serve as
hypotheses for future data collection and empirical testing (Epstein, 2008; Montes, 2012).
Therefore, ABM is not only a tool to represent or imitate a system based on experimental
findings or other empirical data but also a methodology to discover new questions and
new theories (Axelrod, 1997; Chen, 2015; Epstein, 2008). Indeed, as argued by CioffiRevilla (2013), the major scientific contribution of ABM is its ability to run
computational experiments on complex social systems because too often, it is impossible
to conduct human-subject experiments on the social systems of interest for either
scientific research or policy analysis.
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Limitation of ABM
Although ABM is created to tackle the problems in CASs, it is not to say that
agent-based models have better prediction power than classical models. It is because we
may not have enough knowledge to know how the agents in a CAS will adapt to changes
and, in turn, affect the network and structure of the system (Hazy, 2012; Holland, 1992).
Nevertheless, as George E. P. Box’s famous quote says “Essentially, all models are
wrong, but some are useful” (Box & Draper, 1987, p. 424). When there are significant
uncertainties, ABM is much more flexible than equation-based modeling to perform
scenario analysis and provide critical information needed to make policy decisions
(Bankes, 1993; Lansing, 2002).
Although each simulation run is sufficient to build the possible causal relationship
between microspecification and macrostructure, one single run is not enough to answer
the question about how robust the result is (Axtell, 2000). Multiple runs of simulation
with different initial settings and parameters are needed to test the robustness of the result,
which takes a lot more computational power than analytical or numerical resolutions of
equations (Axtell, 2000). Fortunately, this problem has become manageable due to the
rapid development of computer technology.
Even when a microspecification in an agent-based model can “grow” the
macropatterns of interest, the microspecification can only be viewed as one hypothetical
explanation, because other microspecifications (individual behavioral rules) might also
have the same explanatory power (Epstein, 1999). How to find alternative
microspecifications and determine the right explanation often challenges agent-based
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modelers (Epstein, 1999). Agent-based modelers usually need to collaborate with other
researchers to conduct transdisciplinary research because ABM intrinsically needs to
program the features of agents and their environments, which inevitably are multidisciplinary (Epstein, 1999). Sometimes, it is challenging to establish an interdisciplinary
research team. However, agent-based research is not the only research that requires
transdisciplinary collaboration. Social science researchers have long called for
interdisciplinary research because it is impossible to decompose human activities clearly
into separate disciplines. In comparison with other disciplines in social sciences, agentbased social science naturally promotes interdisciplinary teamwork.
Educational Equality
Throughout human history, education has played a major role in determining an
individual’s life chances (Green, 2011). People with higher education tend to have more
earnings, better health, and longer lives (Colclough, Kingdon, & Patrinos, 2010; Green,
2011; Spasojevic, 2010). Another worldwide phenomenon is that people born in families
with higher socioeconomic status tend to have better educational performance than those
born in families with lower socioeconomic status (OECD, 2010). Family socioeconomic
status, education, and personal well-being seem to be reciprocally related. A general
belief is that education, especially higher education, is the key to moving upward for
most individuals (Attewell, 2010; Hojo & Oshio, 2012). Therefore, when income
disparity and health disparity are expanding globally in most countries, many scholars
focus on the issue of educational inequality, in hopes of finding education policies that
can eventually reduce the gap in well-being (Corak, 2013; Ortiz & Cummins, 2011).
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The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2010)
suggested three types of policies to ameliorate educational inequality: (a) additional
assistance to lower-performing schools and students as well as disadvantaged students,
(b) higher evaluation standards for all students, and (c) inclusion of all marginalized
students in mainstream schools and regular classrooms. As to which specific policies to
apply, OECD admitted that it depends on the situation of each region. Whether or not
following OECD’s suggestions, the governments in different countries and regions have
made various policies and reforms to tackle the problems of inequality of school quality
and educational opportunity. Examples are NCLB in the United States, HSEP in South
Korea, and Taiwan’s 12-Year Education Reform.
Whether reducing educational inequality will certainly result in reducing income
and health inequality is questionable. The reason is that the distribution of well-being is a
complex phenomenon, emerging from the interacting influences of many factors,
including the social, cultural, and economic structure of a labor market (Thompson &
Simmons, 2013). For example, a meritocratic labor market where professional interns
receive extremely low or no pay may scare students from middle- and poorer-class
families away from pursuing those professional careers. A labor market that does not
have enough demand to absorb graduates from higher education will keep the graduates
from finding the fitted jobs (Thompson & Simmons, 2013). Societies desiring to tackle
the problem of well-being inequality shall consider multifaceted interventions that are
relatively more beneficial to lower-income families, alongside policies that reduce
educational inequity (Corak, 2013).
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In any case, educational achievement is a powerful driver of upward social
mobility and intergenerational earning mobility (Attewell & Lavin, 2007). To reduce the
gap in well-being, policies reducing educational inequality undoubtedly play a significant
role. However, before the evaluation of a policy aiming at reducing educational
inequality, the definition of educational equality and its measures must be determined.
Unfortunately, there has not been a universal answer ever since the seminal survey
Equality of Educational Opportunity by Coleman et al. (1996), commonly known as the
Coleman Report. Educational equality usually refers to equality of educational
opportunity, which is a tradition inherited from the Coleman Report. However, as
explained by Coleman (1968), there is no single concept of equality of educational
opportunity. Moreover, because the global trend has shifted the responsibility of
education to the public sector, the concept of educational opportunity is now intertwined
with that of school quality. Depending on researchers’ perspectives, the concepts of
equality of educational opportunity and equality of school quality may be the same,
enclaved in the other, or overlapping. Even if the concepts can be clearly defined, their
measures may not be able to fully capture the concepts. The reasons include the
involvement of many interacting factors, the long-lasting effects of schooling, the
limitation of methodology, and the difficulties in collecting data (Borman & Dowling,
2010; Jennings et al., 2015; Ladd & Loeb, 2013). Because of the complexity of
definition and difficulty in measurement, it is necessary for each study to state clearly the
operational definitions of the concepts as well as their measures.
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Equality of Educational Opportunity
Originally, the US society perceived equality of educational opportunity as
providing students with equal school resources (Coleman, 1968). The idea has evolved
to include the discussion of this issue from the effect side of school resources (Coleman,
1968). The Coleman Report provides five definitions of equality of educational
opportunity to accommodate the different perspectives of this issue. These five
definitions are: (a) same tangible school inputs, such as per student expenditures and
quality of teachers that can be measured quantitatively; (b) same student composition of
schools; (c) same intangible school inputs, such as teacher’s morale, teacher’s
expectation of students, and average student’s learning attitude; (d) same school results
given the same student background and abilities; and (e) same school results given
different student backgrounds and abilities (Coleman et al., 1966). The former three are
related to school input; the latter two, effects of schooling. Coleman (1968) explained
that there was no evidence to show that policies based on the definitions in (a) and (b)
could improve school’s effects. The definition in (c) does not offer where to stop and
how relevant these factors are for school quality. The definition in (e) is impossible to
achieve by any policy unless children can be free from the influence of their unequal
family environments (Coleman, 1968). Therefore, the Coleman report focused on
providing information related to the definition in (d). However, Coleman (1968) also
argued that if the focus of the policies is on the definition in (d), then the constant gap
between different student groups would be considered acceptable, which again would not
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be acceptable in a society where the purpose of schooling is to prevent the disadvantages
in children’s family environments from impeding their achievements in adult life.
Up to today, the definition of inequality of educational opportunity still depends
on the purpose and limitation of a study; the same applies to the measure (Ladd & Lauen,
2010). Since the social trend is to hold schools responsible for reducing the impacts of
family differences, most of the studies on inequality of educational opportunity focus on
measuring the portion of student achievements accounted for by students’ family
background (Ferreira & Gignoux, 2014). If there is perfect equality in educational
opportunity (that is, no achievement difference is caused by family background), then the
mean achievements of students from all types of family backgrounds shall be the same
(Ferreira & Gignoux, 2014). The proxies for student achievements commonly used are
regional or national test scores, Program for International Student Assessment (PISA)
scores, the highest level of education attained, and earnings (e.g., Brunello, Fort, &
Weber, 2009; Ferreira & Gignoux, 2014; Pfeffer, 2008).
In this study, I defined equality of educational opportunity from the input point of
view; that is, all junior high graduates have the same opportunity to attend any senior
high school, regardless of their residences, backgrounds, or test scores. This definition is
in accord with the intention of Taiwan’s 12-Year Education Reform, which was to
change the high school entrance system from ability tracking to mixing. There is an
equality of educational opportunity if the mean family income of the admitted students in
each school is the same.

55
Equality of School Quality
To discuss school quality is to discuss how much value a school can add to the
well-being of a student, a community, or a country. Since well-being is a property
emerging from the interaction of many factors, how to measure a school’s value-added
has long been an issue among scholars, especially when some benefits of schooling
cannot be seen immediately. The common proxies for school quality are measures of
resources, measures of school process, and measures of student achievements,
corresponding to the viewpoints of input, the effectiveness of the inputs, and the outcome
of the inputs, respectively (Ladd & Loeb, 2013). Spending per student, teacher-tostudent ratio, and teacher’s years of teaching or certification are examples of measures of
resources. However, the measurement of the quantities of resources cannot catch the
quality and effectiveness of the resources because two schools with the same amount of
resources may not have the same quality due to different resource processes (Ladd &
Loeb, 2013). Evaluation of teacher’s practice in a classroom is an example of measures
of school process. Nevertheless, the evaluation itself is difficult because it is costly and
hard to standardize the evaluators’ rating practice (Ladd & Loeb, 2013). Therefore, some
researchers turn to student outcomes to measure school quality. Student’s scores and
educational attainment are examples of the measures of student outcomes. This approach
is not without problems because test score or educational attainment only represents a
portion of contents learned in schools that will benefit student’s future life (Ladd & Loeb,
2013). Even if test score is a good indicator of student’s future outcome, it is still
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difficult to calculate a specific portion of test result attributed to schooling even with
today’s most sophisticated model (Ladd & Loeb, 2013).
With all these criticisms in mind, when the discussion of school quality focuses
on educational outcome, test score is still appropriate to be the proxy for school quality,
even if it is not the best. The reason is that test score reflects whether a student attains a
specified outcome, which in this case is more important than whether the outcome is
accurately attributed to schools (Ladd & Loeb, 2013). However, it may not be practical
to require schools to make every student have equal test performance because students’
performances also depend on their individual motivation, aptitude, and family influences
(Ladd & Loeb; Tsai & Yang, 2015). A more reasonable proxy for school quality is the
average test score, which can also serve as an index for schools to examine their input
efficiency and adequacy (Ladd & Loeb, 2013). Therefore, in this study, I chose seniors’
average score in a school as the proxy for school quality.
Factors Affecting Student Performance
Student performance is a complex phenomenon, emerging from the interaction of
many factors, including, but not limited to, student’s attitude and attributes, family
background, teacher’s quality, school resources, and peer effect. Due to the complexity
of the interactions, it is not easy to find all of the influencing factors and their
magnitudes, even after researchers’ tremendous efforts in this regard. Additionally,
methodology remains as an issue half a century after the Coleman Report, regardless of
the advancement of statistical technologies. What and how the factors affect student
performance is still under debate.
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The 1966 Coleman report’s main finding was that after controlling students’
socioeconomic status, schools contribute little to the difference in student performance,
although schools do have different effects on students with different socioeconomic
statuses (Coleman et al., 1966). The most influential school factor is peers.
Disadvantaged students benefit more from being mixed with peers having strong
educational supports while advantaged students’ performance is hardly affected by peers
with lower socioeconomic statuses (Coleman et al., 1966). Teacher’s quality also has
some effects, but the effects are more on disadvantaged students than on advantaged
students (Coleman et al., 1966). Over the decades, these findings are still largely
supported by voluminous empirical studies (Burke & Sass, 2013; Dearden, Ferri, &
Meghir, 2002; Hanushek, 1989; Jennings et al., 2015). However, the findings on the size
of peer effect across different ability groups are mixed. Burke and Sass (2013) argued
that the loss experienced by higher performing students in a class with an increased
percentage of very low-performing peers is more than the gain received by a very lowperforming student in a class with an increased percentage of high-performing peers. On
the other hand, Carman and Zhang (2012) found that peer effect is significant on middleperforming students but insignificant on students at both ends.
The empirical findings on the factors influencing Asian students’ performance
also largely conform with those of the Coleman Report. Using the data from the 2007
Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), Hojo and Oshio (2012)
showed that individual and family factors are the keys to student’s performance in the top
5 mathematics-performing Asian countries (Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Hong
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Kong, and Japan). School resources have very limited impact, but peer effect, measured
by the average peer scores, has a significant influence on student performance, which
implies that ability-sorting will further improve the performance of higher-performing
students and exacerbate the inequality of educational outcomes (Hojo & Oshio, 2012).
By investigating the science achievement of the 8th-grade students in Taiwan, Tsai and
Yang (2015) again confirmed the significance of family and individual factors on student
performance; as to school-level factors, while school ethos contributes to student
performance significantly, school resources play a little role. Using the 2006 PISA Hong
Kong sample for their research, Sun, Bradley, and Akers (2012) also confirmed the
significance of the individual and family factors. As to the school factors, Sun et al.
(2012) argued that the socioeconomic status composition of the student body and the
length of instruction time both contribute to the variance of science performance among
the 15-year-old students in Hong Kong. Sun et al. (2012) did not measure peer effect
directly. However, they argued that the significance of the student socioeconomic status
composition of a school implies the significance of peer effect because socioeconomic
status and peer performance are positively and highly correlated (Sun et al. 2012).
Although most empirical studies worldwide have shown that school factors have
much less influence on student performance than individual and family factors, many
educators still believe in the power of school education to reduce socioeconomic
inequality. As argued by Hojo and Oshio (2012), the findings could only be interpreted
as the inefficiency of the current schemes for school education; they did not mean that
school education could not be improved. Other scholars argued that test score, as used in
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most studies, cannot fully reflect the impact of school education on students’ future wellbeing; other measures must be used to have a better understanding of the effect of school
education (Dearden et al., 2002; Jennings & Sohn, 2014).
Regardless of the mixed opinions about the overall school effect, the statement
that peers influence a student’s performance is generally accepted in the literature.
However, how the peers influence student performance or what the process of peer effect
is cannot easily be seen through statistical regression, which is mostly used to study peer
effect. Lomi, Snijders, Steglich, and Torlo (2011) argued that students tend to have a
performance similar to the average performance of their friends. Therefore, Salgado et
al. (2014) assumed that peer effect is through networks; they further assumed that
students form networks based on how much they can tolerate the differences in
performance, gender, and family background (represented by father’s occupation in their
model). They then used an agent-based model to simulate students’ fifth-grade math
scores based on their actual third-grade math scores to find the best-fit parameters of the
three variables. They found that across the 22 schools in their data, students all had high
tolerance towards performance difference; what made the network formation mechanisms
different between schools were the different levels of tolerance in gender and family
background. Their simulated parameters could generate students’ fifth-grade math scores
with 90% accuracy, which indicates that network is a candidate explanation of how peer
effect works (Salgado et al., 2014).
Educational institutions may also have effects on student performance. Compared
to comprehensive education, tracking (sorting students into academic or vocational
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tracks) in secondary schools magnifies inequality in performance by family background
(Ferreira & Gignoux, 2014; Van de Werfhorst & Mijs, 2010). Tracking may further
increase future socioeconomic differences if those who attend vocational schools have
less chance or tendency to receive tertiary education (Ferreira & Gignoux, 2014; Van de
Werfhorst & Mijs, 2010). In Taiwan, students in secondary schools were mainly tracked
by test scores. Since Taiwan students’ scores are positively correlated with their
socioeconomic statuses, tracking by test scores largely resulted in a sorting of students by
socioeconomic status (Liu & Chen, 2010). Ferreira and Gignoux (2014) also suspected a
strong relationship between the tracking and high inequality in math performance in
Taiwan. These empirical studies support the intention of Taiwan’s 12-Year Education
Reform to change the system from tracking to mixing.
School Choices
School choice is a concept initially discussed in Milton Friedman’s (1955)
seminal article “The Role of Government in Education.” Friedman argued that the
governmental action of administering or operating educational institutions is not justified,
even though the governmental action of financing the primary and secondary education
and requiring all educational institutions to meet minimum quality standards is justified.
Friedman (1955) believed that parents should have the freedom to send their children to
the schools that meet their needs; school vouchers can achieve this objective by
increasing the variety and quality of educational institutions through inter-school
competition for students. Nowadays, in addition to school vouchers, various designs of
school choices have emerged, including charter schools, open enrollment, education
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savings accounts, tax-credit scholarships, and individual tax credits and deductions
(Cunningham, 2013).
Advocates of school choices argued that school choices help mitigate socioeconomic segregation between schools (Pathak, 2011). Under the traditional
neighborhood school system, only the rich can afford to live in the neighborhood of
better schools, and better schools tend to attract richer people and further contribute to the
rising of the neighboring housing prices. With school choices, better schools are no
longer the privilege of the rich, and thus a society with less educational inequality can be
achieved (Pathak, 2011). However, the discussion about whether and how to implement
school choices has never stopped because the empirical studies have mixed conclusions
about the benefits of school choices claimed by the advocates (Musset, 2012). Taking
open enrollment as an example, by analyzing the data from a lower-income urban school
district, Hastings, Neilson, and Zimmerman (2012) found that open enrollment improves
participants’ test scores significantly. On the other hand, Choi and Hwang (2014)
analyzed the empirical data of test scores after the implementation of open enrollment
policy in Seoul, Korea, 2010 and found that those exercised school choices and enrolled
in private schools experienced a significant improvement in scores but at the cost of score
deterioration among students who remained in public schools. Since the overall average
score did not change, Choi and Hwang (2014) argued that what school choice brings
about is not productivity enhancement through competition as claimed by the advocates
but private schools’ cream-skimming better-performing students from public schools.
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Another example of school choice is voucher systems. Wolf et al. (2013)
examined student graduation rate and performance under Washington DC’s school
voucher program and concluded that voucher participants who attend private schools
have higher graduation rate but no higher performance, except reading, than their
counterparts in public schools. Lindbom (2010) reviewed the empirical studies on the
impacts of government-funded private schools, mostly established after the 1990s’
Swedish large-scale voucher reform, and concluded that Sweden experiences marginal
positive effect of school choice on student performance and limited negative effect on
segregation, after controlling the effect of residential segregation. However, Lindbom
(2010) could not rule out the possibility that the much higher residential segregation
experienced in Sweden after the school voucher reform was indeed caused by the new
voucher system.
After reviewing the studies published in the 2000s, Musset (2012) summarized
the effects of school choices as follows: (a) there is only weak or no correlation between
school choices and student performance; and (b) there is a positive correlation between
school choices and student segregation in terms of socioeconomic status and academic
performance. Nevertheless, Lindbom (2010) argued that it is dangerous to generalize the
findings of school-choice effect because the impact of a school-choice program is
context-dependent; the success of school choices highly depends on their forms, sizes,
implementations, and social environments. Regardless of the effect of school choices,
many societies worldwide, including the Taipei School District, recognize students’
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rights to choose their own schools and provide students with various forms of school
choices.
Factors influencing School Choice Decisions
Researchers also have different opinions about the factors influencing parents’
and students’ school choice decisions. A key premise underpinning the idea that school
choice helps improve student performance and educational equity is that academic
performance is the main determinant of all parents’ school-choice decisions (Musset,
2012; Burgess, Greaves, Vignoles, & Wilson, 2014). However, empirical data showed
that advantaged parents are more likely than disadvantaged parents to exercise school
choices, which suggests the possibility of heterogeneous factors that influence schoolchoice decisions (Musset, 2012). Researchers have found that in choosing schools,
parents consider not only academic performance but also travel distance and school
socioeconomic composition (Burgess et al., 2014; Musset, 2012). On the one hand,
Burgess et al. (2014) argued that although less affluent parents weigh distance a little
higher than more affluent parents, generally speaking, all parents’ consideration priorities
are similar: high academic performance, school socioeconomic composition with less
poor student percentage, and distance. On the other hand, Dronkers and Avram (2010)
made a cross-national analysis and argued that students (parents) in different countries
have different considerations in choosing schools; some even weigh religious, ethnic, and
socioeconomic factors over performance.
The mixed findings in the empirical studies on the impact of school choice and
the factors influencing students’ school choices reflect the complexity of educational
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systems and the heterogeneity in constituent agents’ decision rules. How students are
admitted depends not only on how students make their school choices but also on the
implemented matching mechanism. A change in matching mechanism will also change
students’ strategies in making school choices. These complex and adaptive interactions
among constituents and institutions make classical reductionist techniques hard to study
the effects of school choices. The agent-based approach used in this study provides a
new way to study complex school choice effects.
Factors considered by students in Taiwan. Taiwan students consider both
school quality and transportation cost, in importance order, in making their high school
choices (Chang, 2011; Chen, 2007). However, middle- and low-performing students give
more consideration to transportation cost than higher-performing students (Chang, 2011).
The reason may be that Taiwan students are prioritized by schools mainly based on their
academic performance in the admission process; when students feel that their academic
performance is so low that only low-quality schools will admit them, school quality no
longer matters and distance becomes relatively important (Chang, 2011). Chang’s (2011)
argument could be inferred that Taiwan students have similar preferences for high-quality
schools but prefer nearby low-quality schools to far-away low-quality schools. Tuition is
a factor of school choice only among low-income students (Chen, 2007). I referred to the
above findings to design students’ school preferences and school-choice rules in this
model.
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Matching Mechanisms
The core of school-choice designs is matching mechanism (assignment
procedure), which determines how to assign students to schools. Matching mechanisms
have long interested mathematicians and economists because they are essential to a wellfunctioning market (Roth, 2002). When a free market fails to produce a satisfying
matching result, a centralized clearinghouse is usually established to implement the
matching procedures, such as the establishment of the National Resident Matching
Program in 1952 to solve the problem of matching medical interns to hospitals (Roth,
2008; Roth & Peranson, 1999). The matching mechanisms in school choice programs
have also received researchers’ wide attention since the pioneering work of
Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez (2003). Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez (2003)’s discussion
of student assignment mechanisms led to a series of school-choice mechanism reforms,
such as New York City’s 2003 reform and Boston’s 2005 reform (Pathak, 2011). The
2003 reform in New York City (NYC) successfully reduced the percentage of students
not being assigned to a school in their choice lists from 30% to 3% (Zweifel, 2009).
Since the matching mechanism in an admission policy is critical to the policy’s success, it
is important to have a clear understanding of how the matching mechanism implemented
in an admission system works.
A matching mechanism can be one-sided (either the demand side or the supply
side) or two-sided (Pathak, 2011). In a one-sided mechanism, the matching is determined
according to the preferences and rankings (order of choices) of the agents on the
autonomous side, while the agents on the other side are only objects (Pathak, 2011). In a
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two-sided mechanism, agents in both sides are autonomous and can have their own
preferences and rankings, even though some agents’ priorities may be controlled by law;
for example, schools may be required by law to have special treatments for disadvantaged
students and reserved seats for students within the walk zone (Abdulkadiroglu &
Sonmez, 2003; Pathak, 2011). It is not unusual for both types of mechanisms to coexist
in a school-student matching system.
In literature, the following three criteria usually are used to evaluate a matching
mechanism: Pareto efficiency, stability, and strategy-proofness (or strategy immunity).
Pareto efficiency in school choice usually is defined from the perspective of students’
welfare as follows: Pareto efficiency is reached when it is impossible to assign a student
to his or her more preferred school without assigning another student to his or her less
preferred school (Abdulkadiroglu & Sonmez, 2003). Stability is to pair a student and a
school in a way that no students and schools that are not paired prefer to be paired with
each other; that is, there is no blocking pair (Gale & Shapley, 1962; Roth, 2008). A
stable matching algorithm will assign a student to his or her preferred school before
assigning those who have lower priorities than this student to the same school; that is, a
stable matching algorithm eliminates justified envy (Abdulkadiroglu & Sonmez, 2003).
Capable students tend to play complicated ranking games when they feel that, if they do
not rank higher their less preferred schools in which they have higher priorities, they may
waste their top choices and end up of being assigned to even worse schools
(Abdulkadiroglu & Sonmez, 2003). A matching mechanism is strategy-proof if students’
best strategy to choose schools is to rank the schools according to their true preferences
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(Roth, 2008). These three criteria, Pareto efficiency, stability, and strategy-proofness,
may not be compatible. A stable algorithm may not be a Pareto-efficient one and vice
versa; stability or Pareto-efficiency does not equal strategy-proofness either
(Abdulkadiroglu & Sonmez, 2003; Roth, 2008). The empirical evidences show that
stability is critical to the success of a matching policy (Roth, 2008). However, in
practice, policymakers usually have other considerations and do not always choose a
stable mechanism. The Taipei mechanism is an example.
In the following paragraphs, I discuss six matching mechanisms: serial
dictatorship, deferred acceptance, the Boston mechanism, top trading cycles, the Chinese
parallel mechanism, and the Taipei mechanism. The first four are widely discussed in the
literature. The Chinese parallel mechanism is a matching mechanism used to be adopted
by many Chinese provinces and municipalities to admit university students. The Taipei
mechanism is the one adopted by the Taipei School District in 2016.
Serial Dictatorship
Under this mechanism, the student with the top priority receives his or her top
choice, the student with the second priority receives his or her top choice among the
schools that still have seats, and so on (Pathak, 2011). I demonstrate this mechanism in
the following example.
Example 1. There are 4 students, S = {s1, s2, s3, s4} and 3 schools, C = {c1, c2,
c3}. Every school has 1 seat and prioritizes the students in the following order: s1⪰ s2 ⪰
s3 ⪰ s4, where the symbol ⪰ means “superior to”. The students’ school choices are as
follows:
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s1: c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3,
s2: c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3,
s3: c2 ≻ c1 ≻ c3,
s4: c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c1.

The symbol ≻ means “preferred to.” Under serial dictatorship, Student s1 has the first

right of choice and receives her first choice, School c1. Then, s2 has the right of choice
and receives her second choice, c2, since c1 has no more empty seat. Next, s3 receives
her third choice, c3, while s4 is rejected by all schools because there is no more empty
seat remained in the system. The matching result, MSD, is presented as below:
MSD =

(

s1
c1

s2
c2

s3
c3

s4
--

).

Serial dictatorship is considered strategy-proof (manipulation-free) and Pareto
efficient; it is stable only when the school agents prioritize the students in the same way
(Abdulkadiroglu & Sonmez, 2003; Pathak, 2011). This mechanism was chosen for
Chicago’s selective high schools admission reform in 2009 (Pathak & Sonmez, 2013).
However, the number of choices a student could make in this reform was less than the
number of participating schools, which made this mechanism subject to strategy
manipulation (Pathak & Sonmez, 2013).
Deferred Acceptance
The school-student matching mechanism adopted by NYC and Boston in the
2000s was a stable mechanism design called student-proposing deferred-acceptance
algorithm (Roth, 2008). This mechanism is a version of deferred acceptance originally
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published by Gale and Shapley (1962). In this mechanism, students are temporarily
assigned to their first-choice schools, and the schools temporarily accept them according
to the priority order of the students in the schools up to the schools’ capacities. Those
who are rejected by their first-choice schools are assigned to their next-choice schools,
and the schools reselect among the previously accepted students and the newly assigned
students according to their priority orders. This process continues until all students
exhaust their choice lists (Pathak, 2011). Example 2 explains this algorithm.
Example 2. The conditions here are the same as in Example 1. The process is as
follows:
Step 1: All students are temporarily assigned to their first choices. The schools
temporarily accept those with the highest priorities and reject the rest. Therefore, c1
temporarily accepts s1 and rejects s2; c2 temporarily accepts s3 and rejects s4.
MDA1 =

(

s1
c1

s2
--

s3
c2

s4
--

).

Step 2: Those who are not assigned go to their second choice. Each school
compares the priories of the students assigned to it in step 1 and step 2, temporarily
accepts those with the highest priorities and reject the rest. Therefore, s2 goes to c2 and
s4 goes to c3. Since s2 has higher priority than s3, c2 accepts s2 and rejects s3. Since s4
is the only student assigned to c3, s4 stays in c3.
MDA2 =

(

s1
c1

s2
c2

s3
--

s4
c3

).
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Step 3: The student who has not been assigned in this step is s3. So, s3 goes to
his next choice, c1. Since s1 has higher priority than s3, c1 keeps s1 and rejects s3.
Therefore, the assignments remain the same as MDA2.
Step 4: Now s3 goes to his next choice, c3. Since s3 has higher priority than s4,
School c3 accepts s3 and rejects s4.

(

MDA4 =

s1
c1

s2
c2

s3
c3

s4
--

).

Step 5: The student who has not been assigned in this step is s4. So, s4 goes to
his next choice, c1. Since s1, the student who is currently assigned to c1, has higher
priority than s4, s4 is rejected by c1. The process ends here because s4 exhausts his
choice lists.
MDA =

(

s1
c1

s2
c2

s3
c3

s4
--

).

The above MSD is the same as MDA because the students have the same prioritized
orders in all schools in the above two examples. That is, when all schools prioritize
students in the same way and the number of choices is not limited, deferred acceptance is,
in fact, the same as serial dictatorship (Chen et al., 2015; Pathak, 2011). Deferred
acceptance is stable and eliminates justified envy. It is also strategy-proof as long as the
number of students’ choices are not limited. Because of these advantages, deferred
acceptance is the most popular mechanism in school-choice reforms (Chen et al., 2015).
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The Boston Mechanism
The Boston mechanism refers to the mechanism adopted by the Boston city
before the 2005 reform (Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2005). While deferred acceptance and
serial dictatorship emphasize student’s performance, the Boston mechanism emphasizes
student’s choice. This mechanism works as follows. First, each school considers only
those students who list it as their top choice and assigns seats to the students according to
their priority orders until no more space left or no more students left. Second, each
school that still has space considers those unassigned students who list it as their second
choice and accepts the students in the same way as in the first step. This process
continues until no school has any seat left or all students have been assigned (Pathak &
Sonmez, 2013). The acceptance in each step is final. Example 3 explains this
mechanism.
Example 3. The conditions here are the same as in Example 1. The process is as
follows.
Step 1: All students are assigned to their first choices. Since each school has only
one seat, each school accepts the student with the highest priority in that school and
rejects the rest. Therefore, c1 accepts s1 and rejects s2; c2 accepts s3 and rejects s4. The
acceptance is final.
MBM1 =

(

s1
c1

s2
--

s3
c2

s4
--

).

72
Step 2: s2 and s4 go to their second choices, c2, and c3, respectively. Since c2 is
full, s2 remains unassigned. The assignment of s4 to c3 is final. Since no more seat is
left, the process stops here.
MBM =

(

s1
c1

s2
--

s3
c2

s4
c3

).

Under the Boston mechanism, it is possible that if students do not list a school as
their top choice, they will lose the seat in that school to a student with lower priority.
That is, the Boston mechanism easily creates justified envy. Often, students must
manipulate their submitted choices in a way different from their true preferences to
secure places in the schools that they like more. Therefore, the Boston mechanism is
neither strategy-proof nor stable (Chen et al., 2015). Nevertheless, even though it is
heavily criticized for its strategy complexity and creation of justified envy, the Boston
mechanism and its similar versions are still widely used in school admissions (Chen et
al., 2015). In China, the traditional college admission mechanism (the sequential
mechanism) is equivalent to the Boston mechanism; a newer mechanism called the
Chinese parallel mechanism adopted to replace the sequential mechanism by many
provinces still has the attributes of the Boston mechanism in its design (Chen et al.,
2015).
The Boston mechanism may not be efficient when students manipulate their
choices (Chen et al., 2015). However, when students have very similar ordinal
preferences and schools have coarse or no priorities over students, the Boston mechanism
may be more Pareto-efficient than deferred acceptance in ex-ante welfare
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(Abdulkadiroglu, Che, & Yasuda, 2011). Therefore, Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2011)
suggested that governments reconsider their decision on switching the Boston mechanism
to deferred acceptance because justified envy for better-performing students means more
chances for low-prioritized students, who are usually disadvantaged students, to attend
better schools.
Top Trading Cycles
The mechanism of top trading cycles was attributed to David Gale by Shapley and
Scarf (1974). Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez (2003) were the first to apply this mechanism
to school-choice design. This mechanism works as follows. Each student points to his or
her top choice, and each school points to its top-priority student. This process will form
at least one cycle. The students in the cycle are assigned to the schools that they point to
and leave the process. Each remaining student points to his or her next choice, and each
school that still has space points to the remaining student who has the highest priority in
that school. Also, there is at least a cycle, and the students in the cycle are assigned to the
schools to which they point. This process ends when all students are assigned, all schools
have exhausted space, or all students have used up their choice lists. The top trading
cycles mechanism is considered Pareto efficient and strategy-proof, but not stable
(Abdulkadiroglu & Sonmez, 2003). This mechanism has been widely discussed in the
literature since its first introduction in 2003. However, it was not implemented in any
real-world school system until 2012 by New Orleans’s Recovery School District
(Vanacore, 2012). Example 4 shows how this mechanism works.
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Example 4. There are 3 students, S = {s1, s2, s3} and 3 schools, C = {c1, c2, c3}.
Each school has only one seat. The students’ school-choice lists are:
s1: c2 ≻ c1 ≻ c3,
s2: c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3,
s3: c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3.

The students’ priorities in each school are:
c1: s1 ⪰ s3 ⪰ s2,
c2: s2 ⪰ s1 ⪰ s3,
c3: s3 ⪰ s1 ⪰ s2.

Step 1: s1 points to c2, his top choice; c2 points to s2, its top priority student; s2
points to c1; c1 points to s1. Now the first cycle is formed as shown in Figure 3 (left
cycle), and Students s1 and s2 are assigned to Schools c2 and c1 respectively.
MTTC1 =

(

s1
c2

s2
c1

s3
--

).

Step 2: s3, who has not been assigned, points to his next choice that still has seats,
which is c3; c3 points to his top priority student who has not been assigned, s3. Now the
second cycle is formed as shown in Figure 3 (right cycle). Since all students are
assigned, the process ends here.
MTTC =

(

s1
c2

s2
c1

s3
c3

).
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Figure 3. Top trading cycles explained in Example 4. The left cycle is formed in Step 1;
the right cycle is formed in Step 2.
The Chinese Parallel Mechanism
Before 2003, all provinces and municipalities in China used the Boston
mechanism to admit university students (Chen et al., 2015; Zhu, 2014). As in other
places where the Boston mechanism is adopted, many Chinese parents complained about
justified envy, and media never stopped reporting the news that some elite students were
unadmitted simply because of the way they ranked their choices (Zhu, 2014). Therefore,
more and more provinces and municipalities changed their matching mechanism from the
Boston mechanism to the parallel choice algorithm, or the Chinese parallel mechanism as
named in the literature, to alleviate the problem of justified envy.
The feature of the Chinese parallel mechanism is to insert deferred acceptance (or
serial dictatorship since all Chinese universities prioritize students in the same way) into
the Boston mechanism. Under the Chinese parallel mechanism, each choice in the
Boston mechanism becomes a class of choices with several choices within each class.
For example, the Chinese parallel mechanism used in Beijing’s 2014 university
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admission process had two classes of choices: Class 1 and Class 2. Students were
allowed to submit two choices in Class 1 and three choices in Class 2. Deferred
acceptance (or serial dictatorship) is employed within each class while the Boston
mechanism is implemented between the classes. Choices within the same class are
considered parallel, and thus this mechanism is named the parallel choice algorithm. The
following is an example of the Chinese parallel mechanism.
Example 5. There are 4 students, S = {s1, s2, s3, s4} and 4 schools, C = {c1, c2,
c3, c4}. Every school has one seat and prioritizes the students in the same way as
follows: s1⪰ s2 ⪰ s3 ⪰ s4. Each student is allowed to have two choices in Class 1 and
one choice in Class 2. The students’ school choices are as follows.
s1: (c1 ≻ c2), c3;
s2: (c1 ≻ c2), c3;
s3: (c2 ≻ c1), c3;
s4: (c2 ≻ c3), c1.

Step 1: Deferred acceptance is applied to the choices in Class 1. s1 goes to his top
choice in Class 1, which is c1. s2 goes to c2. Since the schools listed in s3’s Class 1 are
full, s3 is not assigned. s4 goes to c3. Because all students run out of their Class 1
choices, the process for Class 1 ends here, and the assignments are final.
MCP1 =

(

s1
c1

s2
c2

s3
--

s4
c3

).

Step 2: Those who remain unassigned after the process for Class 1 go to the
process for Class 2. In this example, only Student s3 has not been assigned. The choice
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of Student s3 in Class 2 is School c3. However, c3 has no seat left. Therefore s3 is
rejected by c3. Since all choices in all classes have been processed, the whole process
stops here. The final assignment for the four students is the same as in MCP1:
MCP =

(

s1
c1

s2
c2

s3
--

s4
c3

).

According to the experimental results, Chen et al. (2015) argued that the
performance of the Chinese parallel mechanism lies between those of deferred
acceptance and the Boston mechanism in terms of stability and manipulability. Students
are most likely to use strategies under the Boston mechanism, followed by the Chinese
parallel mechanism and then deferred acceptance. Deferred acceptance is more stable
than the Chinese parallel mechanism, and the Chinese parallel mechanism is more stable
than the Boston mechanism (Chen et al., 2015). The Chinese parallel mechanism can
become the Boston mechanism if only one choice is allowed in each class. The Chinese
parallel mechanism can also become deferred acceptance if all choices allowed are in
Class 1.
The empirical data show that the Chinese parallel mechanism indeed reduces
justified envy in China. However, some scholars criticized that the shift from
emphasizing choices to emphasizing test scores in the matching process gives students
even more study pressure to have better test scores and causes students to focus only on
high-stakes subjects, which jeopardizes a balanced learning (Xin, 2008). This
mechanism also caused some lower-ranked universities but with highly praised special
programs hard to find good students for those special programs (Xin, 2008). The Chinese
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government has decided to reform university admission system again in 2017 to tackle
these problems but insisted in upholding the policy of transforming all university
matching mechanisms to deferred acceptance nationwide (State Council, 2014).
The Taipei Mechanism
I named the 2016 admission mechanism adopted by the Taipei School District the
Taipei mechanism. There are two major features in this mechanism. The first is the
inclusion of the spirit of the Boston mechanism in deferred acceptance by assigning
points to each student’s choice and adding this “choice score” to the composite score,
which is used by each school to prioritize students. 36 points are assigned to student’s
first five choices; 35, the sixth to the tenth choices; 34, the eleventh to the fifteenth
choices; 33, the sixteenth to the twentieth choices; 32, the twenty-first to the thirtieth
choices. No points will be assigned after the 30th choices. Whether or not achievable,
the intent of this design was to encourage students to focus on their own interests rather
than blindly follow school ranks. This feature was more salient in its original 2014
design. In 2014, the point was decreased per each consecutive choice; 30 points were
assigned to the first choice; 29, the second, and so on. In 2015, it was revised to assign
decreasing points to each consecutive group of choices to mitigate many parents’
objections to the gaming feature embedded in this design (School Year 104's Committee
for Exam-free Admission to Taipei District Senior High School (CEFA), 2015). The
second feature is to convert students’ raw scores to coarse-grained scores. This design of
blurring scores aims at reducing students’ study pressure under the assumption that
students care about every point of grade; the less distinctive the grade is, the less pressure
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students have. Under this design, a student’s raw exam scores (1-100 percentage scores
from the Comprehensive Assessment Program for Junior High Students) are converted to
7-scale scores. A rough conversion from 1-100 percentage score to 1-7 scale score is
shown in Table 1.
Table 1
Conversion of Raw Score to 7-Scale Score under the Taipei Mechanism
Raw score = x
x < 41

41 ≤ x <
61

61 ≤ x <
71

71 ≤ x <
84

84 ≤ x <
90

90 ≤ x <
94

x ≥ 94

7-scale
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
score
Note. The conversion is approximate to the average conversion rate of all subjects
calculated based on the press release issued by Research Center for Psychological and
Educational Testing (RCPET, 2015).
Under the Taipei mechanism, a school prioritizes students based on their
composite scores. The composite score is the sum of the scores of the following three
categories: tests, school choice, and diversity learning (Taipei City Government
Department of Education, 2015). Each student has to take the tests administered by
Taipei’s Comprehensive Assessment Program for Junior High Students. There are six
tests in the program: Chinese, mathematics, English, sociology, science, and Chinese
composition. All tests are measured on the scale of 1-7 as illustrated in Table 1, except
that Chinese composition is measured on the scale of 0-1 (0.1, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, and 1).
Hence, the maximum score a student can receive is 36 in this category. As illustrated in
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the previous paragraph, the maximum choice score is also 36. The diversity learning
score refers to student’s performance in art, physical education, and community service.
A student can also receive a maximum of 36 points in this category. Therefore, the
maximum composite score a student can receive is 108. If a tie happens in the
prioritization process, the following scores are compared in a consecutive order to break
the tie: (1) the diversity learning score, (2) the total test score, (3) the choice score, (4)
Chinese test score, (5) math test score, (6) English test score, (7) sociology test score, (8)
science test score, and (9) Chinese composition score. Once students are prioritized in
each school, deferred acceptance is employed to allocate students to schools (Taipei City
Government Department of Education, 2015). Example 6 explains the features of the
Taipei mechanism in a simplified version.
Example 6. There are 4 students, S = {s1, s2, s3, s4} and 4 schools, C = {c1, c2,
c3, c4}. 36 points are assigned to students’ first choice; 35, the second; 34, the third; 33,
the fourth. Every school has one seat. Table 2 shows the students’ raw exam scores,
converted 7-scale scores, diversity-learning score, and their school choices.
Student s1’s composite score in School c1 is 78 (7 for the 7-scale score + 35 for
the diversity learning score + 36 for the choice score); s1’s composite score is decreased
by 1 in each consecutive choice of schools. Table 2 shows each student’s composite
score and priority in each school.
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Table 2
Example 6 - Student’s raw exam score, converted 7-scale score, diversity-learning score,
and school choices
Student
s1

Raw exam
score
95

7-scale
score
7

Diversitylearning score
35

s2

93

6

35

s3

85

5

36

s4

75

4

36

School choices
c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3≻ c4
c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3≻ c4
c1 ≻ c3 ≻ c2≻ c4
c3 ≻ c4 ≻ c2≻ c1

Table 3
Example 6 – Student’s total score and rank in each school

c1

s1
78

s2
77

Composite score
s3
77

s4
73

c2

77

76

75

74

c3

76

75

76

76

c4

75

74

74

75

Student’s ranking
s1 ⪰ s3 ⪰ s2⪰ s4
s1 ⪰ s2 ⪰ s3⪰ s4
s3 ⪰ s4 ⪰ s1⪰ s2
s4 ⪰ s1 ⪰ s3⪰ s2

In Schools c1 and c4, although s2 and s3 have the same composite score, s3 is
prioritized higher than s2 because s3 has a higher diversity-learning score than s2.
Similarly, s4 is ranked higher than s1 in School c4 because s4 has higher diversitylearning score than s1. In School c3, s1, s3, and s4 have the same composite score.
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Since s3 and s4 have higher diversity-learning score than s1, s3 and s4 are ranked higher
than s1. s3 is ranked top in School c3 because s3 has higher test score than s4.
Once the students’ priorities in each school are determined, deferred acceptance is
applied to match the students.
Step 1: All students are temporarily assigned to their first choices. The schools
temporarily accept those with the highest priorities and reject the rest. Therefore, c1
temporarily accepts s1, and c3 temporarily accepts s4. Students s2 and s3 are temporarily
unassigned.
MTM1 =

(

s1
c1

s2
--

s3
--

s4
c3

).

Step 2: Those who are not assigned go to their second choices. Each school
compares the priories of the students assigned to it in step 1 and step 2, temporarily
accepts those with the highest priorities, and rejects the rest. Therefore, s2 temporarily
goes to c2, s3 takes over the seat of s4 in c3, and s4 is now unassigned.
MTM2 =

(

s1
c1

s2
c2

s3
c3

s4
--

).

Step 3: s4 goes to his next choice, which is c4. Since s4 has no competitor in c4,
s4 stays in c4. Now, all students receive their seats. The process ends here.
MTM =

(

s1
c1

s2
c2

s3
c3

s4
c4

).

Under the Taipei mechanism, more than 90% of the students can receive the
maximum diversity-learning score (The Central News Agency, 2014). The inclusion of
this category seems to be more for the purpose of promoting balanced learning than for
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the purpose of prioritizing students. Therefore, students’ priorities (ranks) in each school
are primarily determined by their choice scores and test scores. Assigning scores to
student’s choices is an unconventional design and puzzles many parents who argue that it
is ridiculous to assign decreasing scores to school choices because it is like punishing
students for their bad choices (Zheng, 2015). Whether this unconventional design can
better reach the purpose of mixing students than other mechanisms is undiscussed in
literature; it would be answered by agent-based simulations in this study.
Summary
Most researchers used set-theoretical models to study the stability, strategy
immunity, and Pareto efficiency of a new school-choice mechanism in equilibriums (e.g.,
Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2003; Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, & Roth, 2009; Kamada & Kojima,
2014; Pathak & Sonmez, 2013). It is not until recently that a few researchers have used
general equilibrium models and simulation models to explore the impacts of a schoolchoice mechanism on distribution equality (e.g., Calsamiglia, Martinez-Mora, &
Miralles, 2014; Hafalir, Yenmez, & Yildirim, 2013; Hatfield, Kojima & Narita, 2015;
Maroulis et al. 2014). However, the existing simulation models in this line either employ
historical data as students’ choices or randomly generate students’ choices by assuming
that students truthfully report their school preferences as their school choices without
employing strategies (e.g., Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2009; Erdil & Ergin, 2008; Hafalir et al.,
2013). Roth and Ockenfels (2002) warned that a small change in mechanism design
could induce a significant change in agents’ behaviors and interactions. This change, in
turn, may result in dynamic changes in macropatterns, such as the distribution of
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admissions and distribution of school quality. Therefore, it is improper only to consider
agents’ truth-telling behaviors or assume static system structures. A promising
alternative to study the effects of school-choice mechanisms on educational equality is
ABM. Agent-based simulation is flexible in assuming agents’ behaviors and allows
researchers to investigate the dynamic impacts of a new admission policy. In the next
section, I discuss the pioneering agent-based models applied to school-choice studies.
Agent-Based Models of Education Systems
ABM is still a new research tool in the field of education. In literature, not many
researchers have used ABM to study educational macrophenomena or analyze
macroeducational policies. To the best of my knowledge, there are only five agent-based
models published in peer-reviewed journals addressing macroeducational phenomena in
school-choice systems. In this section, I compare these models to have a better
understanding of the current development of ABM in this field.
Maroulis et al. (2014) wrote an agent-based model in NetLogo (Wilensky, 1999)
to study the aggregate effect of an open-enrollment policy on student achievement by
calibrating the initial setting of their model to reflect the patterns of the student and
school distributions in Chicago School District. Maroulis et al. (2014) argued that
whether school choice can improve student achievement depends on the portion of
parents participating in the school-choice program, higher performing schools’ capacities,
and the survival rate of new, higher value-added schools. Harland and Heppenstall
(2012) hypothesized seven common-sense rules to choose schools and tested them by
adding one rule at a time to their model to find a set of rules that best explains the
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patterns of student allocation in Leeds, UK. In Harland and Heppenstall’s (2012) model,
the rule of closest distance alone could explain 50% of the student allocation in Leeds; all
seven rules combined could explain 60% of the student allocation. Millington, Butler,
and Hamnett (2014) used their model, also written in NetLogo, to replicate the geography
of educational inequality in London, UK. In this region, popular schools have more
percentage of higher-performing students than less popular schools, and the students of
popular schools live closer to their schools than the students of less popular schools.
Millington et al. (2014) argued that one of the following two conditions must be met to
generate such geography: (a) parents must have various aspirations and abilities to move
to the neighborhood of higher performing schools, and (b) schools have different valueadds. Chen et al. (2017) focused their NetLogo model on the operational algorithms of
serial dictatorship, the Boston mechanism, and the Chinese Parallel mechanism and used
the assignment result of serial dictatorship as the baseline to investigate the distributional
effects of the above three mechanisms. Wang et al. (2017) extended Chen et al.’s (2017)
model to compare Taipei’s 2015 student-assignment mechanism with the Chinese
Parallel mechanism for their abilities to mix students.
Regarding model structures, the models of Maroulis et al. (2014), Harland and
Heppenstall (2012), and Millington et al. (2014) showed the geographic distribution of
student agents and considered the distance between a school and a student in forming
students’ school choices. In addition to spatial differences, the student agents’
backgrounds in the above three models were heterogeneous in at least one aspect.
Maroulis et al.’s (2014) student agents were heterogeneous in race, gender,
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socioeconomic level, and school performance. Harland and Heppenstall’s (2012) student
agents had heterogeneous backgrounds in religious belief, gender, and social status.
Millington et al.’s (2014) student agents had different aspirations to attend higher
performing schools; if the student agents were affluent and had high aspiration, they
would move closer to the schools of their choices one period before the start of the
admission process to improve their chances of attending those schools. As to the
structure of school agents, all of the above three models had school agents different in
value-added and location. Harland and Heppenstall’s school agents also differed in types,
such as Catholic schools, same-sex schools, and regular public schools.
In comparison to the above three models, the models of Chen et al. (2017) and
Wang et al. (2017) were relatively simple; none of them have geographic features. Their
school agents were only different in fixed ranks, and their student agents only had the
state variables of scores and school preference lists. However, these two models
contained the operational algorithms of more than one matching mechanism, while the
other three only employed one mechanism. Millington et al. (2014) claimed that the
matching mechanism they used was Gale-Shapley’s deferred acceptance, but the
matching algorithm described in their latest model document published at the website of
OpenABM is more like the Boston mechanism. Neither Maroulis et al. (2014) nor
Harland and Heppenstall (2012) explicitly stated the matching mechanism used in their
models. From their model descriptions, I inferred that the Boston mechanism was used in
both models.
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Regarding agent’s behaviors, Millington et al.’s (2014) model allowed student
agents to have heterogeneous aspiration to attend higher performing schools, so the
agents weigh school distance and school performance differently. Similarly, in Maroulis
et al.’s model, school choice was a function of school performance and school distance.
Each student agent weighed these two factors differently. In Harland and Heppenstall’s
model, only the more affluent student agents considered school performance in making
their school choices. The student agents in the above three models were all truth-tellers;
that is, students report their school preferences as their school choices without applying
any strategies. On the other hand, in addition to the truth-telling strategy, students in the
models of Chen et al. (2017) and Wang et al. (2017) used strategies to report their school
choices which might be different from their school preferences.
As to student prioritization, Maroulis et al’s (2014) school agents randomly
prioritized their student applicants. Millington et al.’s (2014) school agents prioritized
students based on their distances to schools. Harland and Heppenstall’s (2012) school
prioritization rule was the most sophisticated among the three; the schools prioritized the
student applicants not only based on distance but also based on gender and religion. On
the other hand, the schools in the models of Chen et al. (2017) and Wang et al. (2017)
only used scores to prioritize students.
I consider both Maroulis et al.’s (2014) and Millington et al.’s (2014) models
OLG models because in their simulations, there were several generations of agents
coexist during a period and older generations’ performances affected younger generations’
school-choice decisions. Both models used the grades of the older student generations as
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the proxy for school performance, which in turn was considered by younger student
generations in making their school-choice decisions. Once student agents enter schools,
both models calculated their performances based on a fixed formula calibrated to a set of
empirical data without considering how student agents’ performances would be affected
by their peers.
Another agent-based educational model that deserves attention is Salgado et al.’s
(2014) hierarchical model, which contains the levels of student agents, student networks
within classes, and classes. As described in the section of educational equality, the
purpose of their model was to test whether students’ social networks could explain peer
effect and subgroup achievement differences within classes. Among all models discussed
in this section, Salgado et al.’s model is the only model having more than two levels of
hierarchy. Although Salgado et al.’s model pre-assigns students to classes and does not
contain a matching process, it was a pioneering mesoscopic model that provided middlelevel processes to link the micro- and macrophenomena in a complex educational system.
In summary, although the current agent-based models of educational systems are
still simple in comparison to agent-based models developed in other fields, such as
economics, their simulation results have generated interesting policy implications that
may not be easily detected by equation-based models. For example, Maroulis et al.’s
(2014) model showed that the treatment effect of a school-choice program might become
diminishing with the increase of participants’ emphasis on school quality. This
information alerts policymakers to the possible disproportional effects of a school-choice
program in complex educational systems. Salgado et al. (2014) argued that their agent-
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based model can provide a reasonable causal explanation of peer effect, while traditional
equation-based models, such as its counterpart of a multilevel model, generally lack this
ability. With more improved models, ABM is foreseen to further benefit the field of
educational policy analysis (Harland & Heppenstall, 2012). In this study, I enhanced the
design of the matching mechanisms and agents’ behavioral rules in existing agent-based
models with an agent-based OLG school-choice model to contribute to the ongoing
development of the agent-based models for educational policy analysis.
Conclusion
Founded on the concepts of CASs and computational irreducibility, ABM is a
right methodology to study complicated educational systems because it naturally embeds
the features of CASs: emergence, adaptation, heterogeneity, bounded rationality, and
dynamics (Epstein, 1999; Macal & North, 2010; Maroulis et al., 2014). However, to the
best of my knowledge, only five agent-based models have been published to study
macroeducational phenomena. In this chapter, I describe and compare these five models
in detail because they served as stepping stones to construct the model in this study which
contains enhanced real-world matching mechanisms and students’ behavioral rules. I
also review in detail the processes of the six real-world matching mechanisms included in
this model: serial dictatorship, deferred acceptance, the top trading cycles mechanism, the
Boston mechanism, the Chinese parallel mechanism, and the Taipei mechanism.
The literature has mixed findings on how students prioritize schools in their
preference lists. I adopted Chang’s (2011) findings to construct students’ preferences
because Chang’s research was one of the few empirical studies that focused on

90
Taiwanese students. Since there is no strong evidence in the empirical literature to
explain students’ school-choice strategies, I referred to Chen et al.’s (2017) hypotheses
and my observation in the Taipei School District to construct the behavioral strategies in
this study. An advantage of ABM is that it is flexible to do what-if analysis to
accommodate data shortage (Montes, 2012). This study has run simulations with
different strategic scenarios.
Many researchers agree that student performance is influenced largely by
individual and family factors and only modestly by school factors (Burke & Sass, 2013;
Dearden et al., 2002; Hanushek, 1989; Jennings et al., 2015). Among the influential
school factors, peer effect is the most prominent one (Burke & Sass, 2013; Carman and
Zhang, 2012; Coleman et al., 1966). In constructing the module to adjust the scores of
high school students, I referred to the above findings and Salgado et al.’s (2014)
assumption that peer effect is through the networks formed by students themselves.
The purpose of this model was to answer the research questions of whether the
Taipei mechanism and Taipei’s free-tuition policy help equalize educational opportunity
and school quality. There is no consensus about the definition of educational opportunity
or school quality in the literature; it all depends on the purpose and limitation of the study
(Ladd & Lauen, 2010). In this study, I chose the definition of educational opportunity
from the input point of view and that of school quality from the output point of view. I
defined equality of educational opportunity as equality of freshmen’s average family
incomes across the schools. This definition is in line with the intention of Taiwan’s 12Year Education Reform. I defined equality of school quality as equality of seniors’ mean
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scores across the schools, as suggested by Ferreira and Gignoux (2014) as well as Ladd
and Loeb (2013).
In Chapter 3, I discuss the model in detail, including the design concepts,
parameters, variables, processing, computational algorithms, and data analysis plan. The
discussion also includes the issues of model verification and validation.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
The purpose of this study was to contribute to the development of agent-based
educational modeling for educational policy analysis. I built an agent-based OLG model
to qualitatively reflect the environment of Taipei’s senior high school system, including
its 2016 admission mechanism (the Taipei mechanism) and the free tuition policy. I
collected the simulated data to answer the research questions regarding whether Taipei’s
2016 admission policies could help equalize educational opportunity and school quality.
This chapter includes a description of this model according to the overview, design
concepts, and details protocol (the ODD protocol) designed by Grimm et al. (2010) and
the rationale for the model design.
Research Design and Rationale
The classical methodology to study school admission mechanisms is settheoretical models (e.g., Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2003; Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, & Roth,
2009; Kamada & Kojima, 2014; Pathak & Sonmez, 2013). These models are not proper
to investigate the complex effects of admission policies or useful for understanding the
relative consequences of policies for different groups of students (Hafalir et al., 2013).
Researchers have long called for using ABM to conduct research in this line (e.g.,
Maroulis et al., 2010). The few existing agent-based school-choice models also have
demonstrated that ABM is more flexible to handle heterogeneous student agents (Chen et
al., 2017; Harland & Heppenstall, 2012; Maroulis et al., 2014; Millington et al., 2014;
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Wang et al., 2017). Therefore, I chose ABM to study admission policies in an
environment qualitatively representing the Taipei School District.
Most of the few agent-based school-choice models assumed that students were
truth tellers, who submit their school preferences as their school choices. The literature
has shown that students use strategies corresponding to the matching mechanism to make
their school choices (Chen et al., 2014; Pathak, 2011). To assume truth-telling is
ineffective for admission policy analysis. Although Chen et al. (2017) and Wang et al.
(2017) have started the attempt to distinguish students’ preference from choices and
model students’ strategic behaviors, the factor considered in their designs was too simple
to reflect the real-world observations. Therefore, I enhanced their design by adding the
factors of distance and family income, which complied with the findings in the literature
and my observation in the Taipei School District.
An admission mechanism is essential to school choice systems; it determines how
students are assigned to school. Most existing agent-based school-choice models only
used the Boston mechanism to assign students to schools (e.g., Harland & Heppenstall,
2012; Maroulis et al., 2014; Millington et al., 2014). Although the Boston mechanism
might still be the dominant mechanism to assign students to schools in the United States
and some other countries, it has been replaced with deferred acceptance or other mixed
mechanisms in many admission reforms globally. Interestingly, abiding by Taiwan’s 12Year Education Reform, the Taipei School District has brought back the spirit of the
Boston mechanism by mixing it with the original deferred acceptance to form its
admission mechanism since 2014. It seems that none of the mechanisms mentioned
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above would be rid of easily. Therefore, an agent-based model for educational admission
systems should be able to process not only the matching mechanism of interest but also
the commonly used matching mechanisms to provide an in-depth understanding of the
complicated effects of a matching mechanism in comparison with those of the other realworld mechanisms. Wang et al. (2017) have programmed the operational algorithms of
serial dictatorship, the Boston mechanism, deferred acceptance, the Chinese Parallel, and
Taipei’s 2015 admission mechanism in their NetLogo model. I adopted their program
codes to process the former four mechanisms and wrote the code for Taipei’s 2016
admission mechanism (the Taipei mechanism) because the Taipei School District
overhauled the school prioritization rules in its 2015 admission mechanism in 2016.
With all the above improvements, this agent-based simulation model could process five
real-world student-assignment mechanisms in each simulation run and thus allowed a
better analysis of the effects of Taipei’s 2016 admission policies (the Taipei mechanism
and the free tuition policy) on educational equalities.
I made this model an OLG model because in the Taipei School District, students’
school preferences and school ranking are highly correlated, and school ranking are
largely determined by seniors’ performance (Shao, 2015; Stanley1986, 2014). Since
older generations’ behaviors will affect the overlapping younger generations’ decision
making, OLG design is necessary.
One of the advantages of ABM is its flexibility to run scenario analysis. This
feature is important in policymaking because how students may react to a new
educational policy is usually unknown or uncertain. I simulated 300 scenarios with
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different combinations of students’ strategic behaviors, the number of choices, and type
of mechanism with and without the free tuition policies. The simulated results provide
policymakers and stakeholders with a range of plausible policy outcomes and thus
facilitate informative admission policy decisions.
The independent variables in this study were the parameters that defined students’
behavioral rules and admission policies. The control variables were the parameters that
defined the attributes of the entities in this model. I describe these parameters in the
section of model description below. The dependent variables were the outcomes
generated from simulations. Agent-based simulations generate rich microscopic,
mesoscopic, and macroscopic outcomes. It can trace the activity and status of each
individual agent and record the evolution of meso- and macrophenomena of interest at
every time step. The outcomes that I was interested were the distribution of the mean
freshman family income and the distribution of the mean senior score, which are the
proxies for the distribution of educational opportunities and distribution of school quality,
respectively. I used descriptive statistics and paired samples t-tests to compare the
simulated outcomes of all mechanisms and answered the research questions of whether
Taipei’s new admission policies help equalize educational opportunity and school quality.
Model Description
Under ABM, a system is modeled as a collection of autonomous agents that
interact with each other and with the computational world within which the agents reside
(Borrill & Tesfatsion, 2011). Researchers then set the parameters to determine the
system’s initial conditions and let the model run to collect and analyze the micro-, meso-
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and macrodata generated from the simulations. Grimm et al. (2006) suggested the ODD
protocol to clearly and rigorously document a model’s purpose and design so that a third
party can replicate it. After reviewing the uses of the ODD protocol, Grimm et al. (2010)
modified some terms used in the original ODD protocol to better fulfill its purpose and
for the users to better understand and adopt the protocol. The ODD protocol is also
advocated by the Network for Computational Modeling for SocioEcological Science
(CoMSES Net), which maintains the website of OpenABM to promote the methodology
of ABM and to serve as a node for agent-based modelers to share models and exchange
ideas. Therefore, I adopted the 2010 ODD protocol to describe the model in this study.
Under the 2010 ODD protocol, a model should be described with three
consecutive components: overview, design concepts, and details. The context and the
general structure of a model should first be described (overview), followed by the general
concepts supporting the model design (design concepts) and then the technical details
(details). The overview section is further divided into three parts: (a) purpose; (b)
entities, state variables (variables that characterize an entity), and scales; and (c) process
overview and scheduling. The section of design concepts includes the following 11
elements: (a) basic principles underlying the model’s design, including concepts,
theories, and hypotheses; (b) emergence of phenomena from individual agents’
behaviors; (c) adaptation, (d) objectives of the act of adaptation; (e) learning that can
change the adaptive traits of individual agents; (f) prediction involved in agents’ decision
making; (g) sensing the information in the environment; (h) interaction among the agents;
(i) stochasticity applied in the processes; (j) collectives formed by individual agents; and
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(k) observations collected from model simulations. However, any of these elements not
included in a model can be omitted. The last section, details, includes the three
subsections: (a) initialization of each simulation, (b) input data, and (c) submodels for the
processes (Grimm et al., 2010).
In the following sections, I describe the agent-based OLG model of this study in
the format guided by the 2010 ODD protocol.
Overview
Purpose. The purpose of this model is to understand qualitatively how Taipei’s
new high school admission policies affect the distribution of educational opportunity and
school quality under different behavioral scenarios, in comparison with other matching
mechanisms including serial dictatorship, deferred acceptance, the Boston mechanism,
and the Chinese parallel mechanism. This model is an OLG model because in each
simulation run, there will be three generations of student agents in the same time and the
older generation’s performance will affect the school choice decisions of the younger
generation. This model is an example of how ABM can facilitate the micro-,meso-, and
macroanalysis of educational policies, especially in a centralized school admission
system.
Entities, State Variables, and Scales. This model contains three types of entities:
schools, student agents, and the governmental authority. The schools refer to 3-year
senior high schools covering grades 10-12. Each school agent has the following
attributes (state variables): location, admission capacity, type (private or public), the
lowest score of the admitted freshmen, and the lowest rank of the admitted freshmen.
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The government works as a clearinghouse and determines the high school admission and
tuition policies, including the school-student matching mechanism, the level of
information to be released, the number of school choices each student can make, and the
tuition policy. These educational policies are the exogenous factors of the model. They
are determined before the start of each run and remain constant during the run. Student
agents are characterized by the following state variables: scores, location, school
preference, school choice, and family income. There will be three student cohorts in each
simulation year: the cohort of candidates for high school freshmen, the cohort of high
school sophomores, and the cohort of high school seniors.
Space is implicitly included in the model. There are two neighborhoods in the
model (Neighborhood 1 and Neighborhood 2) to represent the two neighborhoods in the
Taipei School District. Neighborhood 1 represents Taipei City and has higher average
household income, higher average student performance, and better high schools than
Neighborhood 2, which represents Suburban Taipei. In the model, there are a total of 10
schools which are distributed in a way that resembles qualitatively the distribution of
school ranks in the Taipei School District in 2015 (Sleepcat615, 2015). The proportions
of the total school capacity in these two neighborhoods are similar to those in Taipei City
and Suburban Taipei in 2015 (sleepcat615, 2015). Table 4 describes the distribution of
the 10 schools. The identification of each school represents its initial rank. For example,
School #1 is initially ranked the highest; School #10, the lowest. The distribution of the
schools in this model reflects the fact that on average, the schools in Taipei City are
ranked higher than the schools in Suburban Taipei. School #3 represents a fee-paying
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private school which lower-income students will not choose if there is no free-tuition
policy. The locations of the student agents also represent their admission statuses. The
admission candidates stay outside of the schools (see Figure 2 for illustration.) Once they
are admitted, they move into the locations of the schools that they are admitted to. Those
who are rejected by all schools leave the system.
Table 4
School Distribution
Neighborhood 1
Neighborhood 2
School #1
School #4
School #2
School #6
School #3
School #7
School #5
School #9
School #8
School #10
Total Capacity percentage
50%
50%
Note. The spatial distribution of the 10 schools in the model qualitatively represents the
School ID

distribution of school ranks in the two neighborhoods of the Taipei School District
(Taipei City and Suburban Taipei). School #3 represents a fee-paying private academic
school. Each school’s ID represents its initial rank in the system.
Each simulation run proceeds in discrete time steps for 33 steps. Since most high
school districts process admissions once a year, each time step represents 1 school year.
Process Overview and Scheduling. At the beginning of each year, freshmen
become sophomores, sophomores become seniors, and seniors graduate and leave the
system. Then, a new set of admission candidates (new student agents) enters into the
system. While some of the new candidates stay in Neighborhood 1 and some stay in
Neighborhood 2, all stay outside of the 10 schools. Admission candidates receive raw

100
scores and family incomes from a multivariate normal distribution, form their school
preference lists, and use strategies to make their school choices. Each school prioritizes
the students based on the rules set by the admission policy. The governmental authority
(clearinghouse) matches the schools and the students according to the matching
mechanism determined by the admission policy. The students who are admitted move to
their high schools and stay in the same schools until graduation. Those who are not
admitted leave the system. After the admission process, the system updates the scores of
the new sophomores and seniors, records the lowest scores and the lowest ranks of the
freshmen each school admits, and calculates the standard deviations of the distribution of
the mean freshman family incomes and the distribution of the mean senior scores across
the schools. These 2 standard distributions are the measures of the inequalities of
educational opportunity and school quality, respectively, in the computer environment.
Figure 4 illustrates the process flow of the model.
Design Concepts
Basic Principles. The design of student agents’ behaviors was based on the
observations made in the Taipei School District and the empirical findings in the
literature. The surveys show that Taiwan students prefer higher quality schools to lower
quality schools and use school rank as the index for school quality (Chang, 2011; Lu,
2012; Shao, 2015; Yan, 2015). However, when schools’ qualities are too low, quality
becomes relatively irrelevant, and students prefer the nearby low-quality schools to the
far-away low-quality schools (Chang, 2011). That is, Taiwan students have highly
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correlated preferences for higher-ranked schools and prefer nearby lower-ranked schools
to far-away lower-ranked schools.

Figure 4. Process overview of the model. Schools prioritize students according to the
admission policy. Candidates submit their school-choice lists based on their preferences
and strategies used. The clearinghouse matches students and schools according to the
matching mechanism determined by the policy. After the matching process, freshman
cohorts emerge as well as the admission distribution. Next year, the freshman cohorts
will become the sophomore cohorts, and the sophomore cohorts will become the senior
cohorts. At the end of each school year, the model updates school information and
collect data needed for analysis.
Students do not always report their school preferences as their school choices. If
how students rank their schools affect their admission results under a mechanism,
students will respond to that mechanism and use strategies to form their school-choice
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lists in a way that they think will maximize their chances to attend their most preferred
schools possible (Chen et al., 2015; Pathak, 2011). A strategy commonly taught to Taipei
students states as follows: (a) Student should first review each school and its features to
form a preference list; (b) student should collect each school’s past admission
information, such as the lowest accepted rank or score, in comparison to student’s own
rank or score, to predict the chance of being admitted to each school and form a list of
possible schools; (c) students should understand the admission mechanism and choose
schools mainly from the list of possible schools; (d) student should form the schoolchoice list in a way that student is confident to be admitted to a school while gambling
for the admission to a more preferred school (Sun, 2015; Zhang & Wang, 2015). A
similar strategy is also widely disseminated in mainland China (e.g., H. Wang, 2015; R.
Wang, 2015; Song, 2015). There are three strategies in this model. Strategy #2 and
Strategy #3 reflect the above commonly advised strategy (see the subsection of details
below). In this information age, it is very likely that students all learn about and use the
same strategy to form their school choices. Therefore, when Strategy #2 or Strategy #3 is
simulated, all student agents use the same strategy to make their school choices. The
design of Strategy #1 was based on the assumption that student agents are truth tellers
and choose schools according to their own considerations (see Strategy #1 in the
subsection of details below).
Without tuition subsidy, it is unlikely for lower-income students to choose
expensive private schools (Chen, 2007). Therefore, student agents in the bottom 50%
income group will not choose School #3, the fee-paying private school, if there is no free-
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tuition policy. All student agents are boundedly rational. Like students in the Taipei
School District, student agents in the model have limited information about their
competitors’ scores, ranks, and school-choice decisions.
At the beginning of each simulation run, the ranks of the schools are in the
following order:
School #1 ⪰ School #2 ⪰ …. ⪰ School #10,

where the symbol “⪰” means “superior to.” The distribution of the school ranks in this
model qualitatively represents the distribution of school ranks in the Taipei School
District in 2015, where most schools in Taipei City were ranked higher than those in
Suburban Taipei. In Taiwan, high schools are ranked mainly based on the percentage of
their graduates who attend elite universities (Shao, 2015; Stanley1986, 2014). The higher
the seniors’ scores, the better chances they have to attend the elite universities. Generally
speaking, if a school’s average senior score is higher, the percentage of its graduates who
attend elite universities will be higher. Therefore, the ranks of the schools in this model
will be adjusted according to their seniors’ average scores in the simulation process.
Income in Taiwan, like those in many other countries, follows a lognormal
distribution (Pinkovskiy & Sala-i-Martin, 2009). As in other Asian countries, Taiwan
students’ performances are positively correlated with their incomes (Hojo & Oshio,
2012). Based on the central limit theorem, it is reasonable to assume that student agents’
scores are normally distributed. It is further assumed that a high-performing student, in
average, performs well in all subjects and vice versa. Under all the above assumptions,
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candidate agents’ log family incomes and their subject test scores form a multivariate
normal distribution in this model.
After the admission (matching) process, student agents stay in their assigned
schools for the entire high school years (Grades 10-12). These high school student
agents’ scores are calculated based on the following two assumptions: (a) The individual
and family factors are constant throughout the agents’ existence in the model, and (b) the
influence of schooling is mainly through peer effect as evidenced in many studies (e.g.,
Coleman et al., 1966; Burke & Sass, 2013; Hojo & Oshio, 2012; Jennings et al., 2015).
The design of peer effect is based on Salgado et al.’s (2014) hypotheses that peer effect is
through the formation of network and that the level of tolerance towards the difference in
family background plays an important role in the network formation. Only those who
can join the peers will be influenced by the peers.
Emergence. After the matching process, a new freshman cohort emerges in each
school, and a new admission distribution emerges.
Adaptation, Objectives, Learning, and Prediction. Candidates for admission
pursue the objective of attending their most preferred schools possible. They use the
information released to them to predict which schools they are confident to be admitted to
(their possible schools) and adapt strategies to form the best school-choice lists possible.
Since each candidate for admission will be in the matching process only once, this
activity is considered a one-shot game. Thus, no learning behavior is programmed in the
candidate agents’ decision process. However, learning is implied in the peer effect
assumed in the calculation of the scores of the high school student agents.
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Sensing. All admission candidates know each school’s quality, the lowest score
and rank of the students admitted to each school, and, as long as the admission policy
allows, their own scores and ranks without any information seeking process. Once
candidate agents form their school-choice lists, the governmental authority receives them
without the need to go through any transmission process either.
Interaction. In the real world, admission candidates talk to their peers and
advisers about how the tests went and how to form school-choice strategies. Students
also talk to high school students they know to seek advice. Even so, admission
candidates can hardly have the same school-choice lists because their scores are hardly
the same. However, in this information age, it is very likely for all of them to use the
same decision strategy as described in the previous paragraph of basic concepts.
Therefore, when Strategy #2 or #3 is employed, all candidate agents will use the same
strategy to make their school choices (see the submodel of student’s school choice list
below.)
Stochasticity. In the Taipei School District, 36% of the admission candidates
reside in Taipei City; 64%, Suburban Taipei (Taipei City Government Department of
Education, 2016). In the model, the admission candidates created each year are placed
randomly in Neighborhoods 1 and 2 according to the above ratio. Each admission
candidate’s log family income and subject test scores are randomly generated from a
multivariate normal distribution. The estimated parameters to generate incomes and
scores are described in the subsection of details below and listed in Table 5. Candidate
agent’s preference list is generated from a Zipf distribution, Zipf (α, n), in conjunction
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with the distance consideration for low-quality schools. The parameter α depicts how
correlated the candidate agents’ preferences are and n is the number of the remaining
schools to be ranked (see the subsection of details below).
Collectives. Each year, after the matching process, candidate agents move to their
individual schools, and the freshman cohort of each school emerges. The old freshman
cohorts formed last year become the sophomore cohorts; the sophomore cohorts become
the senior cohorts; the senior cohorts graduate and leave the system.
Observation. For model testing, individual candidate agents’ admission results
and individual senior agent’s scores were recorded and observed. For model analysis,
only the macro- and mesodata were recorded and observed, e.g., the freshman cohorts’
average incomes, the senior cohorts’ average scores, the top 10-percent candidates’
admission status, and the admission status of the students in the bottom income quartile.
Details
The model, written in NetLogo 5.3 (Wilensky, 1999), can be downloaded from
the website of OpenABM. The direct link is
https://www.openabm.org/model/5521/version/1/view. I also attach the code in
Appendix A.
Initializations. At each initial state, the model created 10 schools, 5 in
Neighborhood 1 and 5 in Neighborhood 2 (see Table 4). These 10 schools were located
in the same places throughout the simulation runs, and all schools were of the same
admission capacity. I set each school to provide 100 admission seats; therefore, there
were a total of 1,000 admission seats for the candidates each year. This level of capacity
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represents a 100% admission opportunity rate, as in the Taipei School District, because
exactly 1,000 admission candidates were created each simulation year in all simulation
runs. At each initial state, the schools were ranked in the following order: School #1 ⪰

School #2 ⪰ … ⪰ School #10. The lowest score accepted by each school was set to be 0.
The lowest ranks accepted by the schools were all set to be the lowest rank of all
students, which was 1,000 in the simulations.
Similar to the residence distribution of the admission candidates in the Taipei
School District, 36% of the candidate agents live in Neighborhood 1; 64%, Neighborhood
2.
The mean and standard deviation of the family income in Neighborhood 1 are
TWD1,575,000 (around USD47,700) and TWD873,000 (around USD26,400),
respectively, approximating to the mean and standard deviation of the 2014 household
income in Taipei City (Taipei City Government Department of Budget, Accounting and
Statistics, 2015). The mean and standard deviation of the family income in
Neighborhood 2 are TWD1,147,000 (around USD34,700) and TWD574,000 (around
USD17,400), respectively, approximating to those of the 2014 household income in
Suburban Taipei (New Taipei City Government, 2015a). These values are constant
throughout all simulations.
The mean and standard deviation of all students’ entrance exam scores in the
Taipei School District were roughly calculated to be 54 and 23, respectively (RCPET,
2015). Based on this information, I set the mean scores of the admission candidate
agents in Neighborhood 1 and Neighborhood 2 to be 65.00 and 47.50, respectively, to
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qualitatively represent the positive correlation between income and score. I set the
standard deviations of the scores in both neighborhoods to be 23, which was the same as
that in the whole Taipei School District. Without empirical data to support the above
information, the above score figures were arbitrarily assumed. In Taiwan, the entrance
exams have been systematically designed to properly reflect students’ performances.
Therefore, the score means and standard deviations were constant throughout all
simulations.
Each candidate agent had five subject test scores. The log family income and
student’s five subject scores formed a 6-dimensional multivariate normal distribution. I
set the correlation coefficient between any two standardized variables in this multivariate
normal distribution, Rho, to be .80, which reflected qualitatively a moderate to high
correlation between score and family income as empirically found in the literature (e.g.,
Hojo & Oshio, 2012; Tsai & Yang, 2015).
I set the alpha in the Zipf distribution used to generate admission candidates’
school preference lists to be 3. This value helped the model to produce moderately to
highly correlated preferences for higher-quality schools among the candidates as
observed in the Taipei School District. The parameter Tolerance determines which high
school student will be affected by the peers, and the parameter PeerEffect determines the
magnitude of the peer effect. I set the value of the parameter Tolerance to be .58, which
means that only those high school student agents whose family incomes are within (1 +
58%) of the average family income of their peers would be affected by their peers. I
adopted this value from the estimated average tolerance level calculated by Salgado et al.
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(2014). I also assumed the value of PeerEffect to be .58, denoting that for each point of
the peers’ mean score higher (lower) than the student’s score, the student’s score would
be increased (decreased) by .58. This value was a direct adoption of the regression
coefficient on peer’s mean score calculated by Hojo and Oshio (2012) to predict Taiwan
students’ math score. Without empirical evidence in the literature, the values of
Tolerance and PeerEffect were arbitrary, just to reflect the quality of peer effect. Table 5
summarizes the parameters and their values at the initial state. These values were
constant in the simulations.
At the initial state of each simulation, the admission policies, given exogenously,
determine the matching mechanism, the number of school choices allowed, the level of
information to be released, and the tuition policy of that simulation. The parameter sortextra-choice is an additional design to reflect candidate agents’ risk aversion attitude.
When sort-extra-choice = yes, candidate agents have a lower risk-aversion level; when
sort-extra-choice = no, candidate agents have a higher risk aversion level. Table 6 shows
the 300 combinations of the values of sort-extra-choice, the types of strategy, the
mechanisms, and the values of the parameters related to the admission and tuition
policies. I simulated each combination 30 times to make statistical analysis feasible.
Input Data. This is an exploratory model to simulate the impact of admission
and tuition policies. No input or data file from external sources were used, except that I
referred to the data from Taipei’s Comprehensive Assessment Program for Junior High
Students in 2015 and the income statistics for the Taipei area to set the values of the
means and standard deviations of candidate agents’ scores and family incomes (see the
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previous paragraph of initializations).
Table 5
Parameters at Initialization
Parameter
Students

Description
Number of students

Value
1,000

Capacity

School capacity

Score-Mean-1

Mean test score of candidates in Neighborhood 1

65.00

Score-Mean-2

Mean test score of candidates in Neighborhood 2

47.50

Score-SD

Standard deviation of candidates’ test scores

23.00

Income-mean-1

Average household income in Neighborhood 1
(representing Taipei City)

$1,575,000.00

Income-mean-2

Average household income in Neighborhood 2
(representing Suburban Taipei)

$1,147,000.00

Income-SD-1

Standard deviation of household income in
Neighborhood 1

$873,000.00

Income-SD-2

Standard deviation of household income in
Neighborhood 2

$574,000.00

Rho

Correlation coefficient between scores and log
family income and among scores

Alpha

α of the Zipf distribution used to generate school
preference list

Tolerance

Family income difference tolerance rate

.58

PeerEffect

Coefficient of peer effect

.58

100

.80

3.00
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Table 6
Combinations of Policy Parameters and risk aversion level in Simulations
Parameters

Serial
Boston
dictatorship/deferred mechanism
acceptance
Yes, No
Yes, No

Chinese parallel
mechanism

Taipei
mechanism

Yes, No

Yes, No

Number of
Choices

2, 4, 6, 8, 10

2, 4, 6, 8, 10

(1, 1), (2,2), (3,
3), (4, 4), (5,5)

2, 4, 6, 8, 10

Strategy used?

#1, #2, #3

#1, #2, #3

#1, #2, #3

#1, #2, #3

Sort-extrachoice?

Yes, No

Yes, No

Yes, No

Yes, No

Free tuition?

Submodels. There are a total of 6 submodels in the program as described in the
following paragraphs.
Candidate’s log family income and scores. Each new candidate agent’s log
family income and five subject test scores are randomly selected from a 6-dimensional
multivariate normal distribution. To simplify the process, I use Derde and Massart’s
(1984) technique of sampling from the standardized multivariate normal distribution and
then converting the sample points to their original units. In the standardized multivariate
normal distribution, its variable zi has a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Its
variance-covariance matrix coincides with its correlation matrix Γ,
1
⎡𝜌𝜌
⎢𝜌𝜌21
31
Γ = ⎢𝜌𝜌
⎢ 41
⎢𝜌𝜌51
⎣𝜌𝜌61

𝜌𝜌12
1
𝜌𝜌32
𝜌𝜌42
𝜌𝜌52
𝜌𝜌62

𝜌𝜌13
𝜌𝜌23
1
𝜌𝜌43
𝜌𝜌53
𝜌𝜌63

𝜌𝜌14
𝜌𝜌24
𝜌𝜌34
1
𝜌𝜌54
𝜌𝜌64

𝜌𝜌15
𝜌𝜌25
𝜌𝜌35
𝜌𝜌45
1
𝜌𝜌65

𝜌𝜌16
𝜌𝜌26 ⎤
𝜌𝜌36 ⎥
⎥
𝜌𝜌46 ⎥
𝜌𝜌56 ⎥
1 ⎦
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where ρij is the correlation coefficient between zi and zj. In this model, I set ρij to be .8. z1
is the variable for the standardized log family income; z2 to z6 are the variables for the
standardized subject test scores. The unstandardized means and standard deviations of
the family income and the five subject test scores are listed in Table 5. Note that the
means and standard deviations of family incomes and scores in Neighborhood 1 are
different from those in Neighborhood 2. The mean, µ, and variance, σ2, of log family
income can be calculated as below:
𝑚𝑚2

µ = ln(√𝑣𝑣+𝑚𝑚2 ) ;
σ = �ln(1 +

𝑣𝑣
)
𝑚𝑚2

where 𝑣𝑣 and m are the variance and mean of family income, respectively. Therefore, the

µ in Neighborhood 1 is 14.14; the µ in Neighborhood 2 is 13.84. The σ in Neighborhood
1 is .52; the σ in Neighborhood 2 is .47.
Once the six values, represented by the vector zk, are randomly sampled from the
standardized multivariate normal distribution, they are converted to their original units,
represented by the vector xk, by using the following formula:
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = σi 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + µi.

Note that x1k is student’s log family income. It then is converted to student’s family
income, y = exp (x1k).
Under the Taipei mechanism, each subject test score is coarse-grained into a 7scale score (Table 1), and schools must use students’ 7-scale scores to prioritize students.
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Under all other mechanisms, students’ five subject test scores are summed up, and
schools use the summed scores to prioritize students.
Candidate’s school preference list. Each year, the ten schools are ranked
according to their quality represented by the average scores of their senior students, and
this ranking is assumed to be publicly recognized. Student agents have similar
preferences for higher-ranked schools. Each student’s preference for the top seven
schools is generated in sequential order from a Zipf distribution, i.e., x~Zipf(α, n), where
n = the number of the remaining schools to be selected and x is the rank of the remaining
schools (x = 1,...,n). In this study, I set α to be 3. To set α = 3 is to depict the moderate to
high correlation between candidates’ school preferences. Therefore, Zipf(3,7) (Figure 5)
is used to determine the most preferred school of a student agent, Zipf(3, 6) is used to
determine the second preferred school, and so on.
To determine the preference for the bottom three schools, student agents first
group them into neighborhood schools and non-neighborhood schools, and the program
will prioritize the schools in the same group by using the Zipf distribution. The following
is an example of how a student’s preference list is determined.
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Figure 5. The probability mass function for Zipf (3,7). The top-ranked school has an
83.81% probability to be selected as a student’s most preferred school under Zipf(3,7).
Example 7. Assuming that the schools are ranked as in the initial setting; that is,
School #1 ⪰ School #2 ⪰ … ⪰ School #10. Candidate i lives in Neighborhood 2. After
randomly selected from the Zipf distribution, Candidate i’s preference for the top seven
schools is:
Pit = {2, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}
in which School #2 is the candidate’s most preferred school. For the bottom three
schools, Candidate i first ranks the schools in Neighborhood 2 (Schools #9 and #10). The
program randomly ranks these two schools from the Zipf distribution, Zipf (3, 2), and the
result is: Pic = {10, 9}. Now, the only school to be ranked is School #8. Apparently,
School # 8 is Candidate i’s least preferred school. As a result, Candidate i’s complete
preference list is as follows:
Pi = {2, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 9, 8}.
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I use the above preference list in later paragraphs to explain the simulation process.
If there is no free-tuition policy and Candidate i is from a bottom 50% family,
Candidate i will not consider School #3 at all. In this case, Candidate i’s preference list is
adjusted to be the following:
Pi,-3 = {2, 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 9, 8}.
Candidate’s school choice list. Candidates’ school-choice decisions depend on
the strategies applied. There are three heuristic strategies for the candidate agents to
adopt. Strategies #2 and #3 are the mimics of the commonly advised strategy described
in the previous subsection of design concepts. Strategy #1 is a truth-telling strategy as
commonly assumed in the literature on school choice and is used for comparison purpose.
I simulated each scenario listed in Table 5 with all of the three strategies to explore how
student agents’ behaviors would change the outcomes of an admission policy.
Under Strategy #1, candidate agents are truth tellers, who arrange their school
choices in the same order as their school preferences. Therefore, when students are
allowed to choose 10 schools, their school-choice lists are the same as their preference
lists. When the number of choices allowed is less than 10, students each form a strategy
that fits his or her risk aversion level and other considerations. The application of the
principle of maximum entropy reflects candidate agents’ heterogeneous considerations.
That is, under Strategy #1, students randomly select the schools from their preference
lists up to the number of choices allowed. Therefore, Strategy #1 is not a single strategy
but a combination of many strategies. The selected schools will then be sorted according
to their orders in candidates’ preference lists because candidate agents are truth tellers.
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For example, if the number of choices allowed is 4, a possible school-choice list of
Student i in Example 7 is Ci = {2, 5, 7, 10}.
Under Strategy #2, candidate agents consider their own test scores and all
information released by the government to make their choice lists. They first compare
their total raw scores, qi,t, with the lowest total raw scores of the students admitted to each
school last year, rj,t-1, to form two groups of schools: the possible group, PG, and the
impossible group, IG. PG contains all schools whose rj,t-1 are lower than the student’s qi,t,
while the rj,t-1 of the schools in IG are at least the same or higher than the student’s qi,t,.
PG = { j : qi,t > rj,t-1}, IG = { j : qi,t ≤ rj,t-1}
Refer to Example 7. Candidate i's PG and IG may be as follows: PG = {7, 10, 9,
8}; IG = {2, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6}. If Candidate i is from a bottom 50% family and there is no
tuition subsidy, then Candidate i's PG and IG are as follows: PG = {7, 10, 9, 8}; IG = {2,
1, 4, 5, 6}.
Then the candidate agent begins the school-choice process by first selecting
schools from PG up to the number of choices allowed. If the school-choice list is not
full, the student agent will strategically select the schools from IG until the list is full.
Again, I apply the principle of maximum entropy to reflect agents’ heterogeneous
considerations to form the strategies to select the schools from IG; that is, the schools in
IG will be randomly selected to fill the school choice list. If sort-extra-choice = yes,
candidates have a low risk-aversion level and are willing to take the risk of wasting their
top choices in order to gamble for the chance of attending their more preferred schools;
that is, candidate agents will sort all of the selected schools according to their preference
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lists. If sort-extra-choice = no, candidate agents have a higher risk-aversion level and
will simply put those impossible schools selected at the end of their school-choice lists.
Refer to Example 7. Using Strategy #2, Candidate i may have the school-choice lists
under the influence of the parameter sort-extra-choice as shown in Table 7.
Table 7
Effect of sort-extra-choice on Candidate i’s School Choice List
Serial
dictatorship/deferred
acceptance/Boston
mechanism/Taipei
mechanism
{7, 10, 9, 8}

{7, 10}, {9, 8}

10

{2, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 9,
8}

{3, 7, 10, 9, 8}, {2, 1, 4,
5, 6}

4

{7, 10, 9, 8}

{7, 10}, {9, 8}

Number of
choices
allowed
4
Sort-extra-choice
= yes

Sort-extra-choice
= no

Chinese parallel
mechanism

10

{7, 10, 9, 8, 2, 1, 3, 4, 5, {7, 10, 9, 8, 3}, {2, 1, 4,
6}
5, 6}
Note. Refer to Example 7 and assume Candidate i’s PG = {7, 10, 9, 8} and IG = {2, 1, 3,
4, 5, 6}. When there are only 4 choices allowed, Candidate i selects schools only from
PG. When the number of choices is 10, Candidate i selects schools first from PG and
then from IG. If sort-extra-choice is yes, Candidate i sorts all selected schools according
to his preference list. If sort-extra-choice is no, Candidate i simply puts the schools
selected from IG behind the schools selected from PG.
Strategy #3 is the same as Strategy #2, except that the information of score rank,
instead of score, is used. That is, candidates compare their own score ranks with the
lowest score rank of the students accepted by each school last year to determine their PG
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and IGs. From the example in Table 7, one can see that when sort-extra-order = True
and the number of choices = 10, the choice lists generated by Strategy #2 and Strategy #3
under SD, DA, TM, and BM are the same as students’ preference lists. When a student’s
choice list is the same as his or her preference list, the strategy used by the student is
called the truth-telling strategy.
Matching. After receiving all candidates’ school-choice lists, the clearinghouse
matches the schools and the candidates according to the matching mechanism regulated
by the policy. The model processes the following five mechanisms for each simulation
run: serial dictatorship, deferred acceptance, the Boston mechanism, the Chinese parallel
mechanism, and the Taipei mechanism. To increase the computational speed, I have
simplified the process of the Taipei mechanism without jeopardizing its quality in the
following aspects: (a) Instead of grouping every 5 choices, this model groups every 2
choices in computing a student’s choice score, i.e., 35 points for the 1st and 2nd choices,
34 points for the 3rd and 4th choices, 33 points for the 5th and 6th choices, and so on; (b)
since almost all students can receive the full diversity learning score, this category is not
functional in distinguishing students’ performance and thus omitted in the computation;
and (c) since the maximum score for Chinese composition is only 1, this score is
relatively unimportant and is also omitted in the process. Therefore, the composite score
of the Taipei mechanism in this model is composed of the choice score (a maximum of
35 points) and the five subject test scores (a maximum of 35 points total). In the realworld, the maximum choice score under the Taipei mechanism is 36. It is changed to 35
in this model to maintain the same proportion of these two scores in the composite score.
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After the matching process, candidates who are admitted move to their individual
schools, and each school updates the record of the lowest score and the lowest rank of its
admitted freshman students. The candidate agents who are not admitted to any school
leave the system.
High school student’s score. The scores of the high school students are their
original scores adjusted by the peer effect. A student’s total raw test scores will be
adjusted by the peer effect only when the student’s family income is within the tolerance
range of the peer.

𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1

𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + �𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 �𝑃𝑃,
=�
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ,

if (1 − 𝑇𝑇)𝐹𝐹𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 < 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 < (1 + 𝑇𝑇)𝐹𝐹𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡

otherwise,

where qi,t is the score of Student i in School j in year t, qij,t+1 is the student’s score in year
t+1, SUj, t is the mean score of the student’s cohort in School j in year t, P = PeerEffect, T
= Tolerance, FUj, t is the mean family income of the student’s cohort in School j in year t,
and fij, t is the student’s family income in year t. In this model, both PeerEffect and
Tolerance are .58. The score adjustment is made at the end of each high school year for
freshmen, sophomores, and seniors. After the senior students’ scores are updated, the
mean senior score in each school is calculated, and the schools are re-ranked according to
the mean scores of their senior students.
Data collection. At the end of each matching process, the program automatically
collects the following macro- and mesolevel data: (a) the mean freshman family income
in each school, (b) the standard deviation of the mean freshman family income, (c) the
mean senior score in each school, (d) the standard deviation of the mean senior score, (e)
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the percentage of the top 10-percent performing candidates admitted to their most
preferred schools, (f) the preference index for students in each income quartile and
students with the bottom 10-percent family income, (g) the overall preference index, and
(h) match rate.
I used the distribution of the mean freshman family income as the proxy for the
distribution of educational opportunity. The less the standard deviation of this
distribution, the less the inequality of educational opportunity. Using standard deviation
to measure inequality has been supported by many scholars (Dorius, 2013). I also
compared the standard deviations of the mean freshman family income under different
policy settings to see which policy setting is more efficient in equalizing educational
opportunity. I used the mean senior score as the proxy for school quality. If all of the
mean senior scores across the schools are not significantly different, then it is possible to
say that the qualities of all schools are similar. I also compared the standard deviations of
the mean senior scores under different policy settings to see which policy setting is more
efficient in equalizing school quality.
The reason to collect the admission information about the top 10-percent
candidates was that the cases of justified envy suffered by elite students easily dominate
the news, creating pressures on policymakers to change policies in favor of the top 10percent. Therefore, how well elite students are admitted to their most preferred schools
under a particular policy setting certainly concerns policymakers. When less than 100%
of the top performing students are admitted to their most preferred schools, justified envy
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occurs. The magnitude of justified envy can be measured by the preference index (PI),
which is calculated as follows:
PI = baseline preference rank – actual preference rank.
Baseline preference rank is the position of the baseline school in a student’s preference
list. Baseline school is the school assigned to a truth-telling student under deferred
acceptance with no choice constraint. I used deferred acceptance without choice
constraint as the baseline mechanism because it avoids strategy manipulation and
justified envy (Pathak, 2011). Therefore, it is the most desired mechanism by elite
students in competitive school districts, such as the Taipei School District. Actual
preference rank is the position of the actual school in a student’s preference list. Actual
school is the school actually assigned to a student. For example, assuming Student i’s
preference list, Pi = {2, 1, 4, 3, 5, 7, 6, 9, 10, 8}, if Student i would be assigned to School
#4 under the baseline mechanism, then the student’s baseline preference rank = 3 because
School #4 is ranked third in the student’s preference list. If the student is actually
admitted to School #3, then the student’s actual preference rank = 4 because School #3 is
ranked fourth in the preference list. Therefore, Student i’s PI = 3 – 4 = -1.
A negative PI indicates the occurrence of justified envy or an admission loss
experienced by a student. The larger the negative PI, the larger the scale of justified
envy. On the other hand, a positive PI indicates an admission gain experienced by a
student. While deferred acceptance without choice constraint avoids justified envy, it also
sorts the students completely based on their scores. Under this policy setting, students
with the bottom 10-percent family income probably will all stay in the lowest-quality
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schools when income and scores are highly and positively correlated. Some societies
may not desire such result. The calculation of PI for students in each income quartiles
and students with the bottom 10-percent family income provides useful information to
evaluate the effects of an admission policy on various groups of students. The overall PI
=

∑ |𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃|
𝑁𝑁

, where N is the total number of students. I used this index to examine whether

the model passed the empirical output validation (see the section of verification and
validation below.)
Match rate is the number of candidates who are assigned to schools divided by the
number of total candidates. If there are a total of 1,000 seats and a total of 1,000
candidates in a school district, then the match rate can be as high as 100%. However,
some students may not be admitted under certain admission policies. If the match rate of
a matching mechanism is low, then the mechanism may not be efficient in assigning
students. Match rate serves as an index to assess the allocation efficiency of a
mechanism.
Data Analysis Plan
The purpose of this study was to answer the research question of whether the
Taipei mechanism, in comparison to other commonly used mechanisms, and the freetuition policy can help equalize educational opportunity and school quality in the Taipei
School District. I simulated 300 combinations of the parameters to explore the possible
results under different behavioral assumptions.
An advantage of running computational experiments is that computational
experiments are controlled experiments, in which clear causal relationships can be
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defined (Chen, 2015; Epstein, 1999). The data collected from the simulations are clean.
Little data cleaning and screening procedure are needed for computer-generated data, in
comparison to human experiments. The software used to build the model and run the
simulations was NetLogo 5.3, developed by Wilensky (1999). NetLogo 5.3 could
automatically generate the needed data during simulations. Because the values of the
computer-generated state variables, such as candidates’ scores and preference lists, will
be not the same in each simulation run, the result of each simulation even under the same
scenario might not be the same. Multiple runs of simulations should be performed to
make statistical analysis feasible. Therefore, I performed 30 simulation runs for each
scenario listed in Table 5.
I exported the simulated data collected from the NetLogo 5.3 model to IBM SPSS
v. 23 to perform descriptive statistics and paired samples t-tests with α = 0.01 to compare
the results of different matching mechanisms under the same scenario or the results under
different scenarios with the same matching mechanism. I used Microsoft Excel to draw
histogram graphs and tables to have a better visual comparison of policy outcomes. I also
calculated Cohen’s d to help determine the effect size.
Verification and Validation
A model must undergo verification and validation to be a rigorous simulation tool
(Rand & Rust, 2011). For simulation models, model verification is to test whether a
model performs as described. Model validation is to determine how well a model
represents the reality that it is designed to represent (Rand & Rust, 2011). However, if
the model is exploratory, model validation should focus on whether the modeler has a
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sound analytic strategy rather than whether the input and output of a model fit the
empirical data (Bankes, 1993).
Verification
Rand and Rust (2011) suggested three steps to properly verify a model:
documentation, programmatic testing, and test cases. I have fully documented the
conceptual model in the section of model description and uploaded the model codes with
clear descriptions to the website of OpenABM for other researchers to verify and
replicate the model. For programmatic testing, I have performed the technique of unit
testing by designing scenarios to test each submodel and the technique of code
walkthrough by reading through the codes to examine whether they did as planned. I
have also performed the technique of debugging walkthrough by running the program
with a small number of student agents to ensure that it generated the correct result for
each agent. For test cases, I have examined the specific scenarios to ensure that the
model produced the three stylized facts as mentioned in the next section of validation.
Therefore, the model in this study has been verified; i.e., the model performs as
described.
Validation
In the field of ABM, how to validate and what to validate are constantly under
debate. Simulation models are usually categorized into two types: consolidated models,
or descriptive models, and exploratory models, or demonstration models (Bankes, 1993;
Marks, 2013). Consolidated models are the models built on known facts or historical
data and used as approximations of the real systems. Exploratory models are built with
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hypothetical details and mechanisms, often due to insufficient knowledge or inherent
uncertainty, and used to explore the implications of the hypotheses and assumptions
(Bankes, 1993). Schelling’s (1971) segregation model is an example of exploratory
models. For consolidated models, it may be possible to validate the model with historical
data. However, if a model’s input and output perfectly fit the historical data, it may be
over-fitted by ignoring the inherent uncertainly in human behavior and produce little
insight in prediction (Banke, 1993). For exploratory models, even though they cannot be
validated with historical data, they help to explore the outcomes within the range of
possible behaviors or help to hypothesize a plausible explanation and guide data
collection to test the hypothesis (Bankes, 1993; Epstein, 2008). Schelling’s segregation
model serves as a good example. Although unable to be validated in a traditional sense,
Schelling’s model provides rich insight into segregation, showing us that macrobehavior
can be very misleading in explaining the micromotives. Therefore, Bankes (1993) argued
that the traditional concept of validation does not apply to exploratory models; instead,
what should be focused is the validity of the analytic strategy. Since this study was an
exploratory modeling, I adopted Bankes’s argument to examine the validity of this study.
In this study, the simulated data were collected by using the measures founded on the
common concepts of educational opportunity and school quality. I ran each scenario 30
times to generate enough data for sound statistical analysis. I analyzed the data by using
statistical techniques offered by SPSS. Therefore, this study had a valid analytic strategy.
Rand and Rust (2011) promoted the following four guidelines to validate a
simulation model: (a) “micro-face” validation to make sure that the properties and
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mechanisms of a model correspond “on face” to the properties and mechanisms of the
real-world system; (b) “macro-face” validation to show that the aggregate patterns
generated by the model on face correspond to the aggregate patterns of the real-world
system; (c) empirical input validation to ascertain a sufficient explanation about how the
input of the model is derived, even if it cannot be calibrated to historical data; and (d)
empirical output validation to show that the output of the implemented model
corresponds to the stylized facts or empirical data of the real-world system. In the
process of empirical output validation, an exploratory model is considered valid as long
as its output corresponds to the stylized facts of the real world. If the model is for
prediction purpose, then the model must demonstrate that one of the exhibited outputs of
the model matches the empirical data of the real world. In the process of both micro-face
and macro-face validation, no data are compared to the model (Rand & Rust, 2011).
In this model, the parameters and agent’s behavioral rules were programmed
based on the findings in the literature and the observations in the Taipei School District,
which allowed the model to be micro-face valid. This model is macro-face valid because
the matching processes in the model comply with those in the real world. This model
met the guidelines of Rand and Rust’s (2011) empirical input validation because
candidates’ scores and incomes generated from a distribution of which the values of the
parameters were derived from the statistical data. This exploratory model also passed the
empirical output validation defined by Rand and Rust (2011) because it reveals the
following stylized facts of the matching mechanisms, which are also well proved in the
literature: (a) serial dictatorship with full number of school choices is strategy-proof and
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avoids justified envy, (b) the Boston mechanism causes justified envy, and (c) the
admission results under serial dictatorship and deferred acceptance are the same in onesided matching markets (Abdulkadiroglu & Sonmez, 2003; Pathak, 2011; Chen et al.,
2015). Since the Taipei mechanism is new, no related stylized fact was studied in the
literature. I discuss the model’s production of these stylized facts in Chapter 4.
Participant Protection
This study did not involve human experiment or any data containing private
information. The values of the parameters in this model were assumed by reference to
the published literature, and all inputs and outputs of this exploratory model were
generated endogenously by the computer. This research has been carefully reviewed to
ensure the compliance of Walden University’s ethical standards and approved by the
Walden Institutional Review Board (IRB approval No. 08-24-16-0304007) on August 24,
2016.
Summary
ABM is the right methodology to study the macrophenomena emerging from the
interactions of the heterogeneous, autonomous, adaptive individual agents in complex
adaptive systems (Borrill & Tesfatsion, 2011). It allows researchers to build models for
complex educational systems with assumptions closer to the real world. The flexibility of
ABM in performing scenario analysis makes it a proper approach to study a new
education policy that involves anticipating human behaviors in its design. ABM also
allows researchers to build causal hypotheses between microbehaviors and
macrophenomena.
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In this chapter, I describe the agent-based OLG model in detail according to the
format of the ODD protocol (Grimm et al., 2010). All concepts, assumptions, and
calculations underpinning this model have been clearly stated so that the model can be
verified by others in the future. The values of the parameters, students’ decision
strategies, and the processes of the matching mechanisms were programmed by reference
to the empirical literature or the real-world systems so that the model is valid in the onface level and the empirical input level (Rand & Rust, 2011). The outputs of this model
exhibit the stylized facts of the matching mechanisms; thus, this model is also valid in the
empirical output level.
Agent-based simulations provide rich micro-, meso-, and macroinformation.
What and how much data to collect depends on research questions. In this study, I
collected the meso-and macroinformation related to the inequalities of educational
opportunity and school quality. I analyzed these data by using descriptive statistics and
paired samples t-tests and compared the outcomes of different matching mechanisms
under the same behavioral scenario or the outcomes of different behavioral scenarios
under the same matching mechanism. I discuss the simulation results in Chapter 4.
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Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
The purpose of this study was to contribute to the development of ABM for
educational policy analysis. I constructed an agent-based OLG model to represent
qualitatively the environment of the Taipei School District. I have uploaded the model
code (see Appendix A) to the website of OpenABM for anyone to download and
replicate. I simulated a total of 300 combinations of the parameters (see Table 5) to
explore the impacts of the Taipei mechanism (TM) and the free-tuition policy on
equalities of educational opportunity and school quality, in comparison with the impacts
of the following matching mechanisms: serial dictatorship (SD), the Boston mechanism
(BM), deferred acceptance (DA), and the Chinese Parallel mechanism (CP). I analyzed
the simulation results to answer the research questions listed below:
Question 1: Does the Taipei mechanism help equalize educational opportunities?
Question 2: Does the Taipei mechanism help school qualities converge upward?
Question 3: Does the Taipei mechanism with the free-tuition policy help equalize
educational opportunities?
Question 4: Does the Taipei mechanism with the free-tuition policy help school
qualities converge upward?
Additionally, I examined whether the model produced the following stylized facts
to ensure that it passed the empirical output validation as defined by Rand and Rust
(2011):
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Stylized Fact #1: SD and DA with the full number of school choices are strategyproof and avoid justified envy (Abdulkadiroglu & Sonmez, 2003; Pathak, 2011; Chen et
al., 2015);
Stylized Fact #2: BM causes justified envy (Abdulkadiroglu & Sonmez, 2003;
Pathak, 2011; Chen et al., 2015); and
Stylized Fact #3: The admission results under SD and DA are the same in onesided matching markets (Abdulkadiroglu & Sonmez, 2003; Pathak, 2011; Chen et al.,
2015).
The organization of this chapter is as follows. First, I review the data generation
process and the appropriateness of the statistical analysis. I then examine the simulated
stylized facts to ensure that the model passed the empirical output validation. I analyze
the simulated standard deviation of the mean freshman family income (SD-Freshman)
and the standard deviation of the mean senior scores (SD-Senior) to have an overall
understanding of the effects of TM on educational opportunity and school quality in
comparison with those of the other four student-assignment mechanisms. I also analyze
the preference index (PI) defined in the section of model description in Chapter 3 to
understand how TM, compared with the other four mechanisms, assigns the students in
different groups to schools. Finally, a summary of the results concludes this chapter.
Data Collection and Analysis
Agent-based computational simulations are controlled experiments (Chen, 2015;
Epstein, 1999). The inputs are preprogrammed and generated directly by the computer;
the outputs are computer simulated through a predetermined process. The data is clean,
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and the causality is clear. There is no need to perform data cleaning or screening
procedures. In this study, each simulation result is a sample observation because the
input set in each simulation step is randomly generated from predefined distributions and
thus different from each other. To have enough data points for statistical analysis, I
simulated each scenario 30 runs, and there were 33 steps (years) in each run. As a result,
each collected output variable had 990 data points, except that the variables related to
senior’s scores had only 930 data points. The reason is that in this model, a freshman
agent takes two years to become a senior in the high schools (Grades 10 – 12), and thus
there were no seniors in the first two steps (years) in each simulation run. Because the
sample sizes were large enough, the central limit theorem applies to all data collected
from the simulations.
Since this was an exploratory study, the purpose of the data analysis was to gain
qualitative insights, rather than quantitative preciseness. Although I performed paired
samples t-tests on SPSS v. 23 to facilitate the comparison of the results under TM and the
other mechanisms, I mainly used graphing to find the relative patterns. The two essential
assumptions under the paired samples t-test are the independence of the observations and
the normality of the pair differences (van den Berg, 2014). Since each observation
resulted from an independently generated input set and the same input set was processed
independently under each matching mechanism, the independence assumption was met.
Because of the central limit theorem, the normality assumption was also upheld.
Therefore, it was appropriate to conduct the paired samples t-tests in this study. In the
cases where a Cohen’s d was reported to measure the effect size, I calculated the Cohen’s
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d by using the calculator on the website of Dr. Lee A. Becker (Effect size Calculators),
University of Colorado Colorado Springs.
Empirical Output Validation
Stylized Fact #1
Justified envy occurs when a higher ranked student loses the seat in his or her
preferred school to a lower ranked student (Abdulkadiroglu & Sonmez, 2003). SD with
the full number of choices avoids justified envy because a student with a higher rank can
always choose a school before a student with a lower rank under this mechanism. PI
serves as a measure of justified envy. It measures how much a student prefers the school
actually assigned to him (the actual school) in comparison to the school the student would
have been assigned to under the SD with the full choices (the baseline school). For
example, PI = -2 means that the student's actual school is ranked 2 lower than his baseline
school on his preference list. If a student does not suffer justified envy, his or her PI = 0.
If a student is unassigned and his baseline school is ranked the second in his preference
list, then the student’s PI is 2 – 11 = -9.
Tables 8 and 9 show the average overall PI under each mechanism and strategic
scenario with and without the free-tuition policy, respectively. The overall PI =

∑ |𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃|
𝑁𝑁

,

where N is the total number of students. The average overall PI is the average of the
overall PIs collected from each step and each run of the simulations under the same
scenario. The only situation where the average overall PI = 0 is when the mechanism =
SD or DA, the number of choices = 10, and sort-extra-choice = True. Since there are 10
schools in this model, the number of choices equal to 10 means that there is no limit to
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the number of schools that a student can choose. Sort-extra-choice = True indicates that
students are truth tellers, who report their preference lists as their choice lists. Therefore,
this model has correctly produced Stylized Fact #1: SD and DA with the full number of
school choices are strategy-proof and avoid justified envy.
Table 8
The Average Overall Preference Index without the free-tuition policy
Number of
choices
2

Strategy
1
2
3

4

1
2
3

6

1
2
3

8

1
2
3

10

1
2
3

Extra-inorder
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE

SD
1.97*
1.97*
2.35*
2.45*
2.17*
2.16*
1.12*
1.12*
1.00*
0.98*
0.91*
0.78*
0.65*
0.65*
0.67*
0.38*
0.56*
0.19*
0.26*
0.25*
0.49
0.08*
0.47*
0.05*
0.00*
0.00*
0.48
0.00*
0.43*
0.00*

BM
2.17*
2.18*
2.84*
2.82*
2.72*
2.68*
1.84*
1.84*
2.28*
2.53*
2.06*
2.37*
1.76*
1.75*
1.91*
2.17*
1.72*
2.13*
1.78*
1.80*
1.57*
1.74*
1.53*
1.64*
1.76*
1.76*
1.45*
1.76*
1.34*
1.76*

DA
1.97*
1.97*
2.41*
2.38*
2.14*
2.18*
1.12*
1.12*
0.99*
0.98*
0.92*
0.78*
0.65*
0.65*
0.66*
0.40*
0.57*
0.21*
0.26*
0.26*
0.49*
0.07*
0.50*
0.05*
0.00*
0.00*
0.48
0.00*
0.43*
0.00*

TM
1.99
1.99
1.55
1.53
1.19
1.19
1.16
1.16
0.60
0.56
0.39
0.31
0.73
0.73
0.54
0.29
0.37
0.27
0.41
0.41
0.48
0.25
0.32
0.24
0.24
0.24
0.45
0.24
0.34
0.24

CP
2.18*
2.18*
2.86*
2.82*
2.75*
2.67*
1.43*
1.43*
1.71*
1.67*
1.50*
1.50*
0.92*
0.92*
0.95*
0.92*
0.85*
0.84*
0.47*
0.47*
0.57*
0.60*
0.54*
0.48*
0.25*
0.24*
0.53*
0.49*
0.47*
0.40*

Note. * denotes that the value is statistically significantly different from that under the
column of TM in the same scenario (the same row), p < .01.
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Stylized Fact #2
Table 8 and Table 9 show that none of the overall PI under BM equals to 0, which
means that BM always produces justified envy. Therefore, this model has successfully
replicated Stylized Fact #2: BM causes justified envy.
Table 9
The Average Overall Preference Index with the free-tuition policy
Number of
choices
2

Strategy
1
2
3

4

1
2
3

6

1
2
3

8

1
2
3

10

1
2
3

Extra-inorder
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE

SD
1.98
1.98
2.27
2.13
1.96
1.98
1.14
1.14
0.95
0.98
0.81
0.79
0.72
0.72
0.61
0.45
0.51
0.25^
0.35
0.35
0.48
0.09
0.40
0.05
0.00
0.00
0.37
0.00
0.35
0.00

BM
2.16
2.15
2.62
2.69
2.49
2.54
1.95
1.95
2.27
2.53
2.08
2.47
2.01
2.01
2.13
2.69
2.02
2.59
1.99
2.00
1.90
2.28
1.90
2.26
2.41
2.41
1.66
2.41
1.72
2.40

DA
1.98
1.98
2.19
2.10
2.01
1.97
1.14
1.14
0.99
0.96
0.87
0.79
0.72
0.72
0.61
0.44
0.51
0.24^
0.35
0.35
0.48
0.10
0.41
0.05
0.00
0.00
0.37
0.00
0.35
0.00

TM
2.00
2.00
1.56
1.51
1.24
1.24
1.19
1.19
0.74
0.64
0.45
0.43
0.80
0.80
0.49
0.30
0.31
0.25
0.48
0.48
0.44
0.26
0.34
0.26
0.28
0.28
0.43
0.28
0.29
0.28

CP
2.16
2.16
2.63
2.70
2.45
2.42
1.49
1.49
1.73
1.75
1.58
1.61
1.03
1.03
1.00
1.02
0.92
0.89
0.65
0.65
0.59
0.57
0.53
0.53
0.44
0.44
0.44^
0.46
0.41
0.36

Note. ^ denotes that the value is statistically insignificantly different from that under the
column of TM in the same scenario (the same row), p > .01.
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Stylized Fact #3
The literature has shown that other things being equal, the results of DA and SD
in one-sided matching are equivalent (Zhu, 2014). Table 8, Table 9, and the rest of the
tables in this chapter also show that the simulation results of SD and DA were
insignificantly different in almost all scenarios, especially when the number of choices
was large. The reason why there were discrepancies between the two is that stochasticity
is applied in two procedures related to the student assignment process in this model (see
the section of model description in Chapter 3 for details). The first is the tie-breaking
procedure adopted from the common practice in many real-world school admission
systems. The model randomly assigns ranks to the students involved in a tie and applies
this random process in each simulation with a different matching mechanism. Therefore,
the same student may be ranked and assigned differently between SD and DA. The
second is the procedure to generate students’ school-choice lists. When the number of
choices is constrained and students need to make a selection among the schools, the
model applies the principle of maximum entropy to make a choice for the students.
Therefore, the same student may have a school-choice list under SD different from that
under DA, resulting in assignment discrepancies between SD and DA.
The smaller the number of choices, the lower the probability of the same school to
be selected twice. Therefore, the difference of the average overall PIs under SD and DA
is larger when the number of choices is smaller, and vice versa. When the number of
choices = 10, all schools are included in a student's choice list, which eliminates the
lottery process of school selection, and thus the simulated results under SD and DA are
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identical or only less than 0.01 insignificantly different, p < .01. The insignificant
difference results from the occasional occurrence of the random tie breaking. From the
above analysis, it is safe to say that this model has successfully generated Stylized Fact
#3: The admission results under SD and DA are the same in one-sided matching markets.
In the rest of this chapter, when the results of SD and DA are equivalent or insignificantly
different, I use “SD (DA)” to imply that the discussion applies to both SD and DA.
Effects of TM without the Free-tuition policy
Overall Effect on Educational Opportunity
SD-Freshman-N. As stated in Chapter 3, I defined equal educational
opportunities as equal freshmen’s average family income across the schools. I measured
the inequality by using the standard deviation of the distribution of the mean freshman
family incomes in the schools (SD-Freshman). The higher the standard deviation, the
more the inequality. SD-Freshman-N denotes the SD-Freshman collected from
simulations without the free-tuition policy. Table 10 summarizes the average SDFreshman-N collected over the 33 simulated years in the 30 simulation runs for each
scenario. The same data in Table 10 are also presented graphically in Figure 6.
I first examined the simulation results under TM in Table 10 and Figure 6 and
summarize the findings below.
•

When students used heterogeneous truth-telling strategies (Strategy #1), the
greater the number of choices, the higher the SD-Freshman-N under TM.
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•

Strategy #1 produced lower SD-Freshman-Ns under TM than Strategy #2 or
Strategy #3 as long as the number of choices was constrained (< 10 in our
model).

•

When students used Strategy #2 and the number of choices > 2, to sort the
choices according to students’ preference lists (sort-extra-choice = True)
resulted in higher SD-Freshman-N than not to sort the choices (sort-extra choice = False).

•

When students used Strategy #3, sort-extra-choice = True resulted in higher
SD-Freshman-Ns than sort-extra -choice = False in all cases.

Table 10
The average standard deviation of the mean freshman family income without the freetuition policy (Average SD-Freshman-N)
Number
of
choices
2

Strategy
1
2
3

4

1
2
3

Extrain-order
FALSE

Scenario
#
1

SD
$373,600

BM
$365,863*

DA
$374,352

TM
$373,065

CP
$366,755*

TRUE

2

$375,788*

$365,907*

$374,571

$372,486

$365,968*

FALSE

3

†$813,078*

$830,445*

$833,570*

$715,455

$828,561*

TRUE

4

$831,010*

$825,781*

$829,641*

$714,095

$821,971*

FALSE

5

$788,836*

$794,645*

$781,408*

$677,684

$818,599*

TRUE

6

$791,934*

$785,829*

$794,182*

$682,904

$800,938*

FALSE

7

$518,298*

$487,050*

$518,032*

$515,725

$510,853*

TRUE

8

$517,200*

$487,098*

$517,498*

$515,675

$510,091*

FALSE

9

†$634,528*

$764,334*

$629,649*

$613,066

$724,282*

TRUE

10

$633,968*

$801,722*

$633,010*

$613,682

$722,457*

FALSE

11

$624,110*

$715,601*

$625,876*

$611,737

$702,533*

TRUE

12

$618,968*

$786,467*

$619,354*

$615,186

$706,921*

(Continued)
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Number
of
choices
6

Strategy
1
2
3

8

1
2
3

10

1
2
3

Extrain-order
FALSE

Scenario
#
13

SD
†$566,061*

BM
$527,617*

DA
$564,510

TM
$563,535

CP
$557,478*

TRUE

14

$564,378*

$525,074*

$563,715*

$561,825

$557,328*

FALSE

15

$609,967

$669,068*

$609,843

$609,593

$615,142*

TRUE

16

$606,513*

$657,893*

$606,502*

$613,795

$614,564

FALSE

17

$608,858*

$640,310*

$608,253*

$610,715

$611,687

TRUE

18

$613,901*

$643,539*

$613,750*

$617,233

$612,853*

FALSE

19

†$591,201

$532,099*

$592,844*

$590,036

$587,071*

TRUE

20

$591,538

$531,457*

$591,311

$590,565

$587,327*

FALSE

21

$600,505

$595,067*

$600,673

$600,031

$597,918*

TRUE

22

$604,633*

$563,831*

$604,911*

$609,384

$597,681*

FALSE

23

$600,505*

$594,896*

$600,263*

$603,785

$597,802*

TRUE

24

$608,538*

$565,879*

$608,358*

$609,798

$598,461*

FALSE

25

$612,510*

$551,870*

$612,510*

$609,485

$606,689*

TRUE

26

$611,901*

$551,620*

$611,901*

$609,836

$606,122*

FALSE

27

$601,404

$573,069*

$601,403

$601,258

$600,187

TRUE

28

$612,714*

$550,680*

$612,714*

$609,332

$597,945*

FALSE

29

$601,336*

$576,949*

$601,335*

$603,423

$600,721*

TRUE

30

$613,740*

$552,721*

$613,740*

$610,722

$601,751*

Note. * denotes that the value is statistically significantly different from that under the
column of TM in the same scenario (the same row), p < .01. $ here represents Taiwan
dollar. † denotes that the value is significantly different from that under the column of
DA in the same scenario (the same row), p < .01.
I then compared the simulation results under TM with those under the other
mechanisms on the scenario-by-scenario basis. The followings summarize the
comparison findings.
•

When Strategy = #1 or the number of choices < 6, the SD-Freshman-N under
TM was smaller than that under SD (DA).

•

When the number of choices ≥ 6 and Strategy = #2 or #3, there was no clear
rule about the relationships of the SD-Freshman-Ns under TM and SD (DA).
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•

When the number of choices ≥ 8, the SD-Freshman-Ns under TM and SD
(DA) were relatively stable, regardless of the school-choice strategy.

Figure 6. The average standard deviation of mean freshman family incomes without the
free-tuition policy (SD-Freshman-N). The scenario # in this figure corresponds to that in
Table 10.
When the numbers of choices were 6, 8, and 10, the SD-Freshman-Ns under TM
was no more than 1.20%, 0.79%, and 0.55% different from the SD-Freshman-Ns under
SD, respectively. Although some of the differences were statistically significant (see
Table 10), a maximum of 1.20% change in the original SD-Freshman (SD-Freshman-N
under SD) was deemed small, Cohen’s d = 0.21 (Cohen, 1988). Therefore, I considered
the values of the SD-Freshman-Ns under SD (DA) and TM in the above scenarios very
close, TM ≈ SD (DA).
The simulation results under BM, compared to TM and the other mechanisms in
each scenario, showed the followings.
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•

When Strategy = #1, BM produced the lowest SD-Freshman-N among the
five mechanisms regardless of the number of choices.

•

When Strategy = #2 or #3 and the number of choices > 6, BM still produced
the lowest SD-Freshman-N among all mechanisms.

•

When Strategy = #2 or #3 and the number of choices was 4 or 6, BM
generated the highest SD-Freshman-N among the five mechanisms.

•

When Strategy = #2 or #3 and the number of choices was 2, although SDFreshman-N under BM was not the highest among the five mechanisms, it
was still higher than the SD-Freshman-N under TM.

I then compared the SD-Freshman-Ns under TM and CP in each scenario and
found the following relationships.
•

When Strategy = #1, TM always generated higher SD-Freshman-N than CP,
regardless of the number of choices.

•

When Strategy = #2 or #3 and the number of choices > 6, TM still generated
higher SD-Freshman-Ns than CP.

•

When Strategy = #2 or #3 and the number of choices < 6, TM produced lower
SD-Freshman-Ns than CP.

•

When Strategy = #2 or #3 and the number of choices = 6, the relationships
between TM and CP were mixed, depending on whether students sorted their
school choices according to their preference lists.

Finally, I compared the five mechanisms together, scenario by scenario, and
found the following properties.
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•

When Strategy = #1, the higher the number of choices, the higher the SDFreshman-N under each mechanism.

•

When Strategy = #1, the size of SD-Freshman-N produced by each matching
mechanism was always in the following order: SD (DA) > TM > CP > BM.

•

When Strategy = # 2 or #3, the SD-Freshman-N under TM was more robust to
the change in the number of choices than BM, CP, and then SD (DA).

•

When Strategy = #2 or #3 and the number of choices > 6, the SD-Freshman-N
under each mechanism was in the following order: TM ≈ SD (DA) > CP >
BM.

•

When Strategy = #2 or #3 and the number of choices < 6, the SD-Freshman-N
under each mechanism was in the following order: TM < CP, TM < BM, and
TM < SD (DA).

When Strategy #2 or #3 was used, the number of choices 6 seemed to work as a
bifurcation or turning point for the relationships of the SD-Freshman-N between TM and
the other mechanisms. While TM produced the lowest SD-Freshman-Ns when the
number of choices < 6, the SD-Freshman-Ns produced by TM were among the highest
when the number of choices > 6.
Match rate. Match rate should be considered in the analysis of a studentassignment mechanism. If the system has enough seats for all candidates and the
candidates do not leave any allowed choices blank, a student-assignment policy resulting
in some students unassigned does not seem to be efficient. Match rate is the number of
candidates assigned to schools divided by the number of total candidates. The simulated
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environment had a total of 1,000 seats (10 schools x 100 seats per school) for the 1,000
candidates per year. Table 11 summarizes the average match rate over the 33 simulation
years in the 30 simulation runs for each scenario without the free-tuition policy. The
same data in Table 11 are also presented graphically in Figure 7.
Table 11
The average match rate under each scenario without the free-tuition policy (Match-N)
Number
of
choices
2

Strategy
1
2
3

4

1
2
3

6

1
2
3

8

1
2
3

Extrain-order
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE

Scenario
#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

SD
%
90.47
90.39
59.86*
58.72*
61.78*
61.81*
95.23
95.23
85.16*
86.03*
86.71*
88.78*
97.67
97.61
95.52
97.48*
95.73*
98.55
98.89*
98.81*
98.03
99.35*
97.77*
99.58

BM
%
87.14*
87.13*
56.79*
55.87*
57.91*
58.06*
93.13*
93.14*
72.83*
67.49*
74.72*
68.85*
95.33*
95.37*
85.59*
82.35*
87.33*
83.17*
98.29*
98.27*
94.83*
94.86*
95.21*
95.27*

DA
%
90.41
90.41
58.76*
59.59*
62.47*
61.78*
95.25
95.24
85.47*
85.98*
86.43*
88.76*
97.43*
97.56
95.52
97.35*
95.62*
98.48*
99.16
98.81*
97.88
99.40*
97.75*
99.55

TM
%
90.45
90.39
71.60
72.13
77.55
77.73
95.16
95.25
92.43
93.85
95.84
97.63
97.64
97.62
95.68
98.55
96.97
98.67
99.19
99.13
97.88
99.71
98.50
99.68

CP
%
87.20*
87.11*
56.53*
57.21*
57.12*
58.72*
94.19*
94.15*
75.06*
75.27*
77.44*
77.22*
97.53
97.68
92.53*
92.86*
93.08*
93.41*
99.13
99.07
97.98
97.69*
97.69*
97.85*

(Continued)

143
Number
of
choices
10

Strategy
1
2
3

Extrain-order
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE

Scenario
#
25
26
27
28
29
30

SD
%
99.74
99.67*
98.41*
99.84
98.62
99.86*

BM
%
100.00*
100.00*
98.93
100.00*
99.09*
100.00

DA
%
99.74
99.67*
98.41*
99.84
98.62
99.86*

TM
%
99.80
99.92
98.77
99.85
98.85
99.98

CP
%
99.78
99.70*
98.27*
98.76*
98.48*
98.95*

Note. * denotes that the value is statistically significantly different from that under the
column of TM in the same scenario (the same row), p < .01.

Figure 7. The average match rate under each scenario without the free-tuition policy
(Match-N). The scenario # in this figure corresponds to that in Table 11.
Match-N denotes the match rate without the free-tuition policy. Figure 7 shows
the trend that under the same mechanism and strategy, the higher the number of choices,
the higher the Match-N. If a match rate of at least 95% is desired without regarding
students’ behaviors, TM, SD, and DA must be accompanied by an allowance of 6 or
more school choices; CP, 8 or more; BM, the full number of choices.
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Among the five mechanisms, only BM could reach a Match-N of 100%. All other
mechanisms always had years in which some slots in the private school (School #3) were
unfilled. The reasons for this phenomenon were as follows: (a) Without the free-tuition
policy, poorer students (student's income < the average income of all candidates in that
year) could not afford to choose School #3; and (b) students' school choices were not
identical. In this study, the similarity of students’ preferences was controlled by α, which
was set to be 3 (see the subsection of details in Chapter 3 for the generation of students'
preferences.) The higher the value of α, the more similar students’ preferences are.
When α = 3, students' preferences are moderately-to-highly correlated. It was possible
that some richer candidates who were eligible to attend School #3 preferred other schools
to School #3. When this situation happened, those richer candidates would “crowd out”
some poorer candidates with lower priorities and make them ended up with no school to
attend under SD and DA because SD and DA emphasize students’ priorities. The
argument also applies to TM and CP because both TM and CP have the element of SD
(DA).
This crowding out effect can be avoided in some situations under BM because
BM emphasizes students’ choices instead of priorities. That is, other things being equal,
a student who ranks School j higher in the choice list has a better chance to be admitted to
School j than a student who ranks School j lower in the choice list. Because of this
property of BM, the more heterogeneous the students’ choice lists are, the higher the
chances they are assigned to their top choices. Under BM, the assignment in every step is
final. That is, once a student is assigned to a school, no one can crowd the student out,
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regardless of the students’ priorities. The simulated 100% Match-N under BM
demonstrates that students’ preferences generated under α = 3 are heterogeneous enough
for BM to avoid the crowding out effect in the scenarios where the number of choices =
10 and students are truth tellers.
I then compared the Match-Ns in each scenario and summarize the findings below.
•

TM produced higher Match-N than CP and SD (DA) in almost all cases; in the
cases where TM generated lower Match-N than CP and SD (DA), the
difference was no more than 0.15%.

•

When Strategy = #2 or #3 and the number of choices < 6, TM produced
7.27% to 15.95% higher Match-Ns than SD (DA).

•

When Strategy = #1 or the number of choices ≥ 8, if the Match-Ns under TM
were greater than those under SD (DA), the differences were no more than
0.73%, Cohen's d = 0.31.

•

BM produced lower Match-Ns than the other mechanisms when the number
of choices < 10 but slightly higher Match-Ns than the others when the number
of choices = 10.

The above findings show that not only the matching mechanism but also the
number of choices and student’s strategy affect the assignment of students to schools.
The interactions of these three factors also affect match rate. An efficient admission
policy should produce a high match rate. Therefore, in the next paragraphs, I make
further discussions about SD-Freshman-N by focusing on scenarios where the number of
choices ≥ 8 (94% or higher of Match-Ns under all mechanisms).
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The comparisons of the simulated SD-Freshman-Ns in the previous paragraphs
were on the scenario-by-scenario basis, which implied that students use the same
strategies under different admission policies. However, students may change their
behaviors when the assignment policy changes (Chen et al., 2015; Lucas, 1996; Roth,
2002). Before or at the beginning of the implementation of a new policy, policymakers
often do not have enough information to know whether and how students will change
their behaviors. Even under the same mechanism, students may change their behaviors in
response to a change in the number of choices. If how students behave is not explicitly
known, it may be necessary to group the simulated results under various behavior
assumptions together and make the group-to-group comparisons to estimate the best and
worst consequences.
To calculate the best-worst estimates, I grouped the scenarios with different
strategies under the same number of choices together for each mechanism. When the
number of choices = 8, the highest and lowest SD-Freshman-Ns under SD were $608,538
and $591,201 (Taiwan Dollars), respectively (see Table 10). The highest and lowest SDFreshman-Ns under TM were $609,798 and $590,036, respectively. If the mechanism is
changed from SD to TM, the maximum increase in the original SD-Freshman can be
$18,598 ($609,798 - $591,201) or 3.15% ($18,598/$591,201), Cohen’s d = 0.92; the
maximum decrease, $18,502 ($608,538 -$590,036) or 3.04% ($18,502/$608,538),
Cohen’s d = 0.91. I used the interval notation [] to present the estimates of the maximum
increase and maximum decrease of a variable. Thus, the estimated maximum percentage
increase and the estimated maximum percentage decrease in the original SD-Freshman
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caused by the change from SD to TM were reported as [3.15%, -3.04%]. Table 12
presents such best-worst estimates for a change from SD to BM, TM, and CP,
respectively. Since I focused on high match rate, Table 12 only shows the best-worst
estimates with the number of choices ≥ 8.
Table 12
The estimated maximum percentage increase and decrease in the original SD-Freshman
resulting from the change from SD to the other mechanisms without the free tuition policy
Number of
choices

To BM
To TM
To CP
%
%
%
Cohen’s d
Cohen’s d
Cohen’s d
8
[0.65%, -12.67%]
[3.15%, -3.04%]
[1.23%, -3.53%]
0.11, -3.30
0.92, -0.91
0.32, -1.05
10
[0.00%*, -10.27%]
[2.06%, -2.02%]
[0.89%, -2.57%]
-, -2.85
0.42, -0.55
0.23, -0.69
Note. The first percentage in the square brackets represents the estimated maximum
percentage increase in the original SD-Freshman (SD-Freshman-N under SD) due to the
change from SD to the new mechanism, and the second percentage in the square brackets
denotes the estimated maximum percentage decrease. The corresponding Cohen’s d is
presented right below each percentage. * No Cohen’s d was calculated for this
percentage because BM did not increase the original SD-Freshman in any scenario within
this category.
From Table 12, one can see that under the same number of choices, BM could
offer the most decrease and least increase in the original SD-Freshman, followed by CP,
and then TM. When the number of choices = 8, while TM had the potential to reduce 3%
of the original SD-Freshman, it also had the potential to increase 3% of the original SD-
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Freshman, depending on students’ strategies before and after the change. If the number
of choices increases to 10, the range of TM’s effects on the original SD-Freshman could
shrink about 1% on both ends. If we follow Cohen’s (1988) suggestions on effect size,
we should take TM’s potential to increase the original SD-Freshman more seriously than
CP’s and BM’s, because the effect size under TM was larger than the effect sizes under
CP and BM as shown in Table 11.
Overall Effect on School Quality
SD-Senior-N. As stated in Chapter 3, I used the mean senior scores as the proxy
for school quality and the standard deviation of the distribution of the mean senior scores
(SD-Senior) to measure the magnitude of the inequality of school quality. The higher the
SD-Senior, the greater the inequality of school quality. SD-Senior-N denotes the SDSenior collected from simulations without the free-tuition policy. Since a freshman must
study for two years to become a senior in this model, there was no SD-Senior-N in the
first two steps (years) of each simulation run. Therefore, each SD-Senior-N listed in
Table 13 was the average of the SD-Senior-Ns collected over the last 31 simulated steps
in the 30 simulation runs. The same data in Table 13 are presented graphically in Figure
8.
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Table 13
The average standard deviation of the mean senior scores without the free-tuition policy
(average SD-Senior-N)
Number
of
choices
2

Strategy
1
2
3

4

1
2
3

6

1
2
3

8

1
2
3

10

1
2
3

Sortextrachoice
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE

Scenario
#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

SD
13.92
13.94*
30.06*
30.49*
29.63*
29.75*
19.61*
19.59*
22.72*
22.60*
22.08*
22.03*
20.93*
20.89*
21.20*
21.42*
21.29*
21.82*
21.52*
21.50*
20.94
21.61
20.83*
21.76*
21.86*
21.84*
20.95
21.90*
21.05*
21.90*

BM
13.48*
13.49*
30.54*
30.87*
29.61*
29.53*
17.07*
17.07*
26.79*
29.76*
26.00*
29.37*
17.18*
17.15*
22.72*
22.09
22.05
21.70*
16.59*
16.51
19.89*
17.96*
19.78*
18.05*
16.83*
16.83*
18.95*
16.80*
19.13*
16.84*

DA
13.96
13.97*
30.78*
30.53*
29.31*
29.76*
19.58*
19.57*
22.49*
22.58*
22.29*
22.05*
20.81
20.86*
21.21*
21.40*
21.29*
21.80*
21.64*
21.48*
20.93
21.63
20.80*
21.75*
21.86*
21.84*
20.95
21.90*
21.05*
21.90*

TM
13.90
13.83
26.77
26.81
25.26
25.32
19.46
19.50
21.73
21.68
21.59
21.83
20.74
20.72
21.49
21.87
21.56
21.97
21.43
21.41
20.99
21.65
21.14
21.66
21.64
21.68
21.09
21.66
21.23
21.70

CP
13.53*
13.49*
30.45*
30.27*
30.54*
29.58*
18.82*
18.78*
26.40*
26.47*
25.80*
25.97*
19.93*
20.00*
21.38
21.27*
21.28*
21.24*
21.01*
20.98*
20.71*
20.58*
20.63*
20.73*
21.29*
21.27*
20.81*
20.97*
20.97*
21.14*

Note. * denotes that the value is significantly different from that under the column of TM
in the same scenario (the same row), p < .01.
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Figure 8. The average standard deviation of the mean senior scores without the freetuition policy (average SD-Senior-N). The scenario # in this figure corresponds to that in
Table 13.
An interesting phenomenon is that the graphic shape of the average SD-Senior-Ns
(Figure 8) resembles that of the SD-Freshman-Ns (Figure 6). The reason is that in this
study, students’ family incomes were highly correlated with their scores (with a
correlation coefficient of .8) and remained constant throughout the students’ stay in the
high schools. The algorithm to calculate senior scores was based on the consistent
empirical findings since the 1966 Coleman’s report. The findings have shown that after
controlling students’ socioeconomic status, schools contribute little to the difference in
student performance and the most influential school factor is peer effect (Burke & Sass,
2013; Dearden, Ferri, & Meghir, 2002; Coleman et al., 1966; Hanushek, 1989; Jennings
et al., 2015). Therefore, although some high school students’ scores were adjusted and

151
moved toward the average of their cohorts’ scores in their schools (see the calculation of
high school student’s scores in the subsection of details in Chapter 3), the score change
was not significant enough to transform the shape of the original distributions of scores.
Since Figure 8 resembles Figure 6, SD-Senior-N had the following properties
similar to those observed in SD-Freshman-Ns based on the scenario-by-scenario
comparisons.
•

When Strategy = #1, the SD-Senior-N produced under each mechanism had
the following order: SD (DA) > TM > CP ≥ BM; the higher the number of
choices, the higher the SD-Senior-N under each mechanism.

•

When Strategy = # 2 or #3 and the number of choices > 6, the relationships of
the SD-Senior-Ns produced under SD (DA) and TM were mixed, although
their differences were less than 0.32 points or 1.53% of the SD-Senior-N
under SD, Cohen’s d = .28.

•

When Strategy = # 2 or #3 and the number of choices > 6, the SD-Senior-Ns
under TM, CP, and BM were in the following order: TM > CP > BM.

•

When Strategy = # 2 or #3 and the number of choices < 6, TM produced the
lowest SD-Senior-Ns among all mechanisms.

Following the logic to calculate the values in Table 12, I estimated the maximum
increase and maximum decrease in the original SD-Senior (SD-Senior-N produced by SD)
caused by a mechanism change from SD to the other mechanisms and compiled the
results in Table 14.
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Table 14
The estimated maximum increase and decrease in the original SD-Senior resulting from
the mechanism change from SD to the other mechanisms without the free tuition policy
Number
of
choices

To BM
To TM
To CP
%
%
%
Cohen’s d
Cohen’s d
Cohen’s d
[0.00%, -24.13%] [4.00%, -3.54%] [0.88%, -5.45%]
8
--, -7.52
0.85, 0.80
0.18, -1.09
[0.00%, -23.29%] [3.62%, -3.72%] [1.65%, -4.98%]
10
--, -10.74
0.66, 0.85
0.29, -1.00
Note. The first percentage in the square brackets represents the maximum percentage
increase in the original SD-Senior (SD-Senior-N under SD) due to the change from SD to
the new mechanism, and the second percentage in the square brackets denotes the
maximum percentage decrease. The corresponding Cohen’s d is presented right below
each percentage. * No Cohen’s d was calculated for this percentage because BM did not
increase the original SD-Freshman in any scenario within this category.
Like Table 12, Table 14 shows that under the same number of choices allowed,
BM, followed by CP, and then TM, could offer the most decrease and least increase in
the original SD-Senor. Table 14 also shows that while TM could reduce the original SDSenior, TM could also increase the original SD-Senior, depending on students’ behaviors
before and after the policy change. Since the maximum increase in the original SDSenior by TM could reach 3.62% or higher, Cohen’s d ≥ 0.66, this risk of increase should
not be taken lightly.
Like SD-Freshman-N, SD-Senior-N emerged from the interactions among the
matching mechanism, the number of choices, and student’s strategies. SD-Senior-N
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measures the size of the inequality of school quality. However, it does not inform
whether the average senior score moves upward after the change of the assignment
mechanism. The comparison of the mean senior scores under different mechanisms in the
following paragraphs could answer the question.
Mean Senior Score. I first calculated the mean senior score of each of the first
31 generations assigned to the high schools in each of the 30 simulation runs. I then
calculated the average of these mean senior scores in each scenario. The results are
presented in Table 15 and Figure 9.
Table 15
The mean scores of the high school seniors enrolled without the free-tuition policy
Number of
choices
2

Strategy
1
2
3

4

1
2
3

6

1
2
3

Sort-extrachoice
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE

Scenario
#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

SD

BM

DA

TM

CP

59.38*

58.96*

59.40*

59.30

58.94*

59.40

58.96*

59.39

59.35

58.96*

61.17*

60.28*

61.78*

56.86

60.67*

61.35*

59.98*

61.68*

56.77

60.10*

59.94*

60.05*

59.75*

55.77

60.50*

60.40*

59.09*

60.13*

55.80

59.73*

56.63

55.84*

56.64

56.59

56.32*

56.62*

55.83*

56.64*

56.49

56.38*

54.82*

56.37*

54.88

55.07

55.81*

54.91

55.60

54.87*

55.12

55.66*

55.15

56.27*

55.00

55.11

55.60*

54.89

55.77*

54.93

54.83

55.59*

55.30

55.08*

55.45*

55.34

55.49*

55.34

55.09*

55.38

55.35

55.41

55.60*

54.97*

55.60*

55.39

54.93*

55.22*

54.03*

55.28*

54.86

55.16*

55.40

54.84*

55.43

55.39

55.00*

54.82

54.18*

54.86

54.84

55.04*

(Continued)
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Number of
choices
8

Strategy
1
2
3

10

1
2
3

Sort-extrachoice
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE

Scenario
#
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

SD

BM

DA

TM

CP

54.77

55.50*

54.66

54.71

54.77*

54.78*

55.49*

54.79*

54.72

54.80*

55.03

54.42*

55.08

55.07

55.00

54.51*

54.44

54.49*

54.43

55.13*

55.17*

54.59*

55.17*

54.91

55.11*

54.42

54.46

54.43

54.44

55.04*

54.40*

54.50

54.40*

54.47

54.45

54.42

54.46

54.42

54.43

54.46*

55.03

54.76*

55.03

54.95

55.10

54.36*

54.52*

54.36*

54.45

54.87*

54.98

54.67*

54.98

54.89

55.04

54.35*

54.49*

54.35*

54.40

54.72*

Note. * denotes that the value is significantly different from that under the column of TM
in the same scenario (the same row), p < .01.

Figure 9. The average mean scores of the high school seniors enrolled without the freetuition policy. The scenario # in this figure corresponds to that in Table 15.
In each school, only the scores of the students whose incomes were within a range
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of their cohort’s mean income would be adjusted to move toward their cohort’s mean
scores. The income distribution and score distribution of a cohort determined how the
scores were adjusted and thus the mean senior scores of that cohort. Since different
mechanisms, behaviors, and the numbers of choices had different influences on
freshmen’s income and score distributions, the mean senior scores under different
mechanisms were different in most scenarios as shown in Figure 9.
Like the graphs of SD-Freshman-N and SD-Senior-N, Figure 9 shows a spike of
senior scores in the scenarios where the number of choices was small, and the scores
became relatively stable when the number of choices ≥ 8. The relationships of the mean
senior scores under different mechanisms were mixed. No single mechanism could
outperform the other in all cases, although CP produced higher senior scores than the
others in two third of the scenarios where the number of choices > 2. Nevertheless, when
the number of choices > 2, the differences of the mean senior scores under CP and SD
(DA) were no more than 1.85%, Cohen’s d = 0.23; under TM and SD (DA), no more than
0.65%, Cohen’s d = 0.17. When the number of choices > 6, the differences between CP
and SD (DA), as well as TM and SD (DA), were even smaller. From this point of view,
TM did not seem to be effective in improving senior scores; it could even reduce the
original mean senior scores in some scenarios.
Following the same logic to calculate the best-worst estimates for SD-FreshmanN and SD-Senior-N, I calculated the best-worst estimates of the senior scores caused by a
change from SD to the other mechanisms without the free-tuition policy as shown in
Table 16. Here, we also see that with a mechanism change from SD to TM or BM, the
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range of the best-worst estimates shrank when the number of choices changed from 8 to
10. While the scenario-by-scenario comparison suggested that TM is likely to reduce
senior scores, the best-worst estimates suggested that TM is also possible to increase the
mean senior scores by more than 1%, Cohen’s d = 0.62, depending on how students react
to the policy change.
Table 16
The estimated maximum increase and decrease in the original senior score resulting from
a mechanism change from SD to the other mechanisms without the free tuition policy
Number
of
choices

To BM
To TM
To CP
%
%
%
Cohen’s d
Cohen’s d
Cohen’s d
[1.99%, -1.35%]
[1.20%, -1.34%] [1.30%, -0.71%]
8
2.55, -0.45
0.62, -0.59
0.59, -0.31
[0.76%, -1.04%]
[1.10%, -1.15%]
[1.37%, -1.06]
10
0.54, -0.45
0.62, -0.51
0.59, -0.46
Note. The first percentage in the square brackets represents the maximum increase in the
original senior score (senior score under SD) due to the change from SD to the new
mechanism, and the second percentage in the square brackets represents the maximum
percentage decrease. The corresponding Cohen’s d is presented right below each
percentage.
Impacts on Different Student Groups
OECD (2010) suggested that a policy aiming at reducing educational inequality
should be able to help lower-performing and disadvantaged students. A competitive
school admission system where students are prioritized mainly by their scores usually
results in sorting if it employs a stable matching mechanism. Sorting means that the top-
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performing students go to the top-ranked schools, and the bottom-performing students go
to the bottom-ranked schools. Many studies since the 1966 Coleman’s report have shown
that disadvantaged students benefit more in a mixed environment while advantaged
students’ performance is hardly affected by peers with lower socioeconomic statuses
(Coleman et al., 1966; Carman & Zhang, 2012; Van de Werfhorst & Mijs, 2010).
Therefore, to help disadvantaged students, a student-assignment mechanism may be
desired to mix students and assign the disadvantaged students to higher ranked schools.
SD-Freshman tells us the degree of dispersion of the schools’ mean family incomes. It
does not say much about how the students in different groups are assigned. The pergroup information helps us understand the how and is presented in Tables 17 – 22 and
Figures 10 – 12.
Table 17
The average percentage of the top 10% performing students being assigned to their top
choices (top-choice match rate) without the free-tuition policy
Number of
choices
2

Strategy
1
2
3

4

1
2
3

Extra-inorder
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE

Scenario
#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

SD
19.84
20.07
95.87
93.73
98.32
99.22
40.11
40.07
99.53
99.85
99.87
99.99

BM
19.94
19.84
94.85
96.90
98.35
99.06
39.97
40.11
89.57
96.09
99.18
98.29

DA
19.99
19.89
96.22
94.53
98.61
98.19
39.85
39.93
99.68
99.75
99.69
99.98

TM
19.84
19.90
99.42
99.45
99.63
99.57
40.23
40.15
99.53
99.56
99.60
99.60

CP
20.00
20.03
95.48
95.57
98.24
96.46
40.36
40.09
96.48
97.30
98.74
99.00

(Continued)
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Number of
choices
6

Strategy
1
2
3

8

1
2
3

10

1
2
3

Extra-inorder
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE

Scenario
#
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

SD
59.97
60.37
99.94
99.94
99.99
100.00
80.34
80.00
99.95
99.85
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
99.96
100.00
100.00
100.00

BM
60.12
60.02
95.65
96.51
99.67
98.94
80.03
80.10
99.80
99.82
99.84
99.98
100.00
100.00
99.95
100.00
100.00
100.00

DA
60.03
59.82
99.97
99.95
100.00
100.00
80.20
80.24
99.96
99.85
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
99.96
100.00
100.00
100.00

TM
60.14
59.95
99.54
99.57
99.60
99.61
80.00
80.37
99.55
99.58
99.64
99.64
99.43
99.48
99.55
99.45
99.58
99.43

CP
59.90
60.21
99.93
99.96
99.98
100.00
80.12
80.11
99.97
99.95
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
99.96
99.94
100.00
100.00

Figure 10. The percentage of the top 10% performing students being assigned to their top
choices. The scenario # in this figure corresponds to that in Table 17.
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Impacts on Top 10% Performing Students. In a competitive admission system
like the Taipei School District, there are few objections against increasing disadvantaged
students’ educational opportunity, but there are serious objections against achieving that
by creating justified envy for top performing students (Zhang, 2016). Policymakers
seeking to change the system from sorting to mixing usually take this public opinion into
account and will need the information about how the new policy affects the assignments
of the top performing students. Table 17 and Figure 10 show the percentage of the top
10% performing students who were assigned to their top choice schools (top-choice
match rate) under each mechanism and reveal the followings.
•

When Strategy = #2 or #3, TM could reach a top-choice match rate of more
than 99% regardless of the number of choices.

•

When Strategy = #2 or #3, to reach a top-choice match rate of more than 99%,
SD (DA) needed the number of choices to be higher than 2; CP, higher than 4;
BM, higher than 6.

•

If Strategy = 1, the greater the number of choices, the greater the top-choice
match rate under all mechanisms.

•

When the number of choices = 10, all mechanisms could produce a top-choice
match rate of more than 99% regardless of the strategy used; if students were
truth tellers (reporting their preference lists as their choice lists), the match
rates could even reach 100% except for those under TM.

I defined the top 10% performing students as the students whose total raw scores
are in the top decile. Since the model randomly breaks a tie, a top 10% performing
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student may be rejected by his top choice simply because the seats are full. Therefore, a
top-choice match rate slightly less than 100% but more than 99.9% should not be
interpreted as the occurrence of justified envy. However, the top-choice match rates
under TM were no more than 99.64%, which seemed to be lower than the match rate
resulting from mere random tie breaking. The reason might be TM’s feature of coarse
prioritization. Unlike the other mechanisms which prioritize students based on their raw
scores, TM prioritizes students based on their total coarse-grained scores converted from
their raw scores (see the subsection of the Taipei mechanism in Chapter 2 and the
subsection of details in Chapter 3 for the conversion rules in the program.) In this
prioritization process, Student i with higher total raw score may be prioritized lower than
Student j with lower total raw score and thus lose the seat in his top-choice school to
Student j. Therefore, the top 10% performing students under TM will always face the
risk of justified envy, and the top-choice match rate under TM is hard to reach 100%.
Table 18
The average preference index (PI) of the students with the bottom 10% family income
enrolled without the free-tuition policy
Number
of
choices
2

Strategy
1
2
3

Extrain-order
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE

Scenario
#
1
2
3
4
5
6

SD
(0.74)
(0.76)
(1.64)
(1.57)
(1.61)
(1.64)

BM
(0.39)
(0.38)
(0.71)
(0.90)
(0.81)
(0.80)

DA
(0.76)
(0.75)
(1.67)
(1.59)
(1.53)
(1.61)

TM
(0.70)
(0.71)
(1.42)
(1.35)
(1.26)
(1.20)

CP
(0.38)
(0.38)
(0.79)
(0.76)
(0.87)
(0.82)

(Continued)

161
Number
of
choices
4

Strategy
1
2
3

6

1
2
3

8

1
2
3

10

1
2
3

Extrain-order
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE

Scenario
#
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

SD
(0.51)
(0.50)
(0.70)
(0.65)
(0.72)
(0.63)
(0.33)
(0.32)
(0.07)
(0.27)
(0.12)
(0.17)
(0.13)
(0.13)
0.03
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.04)
0.00
0.00
0.11
0.00
0.11
0.00

BM
0.84
0.85
0.72
0.82
0.60
0.75
1.57
1.57
1.56
1.97
1.54
1.98
1.67
1.72
1.71
1.99
1.75
1.89
2.88
2.89
1.72
2.88
1.69
2.89

DA
(0.50)
(0.51)
(0.67)
(0.63)
(0.68)
(0.63)
(0.33)
(0.32)
(0.09)
(0.31)
(0.13)
(0.17)
(0.12)
(0.12)
(0.00)
(0.05)
(0.02)
(0.04)
0.00
0.00
0.11
0.00
0.11
0.00

TM
(0.44)
(0.42)
(0.51)
(0.41)
(0.37)
(0.16)
(0.20)
(0.19)
(0.16)
(0.10)
(0.27)
(0.09)
(0.03)
(0.04)
0.08
0.05
(0.06)
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.23
0.05
0.08
0.05

CP
0.11
0.08
(0.38)
(0.43)
(0.46)
(0.47)
0.12
0.12
0.38
0.35
0.27
0.29
0.21
0.22
0.28
0.27
0.16
0.11
0.50
0.50
0.26
0.25
0.22
0.20

Note. Values in parentheses are negative values.
Impacts on Students with Bottom 10% Family Income. Table 18 and
Figure 11 show the average PI of the students with the bottom 10% family income in
each scenario. As explained in the subsection of details in Chapter 3, a positive PI means
that a student is assigned to a school that he prefers more to his baseline school and thus a
gain to the student. In a complete sorting system, the bottom-performing students will be
assigned to the bottom-ranked schools. Since students’ income and scores are usually
positively correlated, most bottom-performing students are disadvantaged students
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(Pinkovskiy & Sala-i-Martin, 2009). Therefore, a mechanism designed to help
disadvantaged students should generate positive PIs for the students with the bottom 10%
family income.

Figure 11. The average preference index (PI) of the students with the bottom 10% family
income enrolled without the free-tuition policy. The scenario # in this figure corresponds
to that in Table 18.
Table 18 and Figure 11 show the following simulated properties of TM compared
with the other four mechanisms.
•

TM could generate positive PIs for students with the bottom 10% income
regardless of student’s strategy used only when the number of choices = 10;
BM, when the number of choices > 2; CP, when the number of choices > 4.

•

Students with the bottom 10% income could hardly have positive PIs under
SD (DA).
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•

When the number of choices > 6, BM could generate an average PI between
1.67 and 2.88 for students with the bottom 10% income; CP, between 0.11
and 0.50; TM, between -0.06 and 0.23; SD (DA), between -0.12 and 0.11.

•

When the number of choices <6, TM generated less negative PIs for students
with bottom 10% income than SD (DA).

From Figure 11, one can see that only BM could generate substantial positive PIs
for the students with the bottom 10% family income; all other mechanisms generated
little or no benefit for those students. However, the number of choices must be high for
the benefits from BM to be realized.
Table 19
The average preference index (PI) of the students with the bottom quartile family income
enrolled without the free-tuition policy
Number of
choices
2

Strategy
1
2
3

4

1
2
3

Extra-inorder
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE

Scenario
#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

SD25 BM25 DA25 TM25 CP25
(0.65) (0.54) (0.66) (0.62) (0.52)
(0.66) (0.53) (0.66) (0.62) (0.52)
(2.26) (1.58) (2.30) (1.76) (1.66)
(2.22) (1.78) (2.23) (1.69) (1.64)
(2.20) (1.67) (2.12) (1.45) (1.72)
(2.21) (1.67) (2.18) (1.41) (1.66)
(0.50)
0.47 (0.50) (0.45) (0.12)
(0.49)
0.49 (0.49) (0.43) (0.12)
(1.00) (0.21) (0.98) (0.57) (1.03)
(0.91) (0.17) (0.91) (0.42) (1.07)
(0.95) (0.28) (0.93) (0.34) (1.02)
(0.79) (0.20) (0.79) (0.13) (1.02)

(Continued)
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Number of
choices
6

Strategy
1
2
3

8

1
2
3

10

1
2
3

Extra-inorder
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE

Scenario
#
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

SD25 BM25 DA25 TM25 CP25
(0.26)
1.12 (0.28) (0.20)
0.03
(0.26)
1.12 (0.26) (0.18)
0.04
(0.21)
0.87 (0.23) (0.28) (0.09)
(0.17)
1.11 (0.20) (0.07) (0.10)
(0.25)
0.84 (0.27) (0.26) (0.15)
(0.11)
1.14 (0.12) (0.07) (0.10)
(0.08)
1.41 (0.08) (0.01)
0.18
(0.09)
1.45 (0.09) (0.01)
0.17
(0.03)
1.22 (0.04) (0.06)
0.09
(0.03)
1.63 (0.03)
0.05
0.08
(0.09)
1.24 (0.08) (0.09)
0.00
(0.02)
1.54 (0.02)
0.05 (0.01)
0.00
2.31
0.00
0.06
0.35
0.00
2.31
0.00
0.06
0.35
0.04
1.25
0.04
0.04
0.11
0.00
2.31
0.00
0.06
0.11
0.03
1.21
0.03 (0.04)
0.08
0.00
2.31
0.00
0.06
0.06

Note. Values in parentheses are negative values.
Table 20
The average preference index (PI) of the students with the second quartile family income
without the free-tuition policy
Number of
choices
2

Strategy
1
2
3

Extra-inorder
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE

Scenario
#
1
2
3
4
5
6

SD50 BM50 DA50 TM50 CP50
(0.37) (0.67) (0.38) (0.38) (0.66)
(0.39) (0.67) (0.38) (0.39) (0.67)
(3.01) (3.13) (3.08) (1.93) (3.21)
(3.09) (3.22) (3.05) (1.90) (3.15)
(2.79) (3.11) (2.75) (1.44) (3.16)
(2.79) (3.06) (2.79) (1.42) (3.05)

(Continued)
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Number of
choices
4

Strategy
1
2
3

6

1
2
3

8

1
2
3

10

1
2
3

Extra-inorder
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE

Scenario
#
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Note. Values in parentheses are negative values.

SD50 BM50 DA50 TM50 CP50
(0.42) (0.66) (0.42) (0.43) (0.62)
(0.42) (0.65) (0.42) (0.41) (0.62)
(1.07) (1.90) (1.06) (0.49) (1.76)
(1.03) (1.94) (1.03) (0.40) (1.72)
(0.96) (1.77) (0.99) (0.26) (1.51)
(0.78) (1.87) (0.77) (0.13) (1.52)
(0.19) (0.33) (0.20) (0.20) (0.26)
(0.19) (0.31) (0.19) (0.19) (0.25)
(0.49) (0.79) (0.48) (0.35) (0.69)
(0.13) (0.64) (0.15) (0.05) (0.66)
(0.44) (0.76) (0.44) (0.23) (0.66)
(0.06) (0.62) (0.07) (0.05) (0.60)
(0.04)
0.33 (0.04) (0.01)
0.03
(0.05)
0.35 (0.04) (0.01)
0.03
(0.30) (0.03) (0.31) (0.27) (0.33)
0.01
0.47
0.01
0.03 (0.35)
(0.32) (0.08) (0.33) (0.16) (0.35)
0.00
0.44
0.00
0.02 (0.31)
0.00
0.79
0.00
0.05
0.05
0.00
0.79
0.00
0.05
0.05
(0.29)
0.11 (0.29) (0.23) (0.32)
0.00
0.80
0.00
0.05 (0.24)
(0.28)
0.08 (0.28) (0.18) (0.29)
0.00
0.78
0.00
0.05 (0.22)
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Table 21
The average preference index (PI) of the students with the third quartile family income
without the free-tuition policy
Number of
choices
2

Strategy
1
2
3

4

1
2
3

6

1
2
3

8

1
2
3

10

1
2
3

Extra-inorder
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE

Scenario
#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Note. Values in parentheses are negative values.

SD75 BM75 DA75 TM75 CP75
(0.49) (0.65) (0.50) (0.53) (0.65)
(0.51) (0.65) (0.51) (0.53) (0.67)
(2.21) (2.85) (2.30) (1.27) (2.93)
(2.36) (2.81) (2.24) (1.25) (2.83)
(1.94) (2.71) (1.92) (0.85) (2.75)
(1.92) (2.65) (1.98) (0.85) (2.64)
(0.34) (0.81) (0.34) (0.35) (0.54)
(0.33) (0.81) (0.34) (0.33) (0.55)
(0.61) (2.02) (0.61) (0.31) (1.29)
(0.61) (2.04) (0.61) (0.29) (1.20)
(0.55) (1.70) (0.56) (0.18) (1.00)
(0.44) (1.83) (0.43) (0.11) (1.02)
(0.17) (0.77) (0.18) (0.19) (0.30)
(0.17) (0.77) (0.17) (0.19) (0.29)
(0.38) (1.45) (0.37) (0.26) (0.61)
(0.20) (1.38) (0.21) (0.07) (0.60)
(0.31) (1.21) (0.31) (0.18) (0.50)
(0.08) (1.30) (0.09) (0.05) (0.51)
(0.07) (0.67) (0.07) (0.08) (0.13)
(0.07) (0.70) (0.08) (0.08) (0.13)
(0.30) (1.04) (0.30) (0.24) (0.33)
(0.02) (0.82) (0.02) (0.02) (0.35)
(0.29) (0.97) (0.31) (0.16) (0.32)
(0.01) (0.75) (0.01) (0.01) (0.28)
0.00 (0.88)
0.00 (0.01) (0.05)
0.00 (0.88)
0.00 (0.02) (0.05)
(0.31) (0.72) (0.31) (0.22) (0.33)
0.00 (0.88)
0.00 (0.02) (0.27)
(0.27) (0.67) (0.27) (0.17) (0.28)
0.00 (0.88)
0.00 (0.02) (0.20)
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Table 22
The average preference index (PI) of the students with the top quartile family income
without the free-tuition policy
Number of
choices
2

Strategy
1
2
3

4

1
2
3

6

1
2
3

8

1
2
3

10

1
2
3

Extra-inorder
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE

Scenario
#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

SD100 BM100 DA100 TM100 CP100
(1.80)
(1.80)
(1.80)
(1.79) (1.80)
(1.79)
(1.81)
(1.79)
(1.80) (1.80)
(0.70)
(1.16)
(0.75)
(0.35) (1.20)
(0.77)
(1.08)
(0.72)
(0.34) (1.13)
(0.55)
(1.00)
(0.55)
(0.21) (1.01)
(0.54)
(0.97)
(0.58)
(0.20) (0.99)
(0.69)
(0.83)
(0.69)
(0.70) (0.71)
(0.69)
(0.84)
(0.69)
(0.69) (0.72)
(0.18)
(0.89)
(0.17)
(0.10) (0.41)
(0.18)
(0.82)
(0.18)
(0.10) (0.37)
(0.17)
(0.63)
(0.16)
(0.06) (0.28)
(0.12)
(0.65)
(0.12)
(0.03) (0.29)
(0.30)
(0.62)
(0.31)
(0.32) (0.32)
(0.30)
(0.62)
(0.30)
(0.32) (0.32)
(0.15)
(0.75)
(0.14)
(0.10) (0.20)
(0.09)
(0.78)
(0.10)
(0.03) (0.21)
(0.10)
(0.52)
(0.10)
(0.07) (0.15)
(0.04)
(0.67)
(0.05)
(0.02) (0.16)
(0.12)
(0.65)
(0.12)
(0.13) (0.14)
(0.12)
(0.66)
(0.12)
(0.14) (0.14)
(0.11)
(0.77)
(0.12)
(0.09) (0.12)
(0.04)
(0.89)
(0.04)
(0.02) (0.14)
(0.11)
(0.62)
(0.11)
(0.06) (0.11)
(0.02)
(0.76)
(0.02)
(0.01) (0.10)
0.00
(0.79)
0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
0.00
(0.79)
0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
(0.12)
(0.62)
(0.12)
(0.09) (0.13)
0.00
(0.79)
0.00
(0.01) (0.10)
(0.10)
(0.51)
(0.10)
(0.06) (0.10)
0.00
(0.79)
0.00
(0.01) (0.07)

Note. Values in parentheses are negative values.
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Figure 12. The average preference indexes (PIs) of the students in each income quartile
enrolled without the free-tuition policy. The upper left is the PIs of the students in the
first quartile; the upper right, the second quartile; the lower left, the third quartile; the
lower right, the fourth quartile. The scenario # in this figure corresponds to that in Tables
19-22.
Impacts on Students in Each Income Quartile. Tables 19-22 and Figure 12
show the average PIs of the students in the four income quartiles and reveal the following
properties of TM and the other mechanisms.
•

Justified envy (negative PIs) always occurred to the students in the top and
third income quartiles regardless of the mechanism or scenario except for the
scenarios where mechanism = SD (DA), the number of choices = 10, and sortextra-choice = True; in this exceptional case, the PI = 0.
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•

TM generated negative PIs for all students except that TM generated small
positive PIs (< 0.06) for the students in the bottom and second income
quartiles in some scenarios where the number of choices ≥ 8.

•

Under SD (DA), students could only receive negative or zero PIs except that
the students in the bottom and second income quartiles would have a small
positive PI (< .04) in some scenarios where the number of choices ≥ 8.

•

BM generated positive PIs for the students in the bottom income quartile in all
scenarios where the number of choices ≥ 6 and for the students in the second
income quartile in all scenarios where the number of choices = 10.

•

CP generated positive PIs for the students in the bottom income quartiles in all
scenarios where the number of choices = 10 and in most scenarios where the
number of choices = 8.

•

CP generated positive PIs for the students in the second income quartile only
when the number of choices ≥ 8 and Strategy = #1.

•

The positive PIs received by students were all less than 1 (less than one rank)
except for the PIs received by the students in the bottom income quartile
under BM in cases where the number of choices ≥ 8 and some cases where the
number of choices = 6.

•

When the number of choices = 10 and the mechanism = TM, BM, or CP, the
students in the third income quartile had larger negative PIs than those in the
top income quartile.
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•

When the number of choices > 6, the PIs under SD (DA) were between 0.04
and -0.32; under TM, between 0.06 and -0.27; under CP, between 0.18 and 0.35.

•

When the number of choices > 6 and under BM, the PIs of the bottomincome-quartile students were between 1.20 and 2.31; the PIs of the secondincome-quartile students, between 0.80 and -0.08; the PIs of the other students,
between -0.51 and -0.89.

The above results showed us how the students were assigned. If a mechanism
aiming at equality should benefit the more disadvantaged students, then BM is the best
among all mechanisms because BM produced the highest positive PIs for those in the
bottom income quartile. However, this benefit occurred only when the number of
choices ≥ 6. When the number of choices was not high enough, many students,
regardless of their groups, would end up having no school to attend because of their “bad”
choices, which could be evidenced by the low match rates and substantially negative PIs
in the cases where the number of choices was low as seen in Figure 7 and Figure 12,
respectively. When the number of choices ≥ 8, BM could also generate the largest
positive PIs or the least negative PIs for the second-income-quartile students and
produced the largest negative PIs for the top- and third-income-quartile students. This
finding suggests that BM mixes students the most, which might be the reason why BM
had the lowest SD-Freshman-Ns when the number of choices ≥ 8. When the number of
choices > 6, CP, by and large, produced more negative PIs for the top- and third-income
quartile students than TM and SD (DA), which might also be the reason why CP had a
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slightly lower average SD-Freshman-Ns than TM and SD (DA). When the number of
choices > 6, the relationships of the PIs in each quartile under TM and SD (DA) were
mixed. However, their values were very close, which might be the reason why SDFreshman-Ds under TM and SD (DA) were close.
Effects of TM with the Free-tuition policy
This section presents the data simulated with the free-tuition policy. I arranged
this section in the same way as the previous section to have a better comparison of the
outcomes with and without this policy.
Overall Effect on Educational Opportunity
SD-Freshman-Y. I defined SD-Freshman-Y as the SD-Freshman with the freetuition policy. Table 23 and Figure 13 show the average SD-Freshman-Y across all the
simulation steps in the 30 simulation runs in each scenario.
Table 23
The average standard deviation of the mean freshman family income under the freetuition policy (SD-Freshman-Y)
Number of
choices
2

Strategy
1
2
3

4

1
2
3

Extra-inorder
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE

Scenario
#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

SD
$327,710
$327,056†
$833,206
$817,636
$795,739
$806,719
$502,868
$502,423
$648,400
$648,728
$631,826
$631,019

BM
$314,351
$314,986
$827,860
$829,770
$804,619
$810,684
$455,527
$455,205
$734,276
$791,605
$725,813
$786,105

DA
$327,890
$326,390
$818,280
$809,773
$796,459
$792,117
$502,773
$502,164
$656,049
$641,767
$639,992
$632,518

TM
$324,949
$324,674
$735,152
$738,503
$697,264
$704,203
$499,008
$499,536
$626,650
$618,485
$613,047*
$611,652*

CP
$314,063
$313,398
$841,903
$835,469
$814,662
$799,248
$489,158
$488,754
$743,329
$747,045
$727,410
$728,609

(Continued)
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Number of
choices
6

Strategy
1
2
3

8

1
2
3

10

1
2
3

Extra-inorder
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE

Scenario
#
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

SD
$557,758
$558,334
$602,448
$603,820
$602,984
$606,900
$585,916
$587,554
$594,665
$600,876
$595,813
$602,934†
$606,656
$605,986
$598,392†
$606,084
$598,190
$607,571

BM
$475,594
$475,636
$652,995
$714,579
$646,793
$705,442
$491,894
$493,994
$582,670
$545,027
$579,511
$543,321
$490,788
$489,865
$557,177
$490,105
$554,051
$492,488

DA
$557,569
$558,049
$602,039
$603,743
$603,149
$606,872
$585,794
$587,332
$594,946
$600,888
$595,783
$602,915†
$606,656
$605,986
$598,362†
$606,084
$598,191
$607,571

TM
$554,080
$554,702
$605,337*
$609,219*
$607,954*
$611,182*
$582,426
$583,622
$597,339*
$601,875
$598,608
$602,872
$603,347
$602,723
$598,522*
$603,095
$599,712
$604,370

CP
$545,080
$545,812
$609,972
$609,150†
$609,734†
$608,849†
$579,040
$579,919
$591,458
$590,970
$593,155
$593,242
$599,036
$598,154
$597,267†
$595,657
$597,144
$599,414

Note. Each value under the columns of SD, BM, DA, and CP is significantly different
from that under the column of TM in the same scenario (the same row), p < .01, except
for the values with a †. * denotes that the SD-Freshman-Y under TM is insignificantly
different from the corresponding SD-Freshman-N under TM, p > .01. $ here represents
Taiwan dollar.

Figure 13. The average standard deviation of mean freshman family income under the
free-tuition policy (SD-Freshman-Y). The scenario # in this figure corresponds to that in
Table 23.
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Figure 13 and its counterpart (Figure 6) share a similar pattern. The relationships
among SD-Freshman-Ys based on the scenario-by-scenario comparisons were also
similar to those among SD-Freshman-Ns and summarized below.
•

When Strategy = #1, the size of SD-Freshman-Y produced by each of the
mechanisms had the following orders: SD (DA) > TM > CP, and SD (DA) >
TM > BM.

•

When Strategy = #1 or the number of choices ≥ 6, the differences between the
SD-Freshman-Ys under TM and SD (DA) were limited (less than 0.89% of
the SD-Freshman-Y under SD, Cohen’s d = 0.10).

•

When Strategy = #2 or #3 and the number of choices > 6, the SD-Freshman-Y
produced by each mechanism was in the following order: TM ≈ SD (DA) >
CP > BM.

•

When Strategy = #2 or #3 and the number of choices < 6, the SD-Freshman-Y
produced by each mechanism was in the following orders: TM < SD (DA) <
CP, and TM < BM; that is, TM generated the lowest SD-Freshman-Y in this
condition.

•

When Strategy = #2 or #3 and the number of choices = 6, the relationships of
the SD-Freshman-Ys under the mechanisms depended on sort-extra-order,
while the SD-Freshman-Y under BM was the highest among all mechanisms
in this condition.
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To see how well the free-tuition policy can reduce the SD-Freshman-N, I
compared SD-Freshman-N and SD-Freshman-Y on the scenario-by-scenario basis as
shown in Table 24 and summarized the findings below.
•

Under SD, DA, TM, and CP, if Strategy = #1 or the number of choices ≥ 6,
SD-Freshman-Y < SD-Freshman-N.

•

Under BM, if Strategy = #1 or the number of choices > 6, SD-Freshman-Y <
SD-Freshman-N.

•

If Strategy = #2 or #3, SD-Freshman-Y > SD-Freshman-N in some scenarios
other than the above.

Table 24
The comparisons of the standard deviations of the mean freshman family income (SDFreshman) with and without the free-tuition policy
Number of
choices

Strategy

Extra-inorder

2

1

FALSE
TRUE

2

FALSE
TRUE

3

FALSE
TRUE

4

1

FALSE
TRUE

2

FALSE
TRUE

3

FALSE
TRUE

Scenario
#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

A
SD

B
BM

C
DA

D
TM

E
CP

F

G

45,890

51,512

46,462

$48,116

52,692

535

48,651

48,731

50,922

48,182

$47,812

52,570

3,302

51,114

(20,128)

2,586

15,290

($19,697)

(13,341)

97,623

77,926

13,374

(3,989)

19,868

($24,407)

(13,498)

116,915

92,507

(6,903)

(9,974)

(15,051)

($19,580)

3,937

111,152

91,571

(14,784)

(24,855)

2,065

($21,299)

1,690

109,030

87,732

15,430

31,523

15,259

$16,717

21,695

2,573

19,290

14,777

31,893

15,334

$16,139

21,337

1,525

17,664

(13,872)

30,059

(26,400)

($13,584)

(19,046)

21,462

7,878

(14,760)

10,117

(8,757)

($4,804)

(24,588)

20,287

15,483

(7,717)

(10,212)

(14,116)

($1,310)

(24,877)

12,373

11,063

(12,051)

362

(13,164)

$3,534

(21,688)

3,782

7,316

(Continued)
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Number of
choices

Strategy

Extra-inorder

6

1

FALSE
TRUE

2

FALSE
TRUE

3

FALSE
TRUE

8

1

FALSE
TRUE

2

FALSE
TRUE

3

FALSE
TRUE

10

1

FALSE
TRUE

2

FALSE
TRUE

3

FALSE
TRUE

Scenario
#
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

A
SD

B
BM

C
DA

D
TM

E
CP

8,302

52,022

6,941

$9,455

12,398

2,525

11,980

6,044

49,439

5,666

$7,124

11,517

2,553

9,677

7,518

16,073

7,803

$4,255

5,170

374

4,629

2,693

(56,686)

2,759

$4,576

5,414

(7,283)

(2,707)

5,874

(6,482)

5,105

$2,761

1,953

(1,857)

904

7,001

(61,903)

6,878

$6,051

4,004

(3,333)

2,719

5,285

40,205

7,049

$7,610

8,031

1,165

8,775

3,984

37,463

3,979

$6,943

7,408

973

7,916

5,841

12,397

5,727

$2,692

6,460

475

3,167

3,757

18,803

4,023

$7,508

6,711

(4,751)

2,758

4,693

15,386

4,480

$5,176

4,647

(3,279)

1,897

5,604

22,558

5,444

$6,926

5,219

(1,260)

5,666

5,854

61,082

5,854

$6,138

7,653

3,024

9,163

5,916

61,755

5,916

$7,113

7,968

2,065

9,178

3,012

15,892

3,041

$2,736

2,920

145

2,882

6,630

60,575

6,630

$6,237

2,287

3,381

9,619

3,146

22,898

3,144

$3,711

3,577

(2,087)

1,625

6,170

60,233

6,170

$6,352

2,336

3,019

9,370

F

G

Note. Columns A to E = SD-Freshman-N minus SD-Freshman-Y under SD, BM, DA,
TM, and CP, respectively. Column F = SD-Freshman-N under SD minus SD-FreshmanN under TM in the same scenario. Column G = SD-Freshman-N under SD minus SDfreshman-Y under TM in the same scenario. A value in parentheses is a negative value.
$ here represents Taiwan dollar.
The intuition is that under the free-tuition policy, students with below-average
family income can afford to choose and attend School #3 (the private school initially
ranked the third best school in the model). With an increase in the population of lowerincome freshmen, School #3’s average Freshman family income could decrease, which in
turn could reduce the overall SD-Freshman-Y. Table 24 shows a counterintuitive
phenomenon that SD-Freshman-Y was larger than SD-Freshman-N in many cases where
Strategy = #2 or #3 and the number of choices ≤ 6. A possible reason is that when the
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number of choices becomes less, school choice becomes more like a game. The freetuition policy gives some players more options to bet on and increases the complexity of
the game, which in turn may cause the policy to have a mixed effect on the equality of
educational opportunity.
Columns F and G in Table 24 shows how well TM and the free tuition alone and
combined could help reduce the SD-Freshman under Taipei’s original mechanism, which
was SD, when students’ strategy was constant. As stated in the previous section, TM
and SD (DA) should be accompanied by an allowance of six or more choices to generate
a Match-N of at least 95% without regard to students’ behaviors. This rule also applied
to TM and SD (DA) with the free-tuition policy (see Table 25.) Assuming that high
match rate is a requirement for efficiency, I focus the following discussion on the
scenarios where the number of choices ≥ 6. The free-tuition policy always helped the
original mechanism reduce SD-Freshman (Column A), while the effect of TM on the
original mechanism depended on students' strategies (Column F). Combining TM and
the free-tuition policy helped balance out TM’s adverse effect and enhance TM’s positive
effect on the original SD-Freshman (see Column G.) If the number of choices > 6, TM
with the free-tuition policy could decrease the original SD-Freshman in all scenarios (see
Column G.)
The above findings were based on the scenario-by-scenario comparisons. I also
calculated the best-worst estimates of the change in SD-Freshman-Y caused by the
change from SD to the mechanisms with the free tuition policy when the number of
choices ≥ 8. Table 25 shows the estimates.
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Table 25
The estimated maximum percentage increase and decrease in the original SD-Freshman
by a change from the SD without the free-tuition policy to the mechanisms with the freetuition policy
Number of choices

8
10

To SD+Free
To BM+Free
To TM+Free
To CP+Free
%
%
%
%
Cohen’s d
Cohen’s d
Cohen’s d
Cohen’s d
[1.98%, -3.72%] [ --*, -16.95%] [1.97%, -4.5%] [0.35%, -3.19%]
0.60, -1.14
--*, -5.32
0.60, -1.32
0.10, -1.48
[1.04%, -2.53%] [ --*, -20.18%] [0.50%, -2.48%]
[ --*, -2.95%]
0.28, -0.76
--*, -5.49
0.14, -0.62
--*, -0.76

Note. The first percentage in the square brackets represents the maximum percentage
increase in the original SD-Freshman (SD-Freshman-N under SD) due to the change from
SD to the new mechanism with the free-tuition policy (SD+Free, BM+Free, TM+Free,
and CP+Free), and the second percentage in the square brackets is the maximum
percentage decrease. The corresponding Cohen’s d is presented right below each
percentage. * denotes that the policy in this column did not increase the original SDFreshman.
As in the scenarios without the free-tuition policy, BM with the free-tuition policy
could provide the largest decrease and least increase in the original SD-Freshman among
all mechanisms with the free-tuition policy. CP with the free-tuition policy also provided
a minimal or no effect on increasing the original SD-Freshman. Additionally, with the
free-tuition policy, CP, as well as TM and SD, could decrease the original SD-Freshman.
However, their effect sizes were much less than that of BM with the free-tuition policy.
The ranges and effect sizes of TM and SD (DA) with the free-tuition policy on the
original SD-Freshman crossed zero, which means that a wrong prediction of students’
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behaviors might cause an opposite expectation of the effect of TM with the free-tuition
policy on SD-Freshman.
In summary, when the number of choices > 6, the free-tuition policy helped TM
reduce the original SD-Freshman. However, in this case, the SD-Freshman-Y under SD
and the SD-Freshman-Y under TM were similar. The SD-Freshman-Y under SD
measured the effect of the free-tuition policy alone on the original SD-Freshman (SDFreshman-N under SD). SD-Freshman-Y under TM measured the combined effect of
TM and the free-tuition policy on the original SD-Freshman. This finding implied that
the free-tuition policy was the primary factor for TM with the free-tuition policy to
reduce the original SD-Freshman. That is, a similar effect could be obtained by
implementing the free-tuition policy alone without changing the mechanism from SD to
TM. I further discuss the policy implication of this fining in Chapter 5.
Match Rate. Match-Y denotes the rate of the candidates assigned to the schools
under a mechanism with the free-tuition policy. Table 26 and Figure 14 show the
average Match-Y across all the simulation steps for each scenario.
Like their counterparts (Table 11 and Figure 7), Table 26 and Figure 14 show a
trend that the higher the number of choices, the higher the Match-Y under all
mechanisms. Also like their counterparts, the TM and SD (DA) with the free-tuition
policy needed an allowance of six or more choices to generate a match rate of at least
95% without regard to students’ strategies, while CP needed eight choices and BM
needed ten choices. However, unlike Table 10 where only BM could reach the 100%
match rate, all mechanisms with the free-tuition policy reached the 100% match rate

179
when the number of choices = 10. That being said, the effect of the free-tuition policy on
match rate under the same mechanism was nonlinear and crossed zero. When the number
of choices < 10, the match rates in many scenarios with the free-tuition policy decreased
instead. The reason might still be the increased complexity of the game caused by the
free-tuition policy as explained in the previous paragraph.
Table 26
The average rate of students assigned to schools under a student-assignment mechanism
with the free-tuition policy (Match-Y)
Number
of
choices
2

Strategy
1
2
3

4

1
2
3

6

1
2
3

Extrainorder
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE

Scenario
#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

SD
%
90.57
90.51
55.87*
57.84*
60.42*
59.58*
95.10*
95.13*
80.00*
80.34*
82.63*
83.62*
97.60*
97.59*
95.29*
97.47*
95.42*
98.44*

BM
%

DA
%

87.46*
87.49*
56.13*
54.39*
57.15*
56.24*
91.52*
91.58*
71.55*
66.03*
72.48*
66.44*
94.85*
94.85*
82.94*
73.91*
83.68*
75.23*

90.52
90.50
57.52*
58.75*
59.94*
60.21*
95.13*
95.13*
79.33*
80.89*
81.63*
83.29*
97.59*
97.60*
95.33*
97.50*
95.37*
98.50*

TM
%

CP
%

90.50
87.46*
90.51†
87.46*
66.95†
55.90*
67.47†
55.69*
72.59†
57.73*
72.42†
58.01*
94.99†
93.80*
95.04†
93.81*
86.62†
71.56*
89.52†
70.86*
92.88†
72.98*
93.85†
72.79*
97.52†
97.53
97.51†
97.56
95.78
90.37*
98.48
90.16*
97.59
90.78*
99.00
91.25*
(Continued)
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Number
of
choices
8

Strategy
1
2
3

10

1
2
3

Extrainorder
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE

Scenario
#
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

SD
%
98.91
98.92
98.27*
99.61
98.31*
99.61
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00

BM
%
97.81*
97.83*
93.50*
92.29*
93.69*
92.55*
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00

DA
%
98.92
98.90
98.26*
99.61
98.29*
99.61
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00

TM
%
98.89†
98.91†
98.01
99.62
98.58
99.61
100.00†
100.00†
100.00†
100.00†
100.00†
100.00

CP
%
98.95*
98.94
97.96
98.02*
97.93*
97.99*
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00

Note. * denotes that the value is statistically significantly different from that under the
column of TM in the same scenario (the same row), p < .01. † denotes that the Match-Y
under TM was significantly different from the corresponding Match-N under TM, p <
.01.
I then compared the match rates under TM and SD with and without the freetuition policy on the scenario-by-scenario basis (Tables 11 and 25).
•

When the number of choices = 10, the Match-Ys under TM and SD were both
100%.

•

When the Strategy = #1, the match rates under TM alone, SD alone, SD with
the free-tuition policy, and TM with the free-tuition policy were no more than
0.32% different.

•

When Strategy = #2 or #3 and the number of choices < 6, TM alone produced
the highest match rates, while SD with the free-tuition policy produced the
lowest.
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•

When Strategy = #2 or #3 and the number of choices = 6, SD with the freetuition policy produced the lowest match rates, while the relationships of the
match rates under TM alone, SD alone, and TM with the free-tuition policy
were mixed.

•

When Strategy = #2 or #3 and the number of choices = 8, the relationships of
the match rates under the four combinations were mixed but no more than
0.81% different, while SD with the free-tuition policy always produced higher
match rates than SD alone (the original mechanism).

Figure 14. The average rate of students assigned to schools under a mechanism with the
free-tuition policy (Match-Y). The scenario # in this figure corresponds to that in Table
26.
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In summary, when the number of choices was high (more than 6 in the
simulations), the free-tuition policy alone was enough to increase the match rate of the
original mechanism. If the number of choices ≤ 6, then TM alone was effective enough
to raise the match rate. TM with the free-tuition policy did not perform better than the
free tuition alone when the number of choices > 6 or TM alone when the number of
choices ≤ 6.
Overall Effect on School Quality
SD-Senior-Y. I defined SD-Senior-Y as the SD-Senior under a mechanism with
the free-tuition policy. Table 27 and Figure 15 show the average SD-Senior-Y over the
last 31 simulation steps in the 30 simulation runs in each scenario.
Table 27
The average standard deviation of the mean scores of the seniors enrolled under the freetuition policy (average SD-Senior-Y)
Number
of
choices
2

Strategy
1
2
3

4

1
2
3

ExtrainScenario
order
#
SD
1
13.27
FALSE
2
13.28
TRUE
3
31.10
FALSE
4
30.50
TRUE
5
30.09
FALSE
6
30.45
TRUE
7
19.81
FALSE
8
19.81
TRUE
9
24.20
FALSE
10
24.27
TRUE
11
23.40
FALSE
12
23.34
TRUE

BM
12.63
12.73
30.90
31.31
30.46
30.56
16.77
16.76
26.73
29.82
27.01
29.88

DA
13.26
13.22†
30.55
30.09
29.90
29.97
19.80
19.81
24.48
23.86
23.74
23.46

TM
13.11
13.17
27.95
28.21
26.46
26.93
19.61
19.61
23.18
22.78
22.32
22.21

CP
12.60
12.67
31.18
30.61
30.38
30.03
18.74
18.76
27.70
27.78
27.34
27.25

(Continued)
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Number
of
choices
6

Strategy
1
2
3

8

1
2
3

10

1
2
3

ExtrainScenario
order
#
SD
13
21.14
FALSE
14
21.18
TRUE
15
21.44
FALSE
16
21.64
TRUE
17
21.50
FALSE
18
21.94
TRUE
19
21.68
FALSE
20
21.70
TRUE
21
21.07
FALSE
22
21.80
TRUE
23
21.17
FALSE
24
21.86
TRUE
25
22.00
FALSE
26
22.00
TRUE
27
21.53†
FALSE
28
22.01
TRUE
29
21.51†
FALSE
30
21.99
TRUE

BM
15.98
15.99
23.04
26.09
22.77
25.69
15.68
15.66
19.48
17.65
19.28
17.50
15.19
15.18
18.61
15.24
18.34
15.22

DA
21.16
21.16
21.40
21.64
21.52
21.93
21.69
21.70
21.09
21.80
21.17
21.86
22.00
22.00
21.53†
22.01
21.51†
21.99

TM
21.00
20.99
21.78
22.04
21.92
22.16
21.46
21.48
21.35
21.71
21.49
21.74
21.79
21.79
21.49
21.80
21.61
21.78

CP
19.96
19.96
21.62†
21.51
21.64
21.60
20.82
20.85
20.65
20.68
20.84
20.82
21.14
21.12
21.40†
21.39
21.40
21.51

Note. All values in the columns of SD, BM, DA, and CP are significantly different from
the corresponding values in the column of TM except for those with a †, p < .01.
Table 27 and Figure 15 have a structure similar to those of their counterparts
(Table 13 and Figure 8), although the gap between BM and the other mechanisms was
wider in the former. Also largely similar to the relationships of SD-Senior-Ns, the
relationships of SD-Senior-Ys were as follows: (a) When Strategy = #1, SD (DA) > TM
> CP and SD (DA) > TM > BM; (b) when Strategy = #2 or #3 and the number of choices
< 6, TM had the lowest SD-Senior-Ys among all mechanisms; and (c) when Strategy =
#2 or #3 and the number of choices > 6, TM > CP > BM, while the relationships between
TM and SD (DA) were mixed and depended on students’ strategies.
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Figure 15. The average standard deviation of the mean scores of the seniors enrolled
under the free-tuition policy (average SD-Senior-Y). The scenario # in this figure
corresponds to that in Table 27.
Table 28
The differences of the standard deviations of the mean scores of the seniors enrolled with
and without the free-tuition policy
Number of
choices

Strategy

2

1
2
3

Extra-inorder
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE

Scenario
#
1
2
3
4
5
6

A
SD

B
BM

C
DA

D
TM

E
CP

F

G

0.65
0.66
(1.04)
(0.01)
(0.46)
(0.70)

0.85
0.76
(0.37)
(0.45)
(0.85)
(1.03)

0.69
0.74
0.23
0.45
(0.59)
(0.21)

0.79
0.66
(1.18)
(1.39)
(1.20)
(1.61)

0.92
0.82
(0.73)
(0.34)
0.16
(0.44)

0.02
0.11
3.30
3.68
4.37
4.43

0.81
0.77
2.12
2.29
3.17
2.82

(Continued)
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Number of
choices
4

Strategy
1
2
3

6

1
2
3

8

1
2
3

10

1
2
3

Extra-inorder
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE

Scenario
#
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

A
SD
(0.20)
(0.22)
(1.48)
(1.68)
(1.32)
(1.31)
(0.22)
(0.28)
(0.24)
(0.23)
(0.20)
(0.12)
(0.16)
(0.20)
(0.13)
(0.19)
(0.34)
(0.10)
(0.14)
(0.16)
(0.58)
(0.11)
(0.46)
(0.09)

B
BM
0.30
0.31
0.06
(0.07)
(1.01)
(0.51)
1.19
1.16
(0.32)
(3.99)
(0.72)
(3.99)
0.91
0.86
0.42
0.30
0.50
0.55
1.64
1.65
0.34
1.57
0.79
1.62

C
DA
(0.22)
(0.23)
(2.00)
(1.28)
(1.45)
(1.41)
(0.36)
(0.30)
(0.19)
(0.24)
(0.23)
(0.13)
(0.05)
(0.22)
(0.15)
(0.17)
(0.37)
(0.10)
(0.14)
(0.16)
(0.58)
(0.11)
(0.46)
(0.09)

D
TM
(0.15)
(0.11)
(1.44)
(1.10)
(0.72)
(0.39)
(0.26)
(0.26)
(0.28)
(0.17)
(0.36)
(0.19)
(0.03)
(0.07)
(0.36)
(0.06)
(0.35)
(0.09)
(0.16)
(0.11)
(0.40)
(0.15)
(0.38)
(0.08)

E
CP
0.07
0.03
(1.30)
(1.31)
(1.54)
(1.28)
(0.02)
0.03
(0.25)
(0.24)
(0.36)
(0.36)
0.18
0.13
0.06
(0.10)
(0.21)
(0.09)
0.16
0.15
(0.59)
(0.42)
(0.43)
(0.37)

F
0.16
0.09
0.99
0.92
0.48
0.20
0.19
0.17
(0.30)
(0.46)
(0.27)
(0.15)
0.09
0.09
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.32)
0.10
0.22
0.16
(0.14)
0.24
(0.19)
0.20

G
0.01
(0.02)
(0.45)
(0.18)
(0.24)
(0.18)
(0.07)
(0.09)
(0.58)
(0.63)
(0.63)
(0.34)
0.06
0.02
(0.41)
(0.10)
(0.67)
0.02
0.07
0.05
(0.54)
0.09
(0.56)
0.12

Note. Columns A to E = SD-Senior-N minus SD-Senior-Y under SD, BM, DA, TM, and
CP, respectively. Column F = SD-Senior-N under SD minus SD-Senior-N under TM.
Column G = SD-Senior-N under SD minus SD-Senior-Y under TM. A value in
parentheses is a negative value.
To see how well the free-tuition policy could help each mechanism shape student
compositions that promote lower SD-Senior-Ys, I compared the SD-Senior-Ns with the
SD-Senior-Ys under the same mechanism on the scenario-by-scenario basis and show
their differences in Table 28.
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Columns A – E in Table 28 show that except for some scenarios where the
number of choices = 2, the free-tuition policy increased the SD-Seniors under TM, SD,
and DA (SD-Senior-Y > SD-Senior-N). With few exceptions, the free-tuition policy also
increased SD-Seniors under CP when Strategy = #2 or #3. Contrarily, the free-tuition
policy helped BM reduce SD-Seniors when Strategy = #1 or the number of choices > 6.
Column F shows that a change of the mechanism from SD to TM reduced the original
SD-Senior when students used Strategy #1 or the number of choices < 6, while TM's
effects were mixed in other scenarios, depending on the number of choices and students’
strategies. Since the free-tuition policy increased the original SD-Seniors in almost all
cases (Column A), when combined with TM, the free-tuition policy weakened TM’s
positive effects and magnified TM’s negative effects on the original SD-Seniors in all
scenarios except for some scenarios where the number of choices = 2 (Column G). From
this point of view, TM with the free-tuition policy was less effective than TM alone on
reducing the original SD-Senior.
I also calculated the best-worst estimates for the original SD-Senior when there is
a change from SD to the other mechanisms with the free-tuition policy. The estimates
presented in Table 29 show that with the free-tuition policy, BM, followed by CP, still
offered the most decrease and least increase in the original SD-Senior among all
mechanisms. When the number of choices increased from 8 to 10, the effect range of TM
with the free-tuition policy remained stable, while the effect of the free-tuition policy
alone (the column of SD+Free) became more adverse by having an interval showing
more increase and less decrease in the original SD-Senior. The comparison of the best-
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worst estimates with and without the free tuition policy showed that the free-tuition
policy weakened TM’s performance by enlarging the size of its maximum increase and
reducing the size of its maximum decrease in the original SD-Seniors.
Table 29
The estimated maximum percentage increase and decrease in the original SD-Senior by a
change from the SD without the free tuition policy to the other mechanisms with the free
tuition policy
Number of
choices
8
10

To SD+Free
To BM+Free
To TM+Free
To CP+Free
%
%
%
%
Cohen’s d
Cohen’s d
Cohen’s d
Cohen’s d
[4.97%, -3.19%] [0.00%*, -28.06%] [4.41%, -1.89%] [0.11%, -5.12%]
1.09, -0.73
--, -11.23
0.97, -0.46
0.02, -1.10
[5.06%, -1.81%] [0.00%*, -30.67%] [4.09%, -1.90%] [2.71%, -3.56%]
0.94, -0.47
--, -13.42
0.75, -0.48
0.44, -1.96

Note. The first percentage in the square brackets represents the maximum percentage
increase in the original SD-Senior (SD-Senior-N under SD) by the change from SD to the
new mechanism with the free-tuition policy (SD+Free, BM+Free, TM+Free, and
CP+Free), and the second percentage in the square brackets is the maximum percentage
decrease. The corresponding Cohen’s d is presented right below each percentage. *
denotes that the policy in this column did not increase the original SD-Freshman and thus
no Cohen’s d was calculated.
Mean Senior Score. To see whether the free-tuition policy helped increase the
mean senior scores, I followed the same logic used to calculate the mean senior scores in
Table 15 to calculate the mean senior scores in each scenario with the free-tuition policy
and present the results in Table 30 and Figure 16.
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Table 30
The average senior scores under each mechanism with the free-tuition policy
Number of
choices
2

Strategy
1
2
3

4

1
2
3

6

1
2
3

8

1
2
3

10

1
2
3

Sort-extrachoice
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE

Scenario
#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

SD

BM

DA

TM

CP

58.60†

58.09

58.60†

58.57

58.13

58.62

58.08

58.65

58.55

58.08

61.67

59.64

61.21

57.72

59.71

60.61

58.82

60.75

57.41

59.18

60.16

58.57

60.12

56.36

59.30

60.58

58.23

59.99

56.21

59.06

55.94†

55.41

55.94†

55.96

55.74

55.97†

55.41

55.97†

55.97

55.76

53.71†

54.91

53.89†

53.73

56.01

53.44

54.51

53.65†

53.81

56.14

53.81

55.19

53.76

54.39

55.73

53.69

54.09†

53.62

54.46

55.68

55.06

55.43

55.04†

55.03

55.24

55.04†

55.44

55.04†

55.03

55.23

54.57†

53.89

54.57†

54.56

54.00

54.71

52.41

54.70

54.65

54.01

54.57

53.94

54.58†

54.62

54.16

54.62

52.93

54.61

54.66

54.18

54.61

54.84

54.61

54.66

54.78

54.60

54.88

54.60

54.66

54.77

54.27†

54.48

54.28†

54.30

54.28†

54.35

54.11

54.35

54.39

54.31

54.28†

54.51

54.28†

54.31

54.29†

54.35

54.19

54.35

54.39

54.31

54.32

54.67

54.32

54.35

54.31

54.33

54.61

54.33

54.37

54.33

54.12

54.63

54.13

54.22

54.13

54.32

54.65

54.32

54.35

54.15

54.14

54.68

54.14

54.25

54.15

54.32

54.60

54.32

54.36

54.17

Note. Each value in Columns SD, BM, DA, and CP are significantly different from the
corresponding value in the column of TM (in the same row), except for the value with a
†,

p < .01.
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Figure 16. The average mean scores of the high school seniors enrolled with the freetuition policy. The scenario # in this figure corresponds to that in Table 30.
When the number of choices ≤ 6, like their counterparts in Figure 9, the senior
scores under each mechanism with the free-tuition policy fluctuated with students'
strategies and the number of choices. When the number of choices > 6, unlike their
counterparts, the senior scores under the free tuition policy became rather stable; the
range (the highest score minus the lowest score) was less than 0.50 points under SD, DA,
and TM and less than 0.80 points under BM and CP. The scenario-by-scenario
comparison of the scores in the cases where the number of choices > 6 shows the
followings.
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•

When the number of choices = 10, the average senior score under the
mechanisms with the free-tuition policy had the following orders: BM > TM >
SD (DA) and BM > TM > CP.

•

When the number of choices = 8 and with the free tuition policy, TM resulted
in higher senior scores than SD (DA), while the relationships between TM and
the other mechanisms were mixed.

•

The score differences between TM and SD (DA), with the free tuition policy,
were small (no more than 0.11 points, Cohen’s d = 0.27).

I also compared the effects of TM alone, the free-tuition policy alone, and the two
interventions combined on the original senior scores (senior scores resulting from SD) on
the scenario-by-scenario basis. Their differences are presented in Table 31.
Column (A) in Table 31 shows that the effects of TM alone on the original senior
scores were mixed. However, if the number of choices > 6, the score differences between
TM and SD were small and no more than 0.26 points different, Cohen’s d = 0.18. On the
other hand, the effect of the free-tuition policy alone on the original senior scores was
quite clear. When the number of choices > 2, all values in Columns (B) are negative,
which means that the free-tuition policy had an adverse effect on senior scores.
Therefore, when these two interventions were combined, the free-tuition policy worsened
TM’s performance and made TM with the free-tuition policy produce a lower senior
score than the original mechanism in almost all scenarios.
I also calculated the best-worse estimates of the senior score change caused by a
change from SD to the mechanisms with the free-tuition policy as shown in Table 32.
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Under the number of choices = 8 and with the free-tuition policy, the positive effect of
the mechanisms on the original senior scores had the following order: BM > CP > TM >
SD, while the sizes of their negative effects were about the same. Under the number of
choices = 10, BM with the free-tuition policy could provide the most increase and least
decrease in the original senior score. The rest of the mechanisms could hardly increase
the original mean senior score, while their effect sizes on decreasing the original senior
score were about medium.
Table 31
The differences of the mean senior scores resulting from SD alone, TM alone, SD with
the free-tuition policy, and TM with the free-tuition policy
Number of
choices
2

Strategy
1
2
3

4

1
2
3

6

1
2
3

Extra-inorder
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE

Scenario
#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

(A)
(B)
TM
Free tuition
alone
alone
(0.08)
(0.78)
(0.04)
(0.77)
(4.31)
0.50
(4.58)
(0.74)
(4.17)
0.22
(4.60)
0.18
(0.04)
(0.69)
(0.12)
(0.65)
0.25
(1.12)
0.21
(1.47)
(0.03)
(1.33)
(0.06)
(1.21)
0.04
(0.24)
0.01
(0.31)
(0.20)
(1.03)
(0.36)
(0.51)
(0.01)
(0.84)
0.01
(0.21)

(C)
TM with the freetuition policy
(0.81)
(0.84)
(3.45)
(3.94)
(3.58)
(4.19)
(0.67)
(0.64)
(1.09)
(1.11)
(0.76)
(0.44)
(0.27)
(0.32)
(1.04)
(0.57)
(0.78)
(0.17)

(Continued)
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Number of
choices
8

Strategy
1
2
3

10

1
2
3

Extra-inorder
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE

Scenario
#
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

(A)
(B)
TM
Free tuition
alone
alone
(0.06)
(0.16)
(0.06)
(0.19)
0.04
(0.75)
(0.08)
(0.16)
(0.26)
(0.89)
0.02
(0.07)
0.07
(0.09)
0.01
(0.09)
(0.08)
(0.91)
0.09
(0.05)
(0.09)
(0.84)
0.05
(0.03)

(C)
TM with the freetuition policy
(0.10)
(0.13)
(0.73)
(0.12)
(0.86)
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.05)
(0.82)
(0.01)
(0.73)
0.00

Note. Column (A) is the mean senior score under TM without the free-tuition policy
minus the mean senior score under SD without the free-tuition policy. Column (B) is the
mean senior score under SD with the free-tuition policy minus the mean senior score
under SD without the free-tuition policy. Column (C) is the mean senior score under TM
with the free-tuition policy minus the mean senior score under SD without the free-tuition
policy. A value in parentheses is a negative value.
In summary, when the number of choices > 6, whether TM alone could improve
SD-Senior depended on students’ behaviors before and after the policy change. Both the
scenario-by-scenario analysis and the best-worst estimates showed that the free-tuition
policy worsened TM’s performance. Therefore, TM with the free-tuition policy could
not increase the original senior score as much as TM alone, if any. When the number of
choices = 10, TM with the free-tuition policy had little chance to increase the original
senior score but probably could decrease it instead.
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Table 32
The estimated maximum percentage increase and decrease in the original senior scores
by a change from the SD without the free-tuition policy to the mechanisms with the freetuition policy
Number of choices

8
10

To SD+Free
To BM+Free
To TM+Free
To CP+Free
%
%
%
%
Cohen’s d
Cohen’s d
Cohen’s d
Cohen’s d
[0.36%, -1.62%] [0.84%, -1.92%] [0.45%, -1.57%] [0.66%, -1.61%]
0.51, -0.69
1.04, -0.58
0.64, -0.68
0.95, -0.68
[ ---*, -0.91%] [0.32%, -0.44%] [0.01%, -0.81%]
[ --*, -0.91%]
--, -0.70
0.64, -0.34
0.07, -0.64
--, -0.70

Note. The first percentage in the square brackets represents the maximum percentage
increase in the original senior score (senior score under SD without the free-tuition policy)
by the change from SD to the new mechanism with the free-tuition policy (SD+Free,
BM+Free, TM+Free, and CP+Free), and the second percentage in the square brackets is
the maximum percentage decrease. The corresponding Cohen’s d is presented right below
each percentage. * denotes that the policy in this column did not increase the original
SD-Freshman and thus no Cohen’s d was calculated.
Impacts on Different Student Groups
Impacts on Top 10% Performing Students. Table 33 and Figure 17 show the
top-choice match rate under the mechanisms with the free-tuition policy. The
comparison between Figure 17 and its counterpart (Figure 10) on the scenario-byscenario basis showed that the percentages under TM with and without the free tuition
policy were less than 0.5% different. The same statement applied to SD (DA) when the
number of choices > 2, CP when the number of choices > 4, and BM when the number of
choices > 6. If the top-choice match rate was 100% in a scenario without the free-tuition
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policy, the percentage remained 100% after the implementation of the free-tuition policy.
Therefore, the free-tuition policy had limited impact on the assignment of the top 10%
performing students. However, when the number of choices < 10, Strategy #1 produced
a significantly different top-choice match rate from Strategy #2 or #3, which implied that
when the number of choices < 10 and students changed their behaviors, the
implementation of the free-tuition policy could have a significant impact on the
assignment of the top 10% performing students.
Table 33
The average percentage of the top 10% performing students assigned to their top choices
under the mechanisms with the free-tuition policy
Number of
choices
2

Strategy
1
2
3

4

1
2
3

6

1
2
3

Extra-inorder
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE

Scenario
#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

SD
19.87
20.07
96.53
96.36
99.15
98.65
39.84
39.89
99.95
99.98
99.98
99.94
60.28
60.22
99.95
99.93
100.00
100.00

BM
20.13
19.93
96.19
96.76
98.56
96.84
40.16
40.07
97.42
99.30
99.47
99.74
59.93
59.84
99.30
99.83
99.75
99.98

DA
19.99
20.15
97.01
96.80
98.69
98.92
39.90
40.03
99.87
99.86
100.00
100.00
59.80
59.57
99.95
99.93
100.00
100.00

TM
CP
19.98 19.94
20.01 19.85
99.08 93.92
99.62 94.28
99.68 97.01
99.72 97.78
39.84 40.00
40.17 40.12
99.51 98.92
99.57 97.96
99.60 99.50
99.62 99.66
60.01 59.71
60.04 60.04
99.55 99.93
99.64 99.95
99.59 100.00
99.61 100.00
(Continued)
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Number of
choices
8

Strategy
1
2
3

10

1
2
3

Extra-inorder
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE

Scenario
#
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

SD
79.89
79.93
99.95
99.92
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
99.96
100.00
100.00
100.00

BM
79.71
79.92
99.83
99.96
99.79
100.00
100.00
100.00
99.97
100.00
100.00
100.00

DA
80.12
80.06
99.95
99.92
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
99.96
100.00
100.00
100.00

TM
80.02
79.87
99.49
99.64
99.60
99.59
99.42
99.45
99.54
99.44
99.60
99.38

CP
80.08
79.93
99.96
99.96
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
99.95
99.93
100.00
100.00

Figure 17. The percentage of the top 10% performing students assigned to their top
choices under the mechanisms with the free-tuition policy. The scenario # in this figure
corresponds to that in Table 33.
Impacts on Students with the Bottom 10% Family Income. Table 34 and
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Figure 18 show the PIs of the students with the bottom 10% family income under the
mechanisms with the free-tuition policy. Compared with its counterpart (Table 18),
Table 34 shows that the free-tuition policy increased the PIs of the students in this group
in almost all scenarios under SD, DA, and TM and all scenarios under BM and CP. Even
if the PIs with the free-tuition policy were lower than the PIs without the free-tuition
policy, their differences were no more than 0.06 if the number of choices ≤ 6 and no
more than 0.02 if the number of choices > 6. Therefore, the free-tuition policy brought
no harm, if no benefit, to the students with the bottom 10% income. When the freetuition policy was implemented with an allowance of 6 choices, BM generated a PI
between 2.07 and 3.10 for this group of students; CP, between 0.23 and 0.69; TM,
between -0.05 and 0.58; SD (DA) between -0.13 and 0.47. Therefore, BM, followed by
CP, still helped the students in this group the most.
Table 34
The average preference index (PI) of the students with the bottom 10% family income
under the mechanisms with the free-tuition policy
Number of
choices
2

Strategy
1
2
3

Extra-inorder
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE

Scenario
#
1
2
3
4
5
6

SD
(0.20)
(0.20)
(0.75)
(0.74)
(0.71)
(0.77)

BM
0.27
0.27
0.05
0.08
0.01
0.00

DA
(0.21)
(0.22)
(0.76)
(0.73)
(0.69)
(0.74)

TM
CP
(0.19)
0.24
(0.16)
0.28
(0.80)
0.01
(0.74)
0.16
(0.77) (0.06)
(0.72) (0.05)
(Continued)
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Number of
choices
4

Strategy
1
2
3

6

1
2
3

8

1
2
3

10

1
2
3

Extra-inorder
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE

Scenario
#
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

SD
(0.17)
(0.15)
(0.37)
(0.28)
(0.37)
(0.30)
(0.16)
(0.15)
0.38
0.06
0.30
(0.01)
(0.13)
(0.13)
0.39
(0.02)
0.33
(0.02)
0.00
0.00
0.46
0.00
0.47
0.00

BM
1.30
1.32
1.35
1.63
1.28
1.62
1.91
1.91
2.00
2.73
2.01
2.67
2.53
2.53
2.09
2.94
2.20
2.87
3.09
3.10
1.95
3.10
2.07
3.10

DA
(0.17)
(0.16)
(0.34)
(0.28)
(0.36)
(0.33)
(0.15)
(0.15)
0.41
0.06
0.30
0.00
(0.13)
(0.13)
0.36
(0.02)
0.33
(0.02)
0.00
0.00
0.46
0.00
0.47
0.00

TM
(0.11)
(0.09)
(0.28)
(0.19)
(0.21)
(0.21)
(0.01)
(0.01)
0.21
0.01
0.07
0.02
(0.05)
(0.05)
0.36
0.06
0.25
0.05
0.12
0.12
0.58
0.11
0.35
0.12

CP
0.54
0.56
0.35
0.27
0.19
0.27
0.35
0.36
0.76
0.78
0.65
0.64
0.23
0.23
0.69
0.66
0.58
0.58
0.83
0.84
0.65
0.61
0.65
0.49
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Figure 18. The average preference index (PI) of the students with the bottom 10% family
income under the mechanisms with the free-tuition policy. The scenario # in this figure
corresponds to that in Table 34.
Impacts on Students in Each Income Quartile. Tables 35-38 and Figure 19
show the PIs of the students in each quartile enrolled under the free-tuition policy. I
compared the results under each mechanism with the free tuition policy (Figure 19) and
without the free tuition policy (Figure 12) and summarize the findings below.
•

The free-tuition policy helped BM and CP increase the PIs of the bottomincome-quartile students in all scenarios.

•

The free-tuition policy helped SD (DA) remain or increase the PIs of the
bottom-income-quartile students in all scenarios except for the scenarios
where the number of choices = 8 and Strategy = #1.

•

The free-tuition policy helped TM increase the PIs of the bottom-income-
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quartile students in all scenarios except for the scenarios where the number of
choices = 8 and Strategy = #1 and the scenario where the number of choices =
4, Strategy = #3, and sort-extra-order = True.
•

The free-tuition policy helped all mechanisms increase the PIs of the secondincome-quartile students in most scenarios, but there were more scenarios
where the free-tuition policy harmed the second-income-quartile students than
the scenarios where the free-tuition policy harmed the bottom-income-quartile
students.

•

The effects of the free-tuition policy on the third-income-quartile students
were mixed; it helped SD, DA, TA, and CP improve these students’ PIs in
most scenarios where the number of choices > 6 and Strategy = 2 or 3 but
helped BM improve these student’s PI only in the scenarios where the number
of choices = 10.

•

The free-tuition policy helped remain or improve the PIs of the top-incomequartile students under SD (DA) and TM except for a few scenarios where the
number of choices = 2 and under CP except for some scenarios where the
number of choices ≤ 6.

•

The free-tuition policy worsened the PIs of the top-income-quartile students
under BM in all scenarios except for some scenarios where the number of
choices ≥ 8 and Strategy = #2.

•

When the number of choices ≥ 8, the PIs under SD (DA) were between ±
0.28; under TM, between 0.28 and -0.13; under CP, between 0.61 and -0.31.
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•

When the number of choices ≥ 8 and under BM, the PIs of the bottomincome-quartile students were between 2.69 and 1.57; the PIs of the secondincome-quartile students, between 1.04 and 0.00; the PIs of the third- and topincome-quartile students, between -0.66 and -1.07.

The above findings show that with the free-tuition policy, BM was still the best
mechanism to improve the assignments of the bottom-income-quartile students, followed
by CP. However, the free-tuition policy made BM produce more negative PIs for the
top-income-quartile students while helping all other mechanisms improve the PIs of the
students in this group. Compared with Taipei’s original mechanism (SD) on the
scenario-by-scenario basis, TM alone or the free tuition alone improved the PIs of the
bottom-income-quartile students in most scenarios but also decreased their PIs in a few
scenarios. With the two interventions combined, the PIs of the students in the bottom
income quartile were all higher than those under the original mechanism. From the
viewpoint of OEDC (2010), since TM with the free-tuition policy benefited the
disadvantaged students, it helped reduce educational inequality.
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Table 35
The average preference index (PI) of the students with the bottom quartile family income
enrolled under the free-tuition policy
Number of
choices
2

Strategy
1
2
3

4

1
2
3

6

1
2
3

8

1
2
3

10

1
2
3

Extra-inorder
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE

Scenario
#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

SD25 BM25 DA25 TM25 CP25
(0.11)
0.10 (0.12) (0.08)
0.10
(0.11)
0.12 (0.12) (0.07)
0.12
(1.46) (0.78) (1.44) (1.28) (0.81)
(1.43) (0.77) (1.41) (1.22) (0.71)
(1.35) (0.80) (1.34) (1.11) (0.84)
(1.40) (0.80) (1.37) (1.09) (0.84)
(0.20)
0.84 (0.20) (0.15)
0.24
(0.19)
0.85 (0.20) (0.15)
0.24
(0.80)
0.47 (0.79) (0.52) (0.38)
(0.71)
0.67 (0.71) (0.36) (0.46)
(0.73)
0.40 (0.74) (0.30) (0.47)
(0.64)
0.66 (0.67) (0.23) (0.42)
(0.16)
1.42 (0.16) (0.09)
0.24
(0.16)
1.42 (0.16) (0.09)
0.24
0.07
1.33
0.09 (0.02)
0.20
0.05
1.75
0.05
0.01
0.20
0.01
1.29
0.01 (0.04)
0.14
0.01
1.73
0.01
0.01
0.14
(0.11)
1.90 (0.11) (0.04)
0.23
(0.11)
1.91 (0.11) (0.03)
0.23
0.21
1.61
0.19
0.13
0.34
(0.01)
2.29 (0.01)
0.05
0.32
0.15
1.67
0.16
0.08
0.27
(0.02)
2.26 (0.02)
0.05
0.28
0.00
2.69
0.00
0.10
0.60
0.00
2.69
0.00
0.10
0.60
0.28
1.57
0.28
0.28
0.39
0.00
2.68
0.00
0.10
0.37
0.27
1.69
0.27
0.15
0.35
0.00
2.68
0.00
0.10
0.26
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Table 36
The average preference index (PI) of the students with the second quartile family income
enrolled under the free-tuition policy
Number of
choices
2

Strategy
1
2
3

4

1
2
3

6

1
2
3

8

1
2
3

10

1
2
3

Extra-inorder
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE

Scenario
#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

SD50 BM50 DA50 TM50 CP50
0.11
0.10
(2.72)
(2.56)
(2.35)
(2.40)
(0.23)
(0.23)
(1.09)
(1.12)
(0.93)
(0.87)
(0.17)
(0.18)
(0.39)
(0.12)
(0.35)
(0.05)
(0.09)
(0.09)
(0.22)
0.01
(0.20)
0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.14)
0.00
(0.16)
0.00

(0.12)
(0.12)
(2.49)
(2.55)
(2.41)
(2.44)
(0.38)
(0.38)
(1.38)
(1.35)
(1.32)
(1.34)
0.00
0.00
(0.54)
(0.50)
(0.53)
(0.44)
0.22
0.23
(0.00)
0.45
0.01
0.46
1.04
1.03
0.34
1.03
0.37
1.02

0.10
0.11
(2.63)
(2.53)
(2.38)
(2.37)
(0.23)
(0.22)
(1.15)
(1.09)
(1.01)
(0.86)
(0.17)
(0.17)
(0.39)
(0.12)
(0.34)
(0.05)
(0.09)
(0.09)
(0.22)
0.01
(0.21)
0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.14)
0.00
(0.16)
0.00

0.10
0.10
(1.89)
(1.80)
(1.46)
(1.44)
(0.24)
(0.23)
(0.63)
(0.47)
(0.29)
(0.22)
(0.18)
(0.17)
(0.24)
(0.03)
(0.12)
(0.02)
(0.05)
(0.05)
(0.17)
0.03
(0.11)
0.03
0.06
0.06
(0.14)
0.06
(0.07)
0.06

(0.11)
(0.11)
(2.51)
(2.53)
(2.39)
(2.39)
(0.40)
(0.40)
(1.54)
(1.59)
(1.45)
(1.44)
(0.21)
(0.20)
(0.61)
(0.63)
(0.59)
(0.56)
(0.04)
(0.03)
(0.30)
(0.28)
(0.27)
(0.26)
0.04
0.04
(0.17)
(0.16)
(0.19)
(0.15)
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Table 37
The average preference index (PI) of the students with the third quartile family income
enrolled under the free-tuition policy
Number of
choices
2

Strategy
1
2
3

4

1
2
3

6

1
2
3

8

1
2
3

10

1
2
3

Extra-inorder
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE

Scenario
#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

SD75 BM75 DA75 TM75 CP75
(0.36) (0.50) (0.35) (0.39) (0.51)
(0.35) (0.50) (0.35) (0.38) (0.50)
(2.39) (2.70) (2.23) (1.40) (2.73)
(2.16) (2.78) (2.12) (1.34) (2.83)
(1.85) (2.52) (1.95) (0.99) (2.48)
(1.89) (2.58) (1.88) (0.96) (2.43)
(0.27) (0.94) (0.27) (0.29) (0.52)
(0.27) (0.94) (0.27) (0.30) (0.52)
(0.60) (1.88) (0.66) (0.35) (1.33)
(0.65) (1.94) (0.63) (0.28) (1.36)
(0.47) (1.61) (0.52) (0.15) (1.15)
(0.46) (1.87) (0.44) (0.13) (1.16)
(0.19) (0.94) (0.20) (0.21) (0.35)
(0.19) (0.94) (0.19) (0.21) (0.35)
(0.28) (1.44) (0.28) (0.16) (0.52)
(0.19) (1.61) (0.19) (0.06) (0.54)
(0.22) (1.32) (0.22) (0.08) (0.45)
(0.10) (1.50) (0.10) (0.03) (0.45)
(0.10) (0.73) (0.10) (0.10) (0.17)
(0.10) (0.72) (0.10) (0.10) (0.17)
(0.24) (1.07) (0.23) (0.13) (0.28)
(0.01) (0.90) (0.01) (0.01) (0.28)
(0.18) (1.05) (0.19) (0.09) (0.24)
(0.00) (0.87)
0.00 (0.01) (0.24)
0.00 (0.66)
0.00
0.01 (0.07)
0.00 (0.66)
0.00
0.01 (0.07)
(0.21) (0.70) (0.21) (0.13) (0.23)
0.00 (0.66)
0.00
0.01 (0.21)
(0.18) (0.73) (0.18) (0.07) (0.20)
0.00 (0.66)
0.00
0.01 (0.15)
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Table 38
The average preference index (PI) of the students with the top quartile family income
enrolled under the free-tuition policy
Number of
choices
2

Strategy
1
2
3

4

1
2
3

6

1
2
3

8

1
2
3

10

1
2
3

Extra-inorder
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE

Scenario
#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

SD100 BM100 DA100 TM100 CP100
(1.79)
(1.80)
(1.79)
(1.80) (1.80)
(1.79)
(1.81)
(1.79)
(1.80) (1.82)
(0.78)
(1.17)
(0.72)
(0.38) (1.21)
(0.69)
(1.20)
(0.67)
(0.37) (1.27)
(0.52)
(1.03)
(0.57)
(0.24) (0.99)
(0.55)
(1.05)
(0.54)
(0.22) (0.95)
(0.67)
(0.92)
(0.66)
(0.68) (0.71)
(0.66)
(0.92)
(0.66)
(0.68) (0.71)
(0.12)
(0.89)
(0.13)
(0.08) (0.39)
(0.13)
(0.89)
(0.13)
(0.06) (0.41)
(0.09)
(0.66)
(0.10)
(0.03) (0.30)
(0.09)
(0.82)
(0.09)
(0.03) (0.32)
(0.30)
(0.83)
(0.30)
(0.32) (0.34)
(0.30)
(0.84)
(0.30)
(0.31) (0.33)
(0.08)
(0.81)
(0.07)
(0.05) (0.14)
(0.07)
(1.01)
(0.07)
(0.03) (0.14)
(0.06)
(0.69)
(0.06)
(0.02) (0.11)
(0.04)
(0.95)
(0.04)
(0.01) (0.11)
(0.12)
(0.69)
(0.12)
(0.13) (0.13)
(0.12)
(0.70)
(0.12)
(0.13) (0.13)
(0.08)
(0.69)
(0.07)
(0.05) (0.08)
(0.03)
(0.86)
(0.03)
(0.02) (0.08)
(0.05)
(0.68)
(0.06)
(0.03) (0.07)
(0.02)
(0.84)
(0.02)
(0.01) (0.07)
0.00
(0.98)
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Figure 19. The average preference indexes (PIs) of the students in each income quartile
enrolled under the free-tuition policy. The upper left is the PIs of the students in the first
quartile; the upper right, the second quartile; the lower left, the third quartile; the lower
right, the fourth quartile. The scenario # in this figure corresponds to that in Tables 3538.
Summary
Educational equality and school quality are complex phenomena emerging from
the interaction between students’ behaviors and their environment. The simulation
results demonstrated that whether TM alone or TM with the free-tuition policy helped
equalize educational opportunities and converge school quality upward depended on the
interactions of students’ school-choice strategies, the admission policy, and the number
of choices. Additionally, as shown in the best-worst analyses, a wrong expectation of
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students’ behaviors might result in an opposite expectation of the effects of a policy on
educational equality and school quality.
SD without the free tuition policy was Taipei’s original admission policy. When
the number of choices < 6 and students use Strategy #2 or #3, the replacement of SD with
TM without the free-tuition policy helped equalize educational opportunity not only by
reducing the SD-Freshman-Ns but also by increasing the match rates. When Strategy =
#1, TM alone still produced less SD-Freshmans than SD, but the match rates produced
under TM were similar to those under SD. When Strategy = #2 or #3 and the number of
choices > 6, the results of TM and SD were mixed but similar regarding SD-Freshman
and the match rate. However, the above analysis was based on the assumption that
students’ behaviors remain the same regardless of the mechanisms. If students changed
their behavioral rules with the change of the mechanism, the effect of TM on SDFreshman might change from positive to negative and vice versa.
The effects of TM alone on the equality of school quality were quite similar to its
effects on educational opportunity. TM reduced the inequality in school quality by
producing less SD-Senior-Ns than SD when (a) Strategy = #1 or (b) Strategy = #2 or #3
and the number of choices < 6. When Strategy = #2 or #3 and the number of choices > 6,
the effects of TM and SD on the equality of school quality were close. However, the
effect of TM alone on improving senior scores was limited. In some scenarios, TM even
reduced the average senior scores.
The effects of the free-tuition policy also depended on the interaction between
students’ behaviors and their environment. When the number of choices < 6, the free-
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tuition policy worsened the performance of TM in reducing the original SD-Freshman in
many scenarios where Strategy = #2 or #3. However, when the number of choices > 6,
the free-tuition policy improved TM’s performance and made TM outperform SD in
reducing the original SD-Freshman without regard to students’ behaviors. That being
said, the benefit of the free-tuition policy might come at the cost of lower overall match
rate, unless the number of choices = 10. When the number of choices = 10, the freetuition policy made all mechanisms produce a 100% match rate, which was a
phenomenon that only BM could achieve if there was no free-tuition policy. Again, if
students changed their behaviors with the change of policy, the effect of TM with the
free-tuition policy on the original SD-Freshman might be reversed from positive to
negative, and vice versa.
The effects of the free-tuition policy on the equality of school quality were
relatively consistent. As long as the number of choices > 2, the free-tuition policy
worsened the inequality of school quality under SD, DA, and TM by increasing the
original SD-Senior in each scenario. Senior students in the above scenarios also had
lower average scores than those in the same scenarios without the free-tuition policy.
However, if students changed their strategies with the change of policy, it was still
possible that TM with the free-tuition policy could reduce the inequality of school quality
and increase the average senior scores, depending on students’ new strategies.
The simulations also showed the effects of TM and the free-tuition policy on the
welfares of the students in each quartile. An ideal admission mechanism or policy is to
increase the educational opportunity of the most disadvantaged students without hurting
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the top performing students. Both TM alone and TM combined with the free-tuition
policy could produce a top-choice match rate of more than 99% for the top 10%
performing students when Strategy # 2 or #3 was used or when the number of choices =
10. The above statement also applied to SD (DA) with and without the free-tuition
policy. Therefore, the implementation of TM either with or without the free-tuition
policy did not affect the welfare of the top 10% performing students. Additionally, TM
and the free-tuition policy benefited the students with the bottom 10% income and in the
bottom income quartile in most scenarios. However, there were still a few scenarios
where TM alone or the free-tuition policy alone reduced the PIs of those students. When
these two interventions were combined, the PIs of those students increased in all
scenarios. Since TM with the free-tuition policy benefited the most disadvantaged
students, it contributed to the improvement of educational equality in this sense.
Chapter 5 provides an in-depth interpretation of the simulation results, the
limitation of this study, and the policy implication of this study. It concludes with
recommendations for future research.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Instruction
In this study, I proposed an agent-based OLG model to study the effects of school
admission policies on educational equality and school quality. The traditional approach
to studying macroscopic education policy is equation-based modeling, which assumes a
fixed system structure and can hardly address the relationship between microbehaviors
and macrophenomena (Chen, 2015). However, educational systems are CASs, where the
macropatterns emerge from the interaction between the individual agents and their
environment. Agents may change their behaviors in response to the change of policies,
which in turn changes the system structures (Lucas, 1976). Therefore, it may not be
proper to analyze policy implications simply based on a model assuming fixed system
structures. ABM enables researchers to address agents’ potential behaviors and let the
macropatterns emerge from the interaction of the agents and the computational
environment through the execution of agents’ behavioral rules (Borrill & Tesfatsion,
2011; Macal & North, 2010). Since the macropatterns in an agent-based model are
generated from the bottom-up, the causal relationship between individual behaviors and
macrophenomena is clear. Therefore, ABM helps to answer not only what an educational
policy can do but also how it works (Maroulis et al., 2010).
The Taipei government implemented TM and the free tuition policy in 2016, with
the goal of enhancing educational opportunity and school quality. Since the government
did not issue any research report to support their decisions, the goal seemed to be more
ideology-based than research-based. Because the government had changed the student-
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assignment mechanism every year since 2014, parents criticized the government for
treating their children as experimental subjects (Center for Educational Research and
Evaluation, NTNU). It is understandable that to conduct human-subject experiments on
new macroeducational policies is often impossible because of the constraints such as
ethical issues, cost, time, and human fatigue (Chen, 2015; Roth, 2002). However, these
policies could be tested by conducting computational experiments and scenario analysis,
and ABM is the right complexity methodology to perform the above tasks.
I simulated the outcomes of TM and the other four real-world mechanisms, with
and without the free tuition policy under 30 different scenarios in this study. The
findings demonstrated that the effects of the matching mechanisms depend on how
students react to the mechanisms and how many choices students are allowed to submit.
The simulation results also reveal interesting counterintuitive outcomes that could not be
obtained by using equation-based models. Therefore, this study contributes not only to
the development of ABM in educational policy analysis but also to the literature on
student-assignment mechanisms.
Interpretation of the Findings
This was an exploratory study. The quantities collected from the simulations
cannot be interpreted as having a direct relationship with the quantities in the real world.
For example, a 2% increase in SD-Freshman cannot be interpreted as a 2% increase in the
real world. Instead, the quantitative amounts in the simulation results should be viewed
as information regarding the qualitative magnitude of the system’s possible
macroproperties.
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Impacts on Educational Opportunities
In this study, I measured the equality of educational opportunity by using the
standard deviation of the mean freshman family income across all schools (SDFreshman). However, this measure only measured the educational inequality among the
students who were admitted to schools. If a school system has enough seats for all
candidates but a high percentage of candidates remain unassigned, then educational
inequality is still high even with a low SD-Freshman. Therefore, match rate and SDFreshman should be discussed together.
The simulated result reveals that like SD-Freshman, match rate depends on
students’ strategy and the number of choices. The number of choices needs to be large to
have a robust high match rate, resistant to students’ strategies. How large the number of
choices is required depends on the mechanisms. The simulations showed that while TM
needed the smallest number of choices, BM needed the most. However, when students
were given the full number of choices, only BM could produce a 100% match rate; the
other mechanisms could only produce a match rate between 98.2% and 99.9% unless
they were accompanied by the free tuition policy. This result suggests that if a little less
than 100% match rate is acceptable, there is no need to implement the costly free tuition
policy to increase match rate, so long as the government does not constrain the number of
choices. On the other hand, if 100% match rate is required, then the free tuition policy
seems to be a must.
Compared with SD, which was Taipei’s original mechanism, TM substantially
reduced the inequality of educational opportunities, but only when the number of choices
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was low and all students used the same strategies. In other scenarios, the performance of
TM was close to that of SD. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, a low number of
choices may result in a low match rate. Therefore, if the government expects TM to
reduce the inequality of educational opportunity, it should keep the number of choices
low and expect a potential loss in the match rate.
In the simulations, the free tuition policy alone reduced the inequality of
educational opportunity in all scenarios where students use heterogeneous strategies or
the number of choices was high but increased the inequality in most scenarios where the
number of choices was low and students use the same strategies. Supplemented by the
free tuition policy, TM could reduce the inequality in almost all scenarios. However,
when the number of choices was high, the SD-Freshmans between SD with the free
tuition policy and TM with the free tuition policy were similar, which implies that a
similar result may be obtained by simply implementing the free tuition policy without the
complicated prioritization rules of TM, as long as students have enough number of
choices. In fact, when the number of choices was high, the SD-Freshmans under SD and
TM with or without the free tuition policy were all very close. On the other hand, when
the number of choices was high, the SD-Freshmans under BM were significantly lower
than those under the other mechanisms, and the free tuition policy further improved BM’s
performance. Although BM seems to be a more efficient mechanism to reduce the
inequality of educational opportunity in an environment with a high number of choices,
BM may cause significant justified envy for students in the top and the third income
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quartiles, which may not be accepted by the parents of higher performing students in a
competitive school district.
Under Taipei’s old admission policy, students had the score and rank information
to use the strategy similar to Strategies #2 or #3 in the model. At the beginning of the
implementation of the new mechanism in 2014, the government released little score or
rank information, hoping students would select schools based on their own preferences
and considerations (Strategy #1). Without the experimental or empirical evidence, it is
unclear whether students would behave as the government planned. If they did, then the
simulated data support the government’s strategy because the simulated SD-Freshman
under Strategy #1 was lower than that under Strategy #2 or #3 regardless of the
mechanisms, so long as there was a choice constraint. However, the government has
constantly been under pressure and has compromised to release more rank and score
information. My observation shows that students would coordinate themselves to use the
same old strategy to make their choices. If students would not behave as the government
expected, the best-worst estimates demonstrate that the actual result could be
significantly different from or even opposite to the anticipated result. This finding
stresses the importance of the Lucas critique and the importance of simulating students’
potential behaviors in educational policy design.
Impacts on School Quality
In this study, the inequality of school quality was measured by the standard
deviation of the mean senior scores in the schools (SD-Senior). The model assumes that
a student’s family income and scores are highly correlated. The model also assumes that
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the only factor that affects a student’s high school scores is his or her peers. Peer effect
will move the student’s scores toward the peers’ mean scores. However, only those
students whose family incomes are within a tolerance range of the peers’ average family
income will be affected by their peers (see the subsection of details in Chapter 3 for the
calculation of senior’s scores.) Under these assumptions, it is not surprising to see that in
the study, the graphic structure of SD-Senior resembles that of SD-Freshman. The
inequality of school quality resulting from the distribution of students assigned by TM
was substantially lower than that assigned by SD only when the number of choices was
small and all students used the same strategy (Strategy #2 or #3 in this model). In other
cases, the levels of the inequality of school quality under TM and SD were close.
When the number of choices was low, the simulated scores of the seniors enrolled
under TM were lower than those of the seniors enrolled under SD in most behavior
scenarios. When the number of choices was high, the relationships of the scores between
TM and SD were mixed but close. This result suggests that TM does not help converge
school quality upward. Neither does the free tuition policy. The simulations showed that
except for some scenarios where the number of choices was low (4 or lower in the
simulations) and some other scenarios under BM, students enrolled under the free tuition
policy had an even lower average senior score than those enrolled without the policy.
The simulations showed that the free tuition policy, under TM, SD, and DA,
worsens the inequality in school quality, except for some scenarios where the number of
choices was extremely low (2 in the model). Under CP, whether the free tuition policy
helped reduce the inequality of school quality depended on students’ behaviors. If
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students used the same strategy, CP with the free tuition policy resulted in a wider
disparity of school qualities than CP without the free tuition policy in almost all scenarios.
If students used heterogeneous strategies, then the results were reversed in almost all
scenarios. Under BM, the free tuition policy helped lower inequality of school quality
when students used heterogeneous strategies or when the number of choices was high.
From the above discussion, it is interesting to see the complex effects of the free
tuition policy on educational opportunity and school quality. When the number of
choices was high, the free tuition policy did not work well with TM but worked quite
well with BM in reducing the inequalities of educational opportunity and school quality.
When students were truth tellers and allowed the full number of choices, the free tuition
policy even helped BM to form a distribution of assignments that resulted in higher
average senior scores. The simulated results suggest that BM, instead of TM, plus the
free tuition policy has the potential to simultaneously reduce the inequalities of
educational opportunity and school quality, maintain a high match rate, and achieve a
better average senior score. Nevertheless, BM plus the free tuition policy may create
more justified envy for the top-income-quartile students, which may not be accepted by
parents in the Taipei School District.
Impacts on Students in Different Groups
Some researchers advocate SD and DA because these mechanisms avoid justified
envy and are strategy free for all students. This argument is true only when there is no
choice constraint (see the section of empirical output validation in this chapter). The
simulated results demonstrate that under the same condition, CP and BM can also avoid
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justified envy for the elite candidates (top 10% performing students), even though they do
create justified envy for other higher performing candidates. In the simulations, TM
could not reach 100% top-choice match rate. However, when students used the same
strategy or there is no choice constraint, TM could allow 99% of the elite students to
attend their top-choice schools regardless of the number of choices allowed. In fact,
when all students use the same strategies, all the five mechanisms could have at least
99% top-choice match rate for the elite students as long as the number of choices was
high enough (at least 8 in this model). When the free tuition policy was implemented, the
threshold could be lower (from 8 to 6). The above results demonstrate that for elite
students, SD and DA are not superior to TM unless 100% top-choice match rate is
required. Even if 100% top-choice match rate is required, SD and DA are not the only
mechanisms that can reach that requirement. BM and CP can also reach the 100%
requirement with the full number of choices.
If a policy is expected to benefit the most disadvantaged students (students with
the bottom 10% income), SD and DA are the worst mechanisms in most cases. I used the
assignment result of no justified envy as the baseline, which occurs when students report
their preferences as their choices without any constraint under DA. In the simulations,
under SD and DA, the bottom-10%-income students were worse off in all scenarios other
than their baseline scenarios. TM and the free tuition policy alone or combined helped
improve the assignments of these students but in a very limited way. By and large, the
performances of CP and CP with the free tuition policy were better than those of TM and
TM with the free tuition policy, respectively. However, the benefits CP, even with the
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free tuition policy, could generate for this group of students were small in comparison to
those generated by BM, when the number of choices is high. With the free tuition policy,
BM could assign these students to even better schools than BM without the free tuition
policy. If we extend the definition of disadvantaged students to all students in the bottom
income quartile, the above statements largely held true, except that the scenarios where
CP could bring positive PIs to the students in this group became less and BM needed a
higher number of choices to bring substantial benefits for these students.
In the simulations, when the number of choices was high, BM could produce the
most positive PIs for the students in the bottom income quartile, the most positive PIs or
the least negative PIs for the second income quartiles, and the most justified envy for the
students in the third and top income quartiles among all mechanisms. This statement also
applied to the scenarios under BM with the free tuition policy. This result implies that
BM could mix students the most. CP produced the second largest justified envy for the
students in the third and top income quartile, which implies that CP could mix students
the second most. The above findings correspond to the simulation results that BM,
followed by CP, produced the lowest inequality of educational opportunity when the
number of choices was high, which might support the claim that mixing, compared with
sorting, helps reduce educational inequality (Van de Werfhorst & Mijs, 2010).
Summary of the findings
Assuming students use the same strategies before and after the policy change, A
simple answer to the research questions is as follows.
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•

TM helps equalize educational opportunities if the number of choices is low and
students use the same school-choice strategy.

•

TM helps school qualities converge upward in few behavioral and admission
policy settings.

•

TM with the free tuition policy helps equalize educational opportunities with few
exceptions.

•

TM with the free tuition policy performs worse than TM without the free tuition
policy in helping school qualities converge upward.
However, the discussions in the previous subsections show that the simulation

results tell more stories than the above simple answer and reveal the complex nature of
the interventions. The effects of both TM and the free tuition policy were nonlinear,
depending on and emerging from students’ behaviors interacting with the interventions
and the number of choices. If students change their behaviors with the change of the
policy, the above answer may not apply. Therefore, if students’ reaction to the new
policy is unknown or uncertain, policymakers should perform the best-worst estimates to
have a better understanding of the possible policy effects.
In addition to the answers to the research questions, the simulations provide
information about the alternatives to the current policies. BM seems to be a better
alternative to reduce the inequality of educational opportunities and converge school
quality upward. I evaluate the simulated results of BM in the section of implications.
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Limitations of the Study
ABM is a generative approach; the macroemergences are generated from the
microspecifications (Epstein, 1999). Therefore, knowing the microspecifications of a
system is essential to an agent-based modeler. However, unlike macropatterns,
microspecifications are usually hard to obtain. In this model, students’ preferences and
school-choice strategies are assumptions based on my observations and the literature.
Since I did not include all plausible preferences and strategies in the model due to the
time and cost constraints, how robust the simulated findings are to students’ preferences
and strategies is unknown. Additionally, this study was exploratory. The parameter
values were not calibrated to the real data. For example, there are more than 100 schools
in the Taipei School District, while the model has only 10. It is uncertain whether scale
has an effect on the macropatterns found in this study.
With the above limitations, the accuracy of the model to predict the outcomes of
TM and the free tuition policy in the context of the Taipei School District may be
challenged. An agent-based model for real-world prediction requires “close feedback
between simulation, testing, data collection and development of theory” (Farmer &
Foley, 2009, p. 686). This enormous task requires funding and interdisciplinary
collaboration because ABM involves computer programming, human behaviors, and
environment construction. If the above issues can be resolved, agent-based models have
a potential to perform policy predictions better than their counterpart equation-based
models for the following two reasons: (a) Agent-based models are not subject to the
constraint of mathematical tractability and can build a virtual world with as many
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features as the modelers deem necessary; and (b) ABM relaxes the behavioral
assumptions of rationality and optimization and allows human learning and adaptation
(Epstein, 1999; Farmer & Foley, 2009).
Even though this exploratory model cannot be viewed as a quantitative prediction
model for Taipei’s new admission policies, the simulation results provide many insights
into the nature of these interventions and the relative effectiveness of different matching
mechanisms. The simulation results show a pattern change in the mechanisms’
relationships at some point in the change of the number of choices, which is a
phenomenon that has never been discussed in the literature. The simulation results also
reveal the significant impacts of students’ behaviors on the macroeffects of the
mechanisms. The behavior of using a homogeneous strategy may lead to higher
inequalities in educational opportunity and school quality than the behavior of using
heterogeneous strategies if the number of choices is low, while the difference in their
effects may become small but still exist if the number of choices is high. To the best of
my knowledge, this phenomenon has never been discussed in the literature either.
Whether the simulated findings are practical can be tested by empirical data collected in
the future. In other words, the findings from agent-based simulations help researchers
form hypotheses for empirical research and serve as a guide for data collection (Chen,
2015; Epstein, 2008).
Recommendations
In this study, I have tested the five student-assignment mechanisms with 30
different scenarios under a computer environment designed to qualitatively represent the
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Taipei School District, which exhibits a moderate-to-high correlation among students’
school preferences and an admission capacity adequate for all candidates. I did not test
scenarios where students have higher or lower preference correlation than students in the
Taipei School District or where the admission capacity is inadequate for all candidates.
Therefore, it is not clear whether the findings in this study can apply to school districts
with different preference correlation or different admission capacity. Future work can
include a robustness test to examine how sensitive the distribution of student assignments
is to preference correlation and admission capacity.
The simulated results have shown that students’ behaviors play an important role
in the formation of the distribution of students’ assignments. The simulated scenarios
only included a few assumptions of school-choice strategies, which can be divided into
the maximum heterogeneous truth-telling strategies (Strategy #1) and the homogeneous
strategies (Strategies #2 and #3). I designed Strategies #2 and #3 according to the
commonly advised strategies in the Taipei School District (Sun, 2015; Zhang & Wang,
2015). Strategy #1 was based on the principle of maximum entropy. Since TM is new,
there has not been any empirical evidence on students’ strategies in response to this new
mechanism. Further work may include the real-world strategic behaviors when the
information becomes available.
The simulations show that the top-choice match rate of the top 10% performing
students was seriously affected by the number of choices if Strategy #1 was used. Since
students in this group have the top scores and the top priorities, it is possible that they do
not need to play games but honestly report their top preferences as their top choices.
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Future work can apply different strategies to different student groups. It will be
interesting to see whether always truthfully reporting their preferences as choices by the
top-performing students regardless of how other students make their decisions can make
the assignments of the top-performing students resistant to the changes in the number of
choices.
The computational environment in this study contains 10 schools and 1,000
candidates, which represents a system about one-tenth the scale of the Taipei School
District. Future work can expand the computational environment by increasing the
numbers of schools and students to test whether there is a scaling effect on the
performance of the interventions.
Implications
Educational policies are powerful tools to make social changes. However, the
history shows a myriad of cases where educational policies produced unexpected and
undesired consequences (Groff, 2013). Lack of the right complexity model to study the
complex educational problems may be one of the reasons. A prediction agent-based
educational model may be difficult to construct. However, an exploratory model still can
provide useful insights into the nature of a macroeducational policy. “Essentially, all
models are wrong, but some are useful” (Box & Draper, 1987, p. 424). As argued by
Epstein (2008), “by revealing tradeoffs, uncertainties, and sensitivities, models can
discipline the dialogue about options and make unavoidable judgments more considered”
(para. 1.7). The findings in this study indeed provide a disciplined basis for Taipei’s
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policymakers and stakeholders to discuss the criticisms of the current admission policies
and the solutions for the current problems.
One criticism of the free tuition policy is that this expensive policy is costinefficient not only because it would crowd out the programs that could directly benefit
disadvantaged students but also because the high school attendance rate had been 93%
before the implementation of this policy. The simulation results show that match rate
was affected not only by the free tuition policy but also by the number of choices and the
mechanism. The number of choices must be high to have a high match rate. In this case,
the free tuition policy has a limited effect on reducing inequality of educational
opportunity. Besides, when there was no choice constraint, even without the free tuition
policy, all mechanisms could reach a match rate of at least 98%; BM could even reach
100%. The above findings seem to support the criticism. Although the free tuition
policy is necessary to bring all mechanism to reach 100% match rate from 98%,
policymakers should perform the cost-benefit analysis carefully to justify the
implementation of the free tuition policy.
TM has been criticized for its design of assigning decreasing scores to student’s
choices. Many parents view this design as a punishment for student’s bad choices
(Zheng, 2015). The Taipei government’s reason for adopting such design was that it
could induce students to focus more on their true preferences than on school ranking and
thus would result in more mixing than sorting. The simulation results show that when the
number of choices was large, the distributions of assignments under TM and SD (Taipei’s
original mechanism) were similar. TM could substantially reduce educational inequality
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only when the number of choices was low. However, a low number of choices might
cause the match rate to drop several to dozens of points. Whether this is acceptable to the
society is doubtful. If the number of choices must be high, then the effect of TM is small.
Whether it is worth implementing TM with a small effect but a heavy criticism is also
debatable.
To ensure a high match rate and low inequalities in both the educational
opportunity and school quality, BM seems to be the best solution if policymakers allow a
high or a full number of choices. Additionally, BM could benefit the disadvantaged
students the most even though BM could create the most justified envy for the students in
the top income quartile. Nevertheless, BM with the full number of choices would not
harm the top 10% performing students. BM emphasizes students’ choices, which
inspired the initial design of choice score in the algorithm of TM. However, because of
the creation of severe justified envy, the role of BM was diminished in the revised
algorithm of TM implemented in 2016. Therefore, despite all the benefits BM can
provide, its acceptance by a society viewing the avoidance of justified envy as fairness is
questionable.
As stated by Ostrom (2005), “if the individuals who are crafting and modifying
rules do not understand how particular combinations of rules affect actions and outcomes
in a particular ecological and cultural environment, rule changes may produce unexpected
and, at times, disastrous outcomes” (p. 3). If the Taipei government intends to have a
successful admission reform to reduce educational inequality, it may want to reconsider
its priority and engage more in public opinion change. Unless the public agrees that
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fairness includes equal opportunity to attend each school, any implementation of a
mechanism deviating from SD may be doomed to be heavily criticized.
An interesting phenomenon revealed by the simulation results is that a change in
the relationships among the effects of the five mechanisms occurs at a certain point in the
change in the number of choices. In the simulations, when students used the same
strategy, the number of choices 6 acted like a bifurcation or turning point. The SDFreshman under BM was among the highest and TM the lowest when the number of
choices < 6; the relationship reversed when the number of choices > 6. Many school
systems constrain the number of choices a student can submit. For example, the Taipei
School District assigns choice scores only to the first 30 choices a student makes, while
there are more than 100 schools in the district (New Taipei City Government, 2015).
Similarly, Boston School District only allows up to 14 choices selected from their 125
schools (Boston Public Schools, 2017). A common reason for the constraints is the
limited computational power. Other causes include stimulating students to contemplate
their real preferences and making school-choice advice feasible (Liu, Liu, & Tu, 2012).
This finding alerts the policymakers to the impact of choice constraints. If policymakers
decide to constrain the number of choices, they must investigate carefully the impact of
the number they choose, or they may experience an “unexpected and, at times, disastrous
outcomes” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 3).
Conclusions
Educational systems are complex adaptive systems. Macroeducation policies
cannot be evaluated easily by using linear regression models. Complexity tools are
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needed to understand what and how an educational policy’s macroeffects emerge from
the interactions between the students and the environment. This study demonstrates that
ABM can provide counterintuitive insights into the impacts of admission policies that can
hardly be found by the traditional equation-based models.
Intuitively, the benefits of the free tuition policy, which makes private schools
affordable for poorer students, are twofold: (a) It gives poorer students more
opportunities to attend higher quality private schools and thus can improve the match
rate; and (b) with a higher proportion of poorer students, this policy helps reduce private
schools’ average family income and consequently result in a lower educational
inequality. However, the agent-based simulation results counterintuitively show that the
free tuition policy may instead reduce the match rate and increase the inequality if the
number of choices is not high enough. The simulations also show a change in the
relationships among the effects of the mechanisms at a certain point in the change of the
number of choices. This nonlinear relationship can hardly be seen in an equation-based
model either. Additionally, ABM is convenient to perform multilevel analysis. In this
study, I analyzed not only macrolevel data but also mesolevel data. This model also
allows me to collect microlevel data, including individual students’ school-assignment
results and their high-school scores. In this sense, ABM is a methodology that can
generate big data, which help researchers to have a multifaceted understanding of the
hierarchical properties of an educational system and the complex effects of educational
policy.
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As argued by Roth (2002), computational simulations “help us analyze games
that are too complex to solve analytically” (p. 1374). This agent-based model helps us
understand what and whom the admission policies work for, in what condition it works,
and how it works. However, few agent-based educational models have been constructed
to analyze macroeducational policies. More efforts are needed to produce full-fledged
agent-based educational models and strengthen the development of ABM in educational
research.
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Appendix A : NetLogo Code of the Model
extensions [r]
breed [students student]
breed [universities university]
globals [
predict-score
ave-score
ave-score-sd

; the predict score of university (may be the min-score or max-rank)
;;
; average score, serial dictator

ave-score-bm

; average score, boston mechanism

ave-score-da

; average score, deferred acceptance

ave-score-tm

; average score, taipei mechanism

ave-score-cp

; average score, chinese parallel

min-score
min-score-sd

;;
; minimum score, serial dictator

min-score-bm

; minimum score, boston mechanism

min-score-da

; minimum score, deferred acceptance

min-score-tm

; minimum score, taipei mechanism

min-score-cp

; minimum score, chinese parallel

max-rank

;; the ranking of the students who has the lowest scores and was

admitted to the universities
max-rank-sd
max-rank-bm

; maximum rank, serial dictator
; maximum rank, boston mechanism
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max-rank-da

; maximum rank, deferred acceptance

max-rank-tm

; maximum rank, taipei mechanism

max-rank-cp

; maximum rank, chinese parallel

max-rank-score

;; the score in this year according to the max-rank last year

high-school
num-univ

;; number of universities

univ
u
mean-utility
average-mismatch-sd

;; to measure the error, serial dictator

average-mismatch-bm

;; to measure the error, boston mechanism

average-mismatch-da

;; to measure the error, deferred acceptance

average-mismatch-tm

;; to measure the error, Taipei mechanism

average-mismatch-cp

;; to measure the error, Chinese parallel

sd-mismatch-sd

;; standard deviation of the mismatch, serial dictator

sd-mismatch-bm

;; standard deviation of the mismatch, boston mechanism

sd-mismatch-da

;; standard deviation of the mismatch, deferred acceptance

sd-mismatch-tm

;; standard deviation of the mismatch, taipei mechanism

sd-mismatch-cp

;; standard deviation of the mismatch, chinese parallel

x

;; to produce random number

no-choices-1

;; number of choices list 1

no-choices-2

;; number of choices list 2
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score-mean
score-sdv

;
;

seven-letter-tiers
mu
;;;;; zipf-H

; array of H(n,n)

income-average
univ-rank
univ-rank-sd

; university rank
; university rank, serial dictator

univ-rank-bm

; university rank, boston mechanism

univ-rank-da

; university rank, deferred acceptance

univ-rank-tm

; university rank, taipei mechanism

univ-rank-cp

; university rank, chinese parallel

y1end-score

; year-1 end score list, aligned to capacity, ordered according to

university
y1end-score-sd

; year-1 end score list, serial dicator

y1end-score-bm

; year-1 end score list, boston mechanism

y1end-score-da

; year-1 end score list, deferred acceptance

y1end-score-tm

; year-1 end score list, taipei mechanism

y1end-score-cp

; year-1 end score list, chinese parallel

y1end-income

; year-1 end family income list, aligned to capacity, ordered

according to university
y1end-income-sd

; year-1 end family income list, serial dicator
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y1end-income-bm

; year-1 end family income list, boston mechanism

y1end-income-da

; year-1 end family income list, deferred acceptance

y1end-income-tm

; year-1 end family income list, taipei mechanism

y1end-income-cp

; year-1 end family income list, chinese parallel

y2end-score

; year-2 end score list, aligned to capacity, ordered according to

university
y2end-score-sd

; year-2 end score list, serial dicator

y2end-score-bm

; year-2 end score list, boston mechanism

y2end-score-da

; year-2 end score list, deferred acceptance

y2end-score-tm

; year-2 end score list, taipei mechanism

y2end-score-cp

; year-2 end score list, chinese parallel

y2end-income

; year-2 end family income list, aligned to capacity, ordered

according to university
y2end-income-sd

; year-2 end family income list, serial dicator

y2end-income-bm

; year-2 end family income list, boston mechanism

y2end-income-da

; year-2 end family income list, deferred acceptance

y2end-income-tm

; year-2 end family income list, taipei mechanism

y2end-income-cp

; year-2 end family income list, chinese parallel

y3end-score-ave
y3end-score-ave-sd
y3end-score-ave-bm
y3end-score-ave-da
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y3end-score-ave-tm
y3end-score-ave-cp
y3end-score-stdev
y3end-score-stdev-sd
y3end-score-stdev-bm
y3end-score-stdev-da
y3end-score-stdev-tm
y3end-score-stdev-cp
income-quartile

;; the average misplacement of each quartile

income-quartile-sd
income-quartile-bm
income-quartile-da
income-quartile-tm
income-quartile-cp
mean-quartile
mean-quartile-sd
mean-quartile-bm
mean-quartile-da
mean-quartile-tm
mean-quartile-cp
mean-top10
mean-top10-sd

;; the average misplacement of each quartile
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mean-top10-bm
mean-top10-da
mean-top10-tm
mean-top10-cp
mean-bottom10
mean-bottom10-sd
mean-bottom10-bm
mean-bottom10-da
mean-bottom10-tm
mean-bottom10-cp
max-top10
max-top10-sd
max-top10-bm
max-top10-da
max-top10-tm
max-top10-cp
percent-top10
percent-top10-sd
percent-top10-bm
percent-top10-da
percent-top10-tm
percent-top10-cp
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income-mean
income-mean-sd
income-mean-bm
income-mean-da
income-mean-tm
income-mean-cp
income-stdev
income-stdev-sd
income-stdev-bm
income-stdev-da
income-stdev-tm
income-stdev-cp
y1-income-mean
y1-income-mean-sd
y1-income-mean-bm
y1-income-mean-da
y1-income-mean-tm
y1-income-mean-cp
y1-income-stdev
y1-income-stdev-sd
y1-income-stdev-bm
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y1-income-stdev-da
y1-income-stdev-tm
y1-income-stdev-cp
private-list
univ-fill
mvrnorm-r-cmd
mvrnorm-matrix
mvrnorm-idx
zone-ln-income-mean
zone-ln-income-stdev
zone-score-mean
zone-score-stdev
univ-enrollment
univ-enrollment-sd
univ-enrollment-bm
univ-enrollment-da
univ-enrollment-tm
univ-enrollment-cp
end-score
end-income
average-score
average-income
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]
universities-own [
priority-students-list

;;

potential-students

;;

univ-zone

;; school location zone (0 or 1)

]
students-own [
score

;; students' score, it is now the average of the score-subjects

score-subjects

;; students' score of each of the 5 subject

preference-rank

;; students' preference of school ranks

preference-list

;; student's preference of school ID

choice

;; a list to store student's total choice (use n-value choices []

seven-scale-score

;; sum of seven scale for "Taipei mechanism"

last-choice

;; index for deferred acceptance

next-choice

;; index for deferred acceptance

choice-1

;; a list of student's first choice under Chinese parallel

choice-2

;; a list of student's second choice under Chinese parallel

utility

;; utility the students have

base-place

;; where he could go

actual-place

;; where he goes actually

misplacement-abs

;; to measure the misplacement-abs (absolute distance of base-

place and what he really get)
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misplacement

;; to measure misplacement gain or loss

rank
base-preference

;; index of preference

actual-preference

;; index of enrollment

income
district

;; student's family income
;; student's living district (1 or 2)

]
to setup
clear-all
;; initialize R interface
;; activate MASS library for mvrnorm function
r:eval "library(MASS)"
;; initialize covariance matrix
r:eval (word "Sig <- matrix(c("
"1.0, 0.8, 0.8, 0.8, 0.8, 0.8, "
"0.8, 1.0, 0.8, 0.8, 0.8, 0.8, "
"0.8, 0.8, 1.0, 0.8, 0.8, 0.8, "
"0.8, 0.8, 0.8, 1.0, 0.8, 0.8, "
"0.8, 0.8, 0.8, 0.8, 1.0, 0.8, "
"0.8, 0.8, 0.8, 0.8, 0.8, 1.0), nrow=6)")
;; initialize mvrnorm command string
;; This is needed because number of students may vary
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set mvrnorm-r-cmd (word "X <- mvrnorm(" num-students ", mu=rep(0, 6), Sigma = Sig,
empirical = TRUE)")
;; set tolerance 0.5

;;0.58

;; set peer-effect 0.1

;;0.58

;random-seed 0
set-default-shape students "person"
set-default-shape universities "house"
set num-univ 10
set zone-ln-income-mean [14.14 13.84]
set zone-ln-income-stdev [0.52 0.47]
set zone-score-mean [65.0 47.5]
set zone-score-stdev [23.0 23.0]
set univ-rank n-values num-univ [?]
set univ-rank-sd univ-rank
set univ-rank-bm univ-rank
set univ-rank-da univ-rank
set univ-rank-tm univ-rank
set univ-rank-cp univ-rank
set seven-letter-tiers [41 61 71 84 90 94 100]
set mu 3
set ave-score n-values num-univ [-1 - ?]
set ave-score-sd ave-score
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set ave-score-bm ave-score
set ave-score-da ave-score
set ave-score-tm ave-score
set ave-score-cp ave-score
set min-score n-values num-univ [0]
set min-score-sd min-score
set min-score-bm min-score
set min-score-da min-score
set min-score-tm min-score
set min-score-cp min-score
set y1end-score n-values (num-univ * capacity) [-1]
set y1end-score-sd y1end-score
set y1end-score-bm y1end-score
set y1end-score-da y1end-score
set y1end-score-tm y1end-score
set y1end-score-cp y1end-score
set y1end-income n-values (num-univ * capacity) [0]
set y1end-income-sd y1end-income
set y1end-income-bm y1end-income
set y1end-income-da y1end-income
set y1end-income-tm y1end-income
set y1end-income-cp y1end-income
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set y2end-score n-values (num-univ * capacity) [-1]
set y2end-score-sd y2end-score
set y2end-score-bm y2end-score
set y2end-score-da y2end-score
set y2end-score-tm y2end-score
set y2end-score-cp y2end-score
set y2end-income n-values (num-univ * capacity) [0]
set y2end-income-sd y2end-income
set y2end-income-bm y2end-income
set y2end-income-da y2end-income
set y2end-income-tm y2end-income
set y2end-income-cp y2end-income
set y3end-score-ave n-values num-univ [-1 - ?]
set y3end-score-ave-sd y3end-score-ave
set y3end-score-ave-bm y3end-score-ave
set y3end-score-ave-da y3end-score-ave
set y3end-score-ave-tm y3end-score-ave
set y3end-score-ave-cp y3end-score-ave
set univ-enrollment n-values num-univ [0]
set univ-enrollment-sd univ-enrollment
set univ-enrollment-bm univ-enrollment
set univ-enrollment-da univ-enrollment
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set univ-enrollment-tm univ-enrollment
set univ-enrollment-cp univ-enrollment
set max-rank n-values num-univ [num-students]
set max-rank-sd max-rank
set max-rank-bm max-rank
set max-rank-da max-rank
set max-rank-tm max-rank
set max-rank-cp max-rank
set income-quartile n-values 4 [0]
set income-quartile-sd income-quartile
set income-quartile-bm income-quartile
set income-quartile-da income-quartile
set income-quartile-tm income-quartile
set income-quartile-cp income-quartile
set mean-quartile n-values 4 [0]
set mean-quartile-sd mean-quartile
set mean-quartile-bm mean-quartile
set mean-quartile-da mean-quartile
set mean-quartile-tm mean-quartile
set mean-quartile-cp mean-quartile
set mean-top10-sd 0
set mean-top10-bm 0
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set mean-top10-da 0
set mean-top10-tm 0
set mean-top10-cp 0
set mean-bottom10 0
set mean-bottom10-sd 0
set mean-bottom10-bm 0
set mean-bottom10-da 0
set mean-bottom10-tm 0
set mean-bottom10-cp 0
set max-top10-sd 0
set max-top10-bm 0
set max-top10-da 0
set max-top10-tm 0
set max-top10-cp 0
set percent-top10-sd 0
set percent-top10-bm 0
set percent-top10-da 0
set percent-top10-tm 0
set percent-top10-cp 0
set predict-score n-values num-univ [0]
set income-mean n-values num-univ [0]
set income-mean-sd income-mean
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set income-mean-bm income-mean
set income-mean-da income-mean
set income-mean-tm income-mean
set income-mean-cp income-mean
set income-stdev 0
set income-stdev-sd income-stdev
set income-stdev-bm income-stdev
set income-stdev-da income-stdev
set income-stdev-tm income-stdev
set income-stdev-cp income-stdev
set y1-income-mean n-values num-univ [0]
set y1-income-mean-sd y1-income-mean
set y1-income-mean-bm y1-income-mean
set y1-income-mean-da y1-income-mean
set y1-income-mean-tm y1-income-mean
set y1-income-mean-cp y1-income-mean
set y1-income-stdev 0
set y1-income-stdev-sd y1-income-stdev
set y1-income-stdev-bm y1-income-stdev
set y1-income-stdev-da y1-income-stdev
set y1-income-stdev-tm y1-income-stdev
set y1-income-stdev-cp y1-income-stdev
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set end-score n-values num-students [-1]
set end-income n-values num-students [0]
set average-score n-values num-univ [-1 - ?]
set average-income n-values num-univ [0]
;; set top10-rank 0
setup-schools

;; setup ten universities and high-school

set univ-fill n-values num-univ [11 + ?]
setup-students
;;;;; setup-zipf num-univ alpha
if behaviorspace-run-number < 2 [
write-file-header
]

reset-ticks
end
to setup-schools
set univ n-values num-univ [?]
let n 0
let i 0
let d (max-pxcor - min-pxcor) / num-univ
repeat num-univ

;; init zipf array index
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[
set i n / d
set univ replace-item i univ patches with [pycor > -10 and pxcor > (min-pxcor + n)
and pxcor < (min-pxcor + d + n)]
ask patches with [pycor > -10 and pxcor > (min-pxcor + n) and pxcor < (min-pxcor +
d + n)] [
ifelse i = 0 or i = 1 or i = 2 or i = 4 or i = 7 [
set pcolor 105
][
set pcolor 102
]
]
ask patch (min-pxcor + d / 2 + n) -10 [set plabel-color white set plabel (n / d + 1) ]
ask patch (min-pxcor + d / 2 + n) -11 [set plabel-color red set plabel item (n / d)
predict-score]
ask patch (min-pxcor + d / 2 + n) (max-pycor) [
sprout-universities 1 [
;; hard code school zones
ifelse i = 0 or i = 1 or i = 2 or i = 4 or i = 7 [
set univ-zone 1
][
set univ-zone 2

276
]
;; hard code private schools without supplement
;; use color to code this flag
;; color white indicates public schools or private schools with supplement
;; color 27 indicates private schools without supplement
ifelse i != 2 [
set color white
][
set color 27
]
]
]
set n (n + d)
]
set high-school patches with [pycor < -11]
ask high-school [set pcolor lime - 4]
set private-list []
;; remove private school from list, hard coded for now
foreach sort universities with [color != white] [
ask ? [
set private-list lput (who + 1) private-list
]
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]
end
to setup-students
create-students num-students [
set last-choice 0
set next-choice 0
setxy random-xcor (- 12 - random 5)
set color magenta
set size 1
set district 2
]
ask n-of round (num-students * 0.36) students [
set district 1
]
end
to generate-rank-list
set preference-rank []
let z-value 0
let j 1
let school-list n-values zone-split [? + 1]
repeat zone-split [
set z-value zipf (zone-split + 1 - j) alpha
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set preference-rank lput item (z-value - 1) school-list preference-rank
set school-list remove-item (z-value - 1) school-list
set j (j + 1)
]
set school-list n-values (num-univ - zone-split) [? + 1]
set j 1
repeat (num-univ - zone-split) [
set z-value zipf (num-univ - zone-split + 1 - j) alpha
set preference-rank lput (zone-split + item (z-value - 1) school-list) preference-rank
set school-list remove-item (z-value - 1) school-list
set j (j + 1)
]
end
to generate-preference
set preference-list []
let univ-zone-list []
let t0 0
let j 1
repeat zone-split [
set preference-list lput (1 + item (item (j - 1) preference-rank - 1) univ-rank)
preference-list
set j (j + 1)
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]
;; update school zone list here too
set j 1
repeat (num-univ - zone-split) [
set t0 item (item (zone-split + j - 1) preference-rank - 1) univ-rank
set preference-list lput (t0 + 1) preference-list
set univ-zone-list lput get-univ-zone t0 univ-zone-list
set j (j + 1)
]
; perform shuffle
; initialize starting list index
let temp-zone-idx zone-split
let temp-pref-list []
; check for list of schools in the same district
while [member? district univ-zone-list] [
; if the remaining schools are still in the list
ifelse item 0 univ-zone-list != district [
; first school is not in the same zone, start shuffling
; get the first school in district from the list
let univ-id item (temp-zone-idx + position district univ-zone-list) preference-list
; remove the first school from the list
set preference-list remove univ-id preference-list
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; insert the school to the front
set preference-list se (se sublist preference-list 0 temp-zone-idx univ-id) sublist
preference-list temp-zone-idx length preference-list
; remove the school from zone list
set univ-zone-list remove-item (position district univ-zone-list) univ-zone-list
]
[
; current top school is in the same zone, remove it from list
set univ-zone-list remove-item 0 univ-zone-list
]
set temp-zone-idx (temp-zone-idx + 1)
]
; remove private school without grant
if not grant and income <= income-average [
foreach private-list [
if member? ? preference-list [
set preference-list remove ? preference-list
]
]
]
end
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to-report get-univ-zone [id]
let tval 0
ask university id [
set tval univ-zone
]
report tval
end
to generate-students-priority
set priority-students-list []
let school-id who + 1
ifelse mechanism = "Taipei mechanism" [
set priority-students-list sort-on [
(- (score / 1000000000 + seven-scale-score + (35 - floor (ifelse-value is-number?
(position school-id choice) [position school-id choice / group-size][35]))))
] students
][
set priority-students-list sort-on [(- score)] students
]
end
to go-to-high-school
move-to one-of high-school
set color magenta
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set last-choice 0
set next-choice 0

;; index for deferred acceptance

end

to go
if ticks >= max-tick [stop]
set score-mean (random-normal population-mean (population-standard-deviation / 3.0))
set score-sdv sqrt (random-gamma 30 0.5 * population-standard-deviation ^ 2 / 60)
;; generate normalized student income/score matrix
r:eval mvrnorm-r-cmd
;; receive income/score matrix from R
;; matrix structure is as follows
;; items 0 * num-students to (1 * num-students - 1) => normalized delta of student's
household income
;; items 1 * num-students to (2 * num-students - 1) => normalized delta of student's
subject 1 score
;; items 2 * num-students to (3 * num-students - 1) => normalized delta of student's
subject 2 score
;; items 3 * num-students to (4 * num-students - 1) => normalized delta of student's
subject 3 score
;; items 4 * num-students to (5 * num-students - 1) => normalized delta of student's
subject 4 score
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;; items 5 * num-students to (6 * num-students - 1) => normalized delta of student's
subject 5 score
set mvrnorm-matrix r:get "X"
;; create index to easily map inome and subjects scores to mvrnorm-matrix
set mvrnorm-idx 0 ;;n-values 6 [? * num-students]
ask students [get-score]

;; get score

set income-average mean [income] of students
ask students [generate-rank-list]
set no-choices-2 floor no-choices / 2
set no-choices-1 (no-choices - no-choices-2)
let mechanisms (list "Serial dictatorship" "Boston mechanism" "Deferred acceptance"
"Taipei mechanism" "Chinese parallel mechanism")
if dbg-print [print (word "########## tick count: " ticks)]
ifelse All_mechanism? [
foreach mechanisms [
if dbg-print [print (word "<<<< mechanism: " ? " >>>>")]
set mechanism ?
update-begin-variables ?
ask students [generate-preference]
to the probability matrix P
ask students [get-seven-scale-score]

;; generate random preference list according
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get-fair-place

;; to find out the base-place, i.e. the university that the

student could go
ask students [go-to-high-school]
get-max-rank-score
ask students [
set next-choice 0
set last-choice 0
choose
]
ask universities [generate-students-priority]
enroll
ask students [calculate-misplacement]
update-min-score-and-rank
update-label
class-mismatch
; update year 3 end score from year 2 end score
update-y3end-score
; update school ranking based on year 3 end score
update-univ-rank y3end-score-ave
; update year 2 end score from year 1 end score
update-y2end-score
; update year 1 end score from year 1 beginning score
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update-y1end-score
update-dynamic-variables ?
]
ifelse print-first-three [
write-simulation-data
]
[
if ticks > 2 [write-simulation-data]
]
]
[
update-begin-variables mechanism
ask students [generate-preference]

;; generate random preference list according

to the probability matrix P
ask students [get-seven-scale-score]
get-fair-place

;; to find out the base-place, i.e. the university that the

student could go
ask students [go-to-high-school]
get-max-rank-score
ask students [
set next-choice 0
set last-choice 0
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choose
]
ask universities [generate-students-priority]
enroll
ask students [calculate-misplacement]
update-min-score-and-rank
update-label
class-mismatch
; update year 3 end score from year 2 end score
update-y3end-score
; update school ranking based on year 3 end score
update-univ-rank y3end-score-ave
; update year 2 end score from year 1 end score
update-y2end-score
; update year 1 end score from year 1 beginning score
update-y1end-score
update-dynamic-variables mechanism
ifelse print-first-three [
write-simulation-data
]
[
if ticks > 2 [write-simulation-data]
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]
]
tick
;;ask students [do-plots]
end
to-report cut-list [string]
let temp (word map [(word ? ", ")] string)
set temp remove-item 0 remove-item (length temp - 1) temp
report temp
end
to get-score
let i 0
;; get the current student map index
let n mvrnorm-idx
;; update map index for next student
set mvrnorm-idx (mvrnorm-idx + 1)
;; setup student's living district index
let zone (district - 1)
;; calculate income by e ^ (log of income)
set income exp (item zone zone-ln-income-stdev * item n mvrnorm-matrix + item zone
zone-ln-income-mean)
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;; calculate student's subject scores
set score-subjects []
while [i < 5] [
;; update mvrnorm index by adding num-students to n
set n (n + num-students)
set score-subjects se score-subjects (max (se 0.00001 min (se 99.99999 (item zone
zone-score-stdev * item n mvrnorm-matrix + item zone zone-score-mean))))
set i (i + 1)
]
;; calculate composite score
set score mean score-subjects
end
to get-seven-scale-score
let i 0
let mult-scale 0.001
set seven-scale-score 0
repeat length score-subjects [
let t-score item i score-subjects
let j 1
while [t-score >= item (j - 1) seven-letter-tiers] [set j (j + 1)]
set seven-scale-score (seven-scale-score + (j * 1.01) + (j * mult-scale))
set mult-scale (mult-scale * 0.1)
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set i (i + 1)
]
end
to get-max-rank-score
set max-rank-score map [item (? - 1) sort-by > [score] of students ] max-rank
max-rank-score based on the max-rank last year and the scores this year
end
to get-fair-place
let c-max 0
set u n-values num-univ [0]
foreach sort-on [(- score)] students [
ask ? [
set c-max length preference-list
let i 1

;; the i th univ that the students choose

while [i <= c-max] [
set base-place item (i - 1) preference-list ;;of self)
ifelse item (base-place - 1) u >= capacity [
set i (i + 1)
][
set base-preference i
set i c-max + 2

;; to end the circle

;; get
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set u replace-item (base-place - 1) u (item (base-place - 1) u + 1)
students
]
if i = c-max + 1 [
set base-place num-univ + 1
set base-preference num-univ + 1
]
]
]
]
end
to choose

;; to choose university

ifelse scheme = "1" [
produce-random-strategy
][
produce-c&c-strategy
]
;; move-to one-of (item (first choice - 1) univ)
end
to produce-random-strategy
let c-max length preference-list
if c-max > no-choices [set c-max no-choices]

;; count the
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set choice n-of c-max preference-list
if mechanism = "Chinese parallel mechanism" [
let t1 no-choices-1
if t1 > c-max [set t1 c-max]
set choice-1 sublist choice 0 t1
set choice-2 sublist choice t1 c-max
]
end
to produce-c&c-strategy
ifelse scheme = "2 or 3" [
set predict-score min-score
][
set predict-score max-rank-score
]
set choice []
let school-left []
let i 0
let c-max length preference-list
foreach preference-list [

;; get the F_i set

ifelse score >= item (? - 1) predict-score [
set choice lput ? choice
set i (i + 1)
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][
set school-left lput ? school-left
]
]
if c-max > no-choices [set c-max no-choices]
if i < c-max [
let choice-left n-of (c-max - i) school-left
set choice se choice choice-left
]
set choice sublist choice 0 c-max
ifelse (mechanism = "Chinese parallel mechanism") [
chinese-choice
][
if extra-in-order = true [
set choice sort-by-preference choice preference-list
]
]
end
to chinese-choice
let c-max length choice
let t1 no-choices-1
if t1 > c-max [set t1 c-max]
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set choice-1 sublist choice 0 t1
set choice-2 sublist choice t1 c-max
if extra-in-order = true [
set choice-1 sort-by-preference choice-1 preference-list
set choice-2 sort-by-preference choice-2 preference-list
]
end
to enroll

;; the university give offer according to its enrollment plan

and the ranking of students
set u n-values num-univ [0]

;; the number of students that enrolled

if mechanism = "Serial dictatorship"
[serial-dictatorship]
if mechanism = "Boston mechanism"
[boston-mechanism]
if mechanism = "Deferred acceptance"
[deferred-acceptance]
if mechanism = "Taipei mechanism"
;;[taipei-mechanism]
[deferred-acceptance]
if mechanism = "Chinese parallel mechanism"
[chinese-parallel]
end
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to serial-dictatorship
foreach sort-on [(- score)] students [
ask ? [
let c-max length choice
let i 1

;; the i th univ that the students choose

while [i <= c-max] [
set actual-place (item (i - 1) choice) ;;[choice] of self)
ifelse item (actual-place - 1) u >= capacity [
set i (i + 1)

;; over capacity, not placed, test for

next choice
][
set actual-preference position actual-place preference-list + 1
set i (c-max + 2)

;; to end the circle
;; set utility (12 / 11 - actual-place / 11 -

score / 1089)

;; set the utility
;; set misplacement abs (base-place -

actual-place)

;; set the misplacement

move-to one-of (item (actual-place - 1) univ)
ifelse district = 1 [set color yellow] [set color lime]
color

;; show placement
;; change display
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set u replace-item (actual-place - 1) u (item (actual-place - 1) u + 1)

;; count

the students that enrolled
]
if i = c-max + 1 [
;; move-to one-of high-school set color white

;;the student go back to high

school if got no offer]
set actual-place num-univ + 1
set actual-preference num-univ + 1
;; set misplacement abs (base-place - 11)]
]
]
]
]
end
to boston-mechanism
let n 0
while [n < no-choices and (any? students with [color = magenta])] [
foreach n-values num-univ [?] [
foreach sort-on [(- score)] students with [item n (se choice univ-fill) = ? + 1 and color
= magenta ] [ ; ? represents 0, 1, 2,..., 9
ask ? [
score to lowest score

;; students from highest
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set actual-place item n choice ;;[choice] of self
if item (actual-place - 1) u < capacity
[
move-to one-of (item (actual-place - 1) univ)
ifelse district = 1 [set color yellow][set color lime]

;; change display

color
set u replace-item (actual-place - 1) u (item (actual-place - 1) u + 1) ;; count the
students that enrolled
set actual-preference position actual-place preference-list + 1
]
]
]
]
set n n + 1
]
if any? students with [color = magenta] [
ask students with [color = magenta] [
set actual-place num-univ + 1
set actual-preference num-univ + 1
]
]
end
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to deferred-acceptance
let excluded-students []
let choice-sum 1
let temp []
let c-max 0
while [choice-sum != 0] [
;; create a sublist of unassigned students
;; initialize the list
set excluded-students students
foreach sort universities [
ask ? [
set temp students with [item next-choice choice = ([who] of ? + 1) and color =
magenta ]
let univ-priority [priority-students-list] of ?
;show univ-priority
set potential-students (sort-by-preference sort temp univ-priority)
;show potential-students
if length potential-students >= capacity [
set potential-students sublist potential-students 0 capacity
]
;show potential-students
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set excluded-students (sort-by-not-listed sort excluded-students potential-students)
foreach (sort temp) [
if not member? ? potential-students [
ask ? [
set c-max length choice
set last-choice next-choice
set next-choice next-choice + 1
if next-choice >= (c-max - 1) [
set next-choice (c-max - 1)
]
]
]
]
]
]
;; detect end of loop
;show excluded-students
set choice-sum 0
foreach (sort excluded-students) [
ask ? [
set c-max length choice
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if last-choice != (c-max - 1) [
set choice-sum (choice-sum + 1)
]
]
]
;show choice-sum
]
; enroll
foreach sort universities [
ask ? [
foreach potential-students [
ask ? [
ifelse district = 1 [set color yellow][set color lime]

;; change display color

set actual-place ([who] of myself + 1)
set actual-preference position actual-place preference-list + 1
set u replace-item (actual-place - 1) u (item (actual-place - 1) u + 1)
move-to one-of (item (actual-place - 1) univ)
]
]
]
]
if any? students with [color = magenta]
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[ask students with [color = magenta]
[
set actual-place num-univ + 1
set actual-preference num-univ + 1
]
]
end
to chinese-parallel
let c-max 0
foreach sort-on [(- score)] students [
ask ? [
set c-max length choice-1
let i 1

;; the i th univ that the students choose

while [i <= c-max] [
set actual-place (item (i - 1) choice-1) ;;[choice-1] of self)
ifelse item (actual-place - 1) u >= capacity [
set i (i + 1)

;; over capacity, not placed, test for next choice

][
ifelse district = 1 [set color yellow][set color lime]

;; change display color

set u replace-item (actual-place - 1) u (item (actual-place - 1) u + 1)

;; count

the students that enrolled
move-to one-of (item (actual-place - 1) univ)

;; show placement
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set i (c-max + 2)

;; to end the circle

set actual-preference position actual-place preference-list + 1
]
;

]
if (i = c-max + 1) and (no-choices-2 = 0) [
;; move-to one-of high-school set color white

;;the student go back to high

school if got no offer]
set actual-place num-univ + 1
set actual-preference num-univ + 1
;; set misplacement abs (base-place - 11)]
]
]
]
]
if no-choices-2 != 0 [
foreach sort-on [(- score)] students with [color = magenta ] [
ask ? [
set c-max length choice-2
let i 1

;; the i th univ that the students choose

while [i <= c-max ] [
set actual-place (item (i - 1) choice-2) ;;[choice-2] of self)
ifelse item (actual-place - 1) u >= capacity [
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set i (i + 1)
][
set i (c-max + 2)

;; to end the circle
;; set misplacement abs (base-

place - actual-place)

;; set the misplacement

move-to one-of (item (actual-place - 1) univ)
ifelse district = 1 [set color yellow][set color lime]

;; change display

color
set u replace-item (actual-place - 1) u (item (actual-place - 1) u + 1) ;; count the
students that enrolled
set actual-preference position actual-place preference-list + 1
]
if i = c-max + 1 [
;; move-to one-of high-school set color white
school if got no offer]
set actual-place num-univ + 1
set actual-preference num-univ + 1
;;set misplacement abs (base-place - 11)]
]
]
]
]

;;the student go back to high
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]
end
to calculate-misplacement
set misplacement-abs abs (base-preference - actual-preference)

;; set the

misplacement-abs
set misplacement (base-preference - actual-preference)

;; set misplacement

gain or loss
end
to class-mismatch
set income-quartile [0 0 0 0]
let quartile-turtles [0 0 0 0]
(foreach [0 1 2 3] [0 0.25 0.5 0.75] [0.25 0.5 0.75 1]
[set quartile-turtles replace-item ?1 quartile-turtles turtle-set sublist sort-on [income]
students int (?2 * num-students) int (?3 * num-students)])
set income-quartile replace-item 0 income-quartile (mean [misplacement] of item 0
quartile-turtles)
set income-quartile replace-item 1 income-quartile (mean [misplacement] of item 1
quartile-turtles)
set income-quartile replace-item 2 income-quartile (mean [misplacement] of item 2
quartile-turtles)
set income-quartile replace-item 3 income-quartile (mean [misplacement] of item 3
quartile-turtles)
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set mean-quartile [0 0 0 0]
; get the 25% 50% 75% quartile using the "TI-83" method
; divide to students into four group according to their score
set quartile-turtles [0 0 0 0]
(foreach [0 1 2 3] [0 0.25 0.5 0.75] [0.25 0.5 0.75 1]
[set quartile-turtles replace-item ?1 quartile-turtles turtle-set sublist sort-on [score]
students int (?2 * num-students) int (?3 * num-students)])
; calculate the mean of misplacement of each quartile
set mean-quartile replace-item 0 mean-quartile (mean [misplacement] of item 0 quartileturtles)
set mean-quartile replace-item 1 mean-quartile (mean [misplacement] of item 1 quartileturtles)
set mean-quartile replace-item 2 mean-quartile (mean [misplacement] of item 2 quartileturtles)
set mean-quartile replace-item 3 mean-quartile (mean [misplacement] of item 3 quartileturtles)
; get the top 10% of students
let top10 turtle-set sublist sort-on [score] students int (0.9 * num-students) num-students
set mean-top10 mean [misplacement] of top10
set max-top10 max [misplacement-abs] of top10
set percent-top10 count top10 with [actual-preference = base-preference] / count top10
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; get the bottom 10% of students
let bottom10 turtle-set sublist sort-on [income] students 0 int (0.1 * num-students)
set mean-bottom10 mean [misplacement] of bottom10
end
to update-min-score-and-rank
set ave-score n-values num-univ [0]
set min-score n-values num-univ [0]
set max-rank n-values num-univ [num-students]
let i 0
repeat num-univ [
if any? students with [actual-place = (i + 1)] [
set ave-score replace-item i ave-score (mean [score] of students with [actual-place =
(i + 1)])
set min-score replace-item i min-score ([score] of min-one-of students with [actualplace = (i + 1)] [score])
set max-rank replace-item i max-rank (position (item i min-score) (sort-by > [score]
of students) + 1)
]
set i i + 1
]
end
to update-label
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let n 0
let d (max-pxcor - min-pxcor) / num-univ
repeat num-univ [
ask patch (- (max-pxcor - d / 2) + n) -11 [set plabel-color red set plabel round item (n
/ d) min-score]
set n (n + d)
]
end
to-report sort-by-preference [list1 list2]

;;define a function to sort list1 according to

list2
let newlist []
foreach sort map [position ? list2] list1 [
set newlist lput item ? list2 newlist
]
report newlist
end
to-report sort-by-not-listed [list1 list2]
NOT in list2
let newlist []
foreach sort list1 [
if position ? list2 = false [
set newlist lput ? newlist

;;define a function to sort list1 according to
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]
]
report newlist
end
to do-plots
set-current-plot "E1"
set-current-plot-pen "E1"
plotxy ticks mean [misplacement-abs] of students
;; set-current-plot "E2"
;; set-current-plot-pen "E2"
;; plotxy ticks mean [misplacement-abs] of students with [base-place <= 10]
;; set-current-plot "E3"
;;set-current-plot-pen "E3"
;;plotxy ticks mean [misplacement-abs] of students with [color = yellow ]
end
; draw zipf (zeta) distribution
;;----------------------- generate random number in Zeta distribution (or Zipf distribution)
;; ----- 1. Generate a uniform random number z in [0,1]
;; ------ 2. The cumulative distribution function F(x) = \frac{H_{x,a}}{H_{n,a}}, where
H_{n,a} = \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \frac{1}{n^a}
;;------- 3. The random number we get is F^{-1}(z)
;; ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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to-report zipf [n a]
let H 0
let zipf-value 0
;draw a uniform random number z in [0,1]
let z random-float 1
; calculate H_{n,a} = \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \frac{1}{n^a}
let i 1
repeat n [
set H (H + (1 / i) ^ a)
set i i + 1
]
;map z to the to F^{-1}(z)
let sum-pro 0
set i 1
repeat n [
set sum-pro (sum-pro + 1 / (H * i ^ a))
if (sum-pro >= z) [
set zipf-value i
report zipf-value
stop
]
set i i + 1
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]
end
to update-univ-rank [rank-list]
let sorted-rank-score sort-by > rank-list
let i 0
repeat num-univ [
let temp-position position (item i sorted-rank-score) rank-list
set univ-rank replace-item i univ-rank temp-position
set rank-list replace-item temp-position rank-list (min rank-list - 1)
set i (i + 1)
]
end
to update-endyear-score [begin-score begin-income] ;; this is to calculate the avergae
score of a cohort in each school
set end-score begin-score
set end-income begin-income
set average-score n-values num-univ [-1 - ?]
set average-income n-values num-univ [0]
let n 0
repeat num-univ [
let idx-a n * capacity
let temp sublist begin-score idx-a (idx-a + capacity)
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let enrollment-count capacity
if min temp = -1 [
set enrollment-count position -1 temp
]
let idx-b (idx-a + enrollment-count)
if idx-b != idx-a [
let income-bot mean sublist end-income idx-a idx-b
set average-income replace-item n average-income income-bot
let income-top income-bot * (1 + tolerance)
set income-bot income-bot * (1 - tolerance)
let score-effect mean sublist temp 0 enrollment-count
set score-effect score-effect * peer-effect
let idx-c idx-a
;; the following is to calculate the new scores of the students in a school
repeat enrollment-count [
let temp-income item idx-c end-income
if (temp-income < income-top and temp-income > income-bot) [
let temp-score item idx-c end-score
set temp-score temp-score * (1 - peer-effect) + score-effect
set end-score replace-item idx-c end-score temp-score
]
set idx-c idx-c + 1
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]
set average-score replace-item n average-score mean sublist end-score idx-a idx-b
]
set n (n + 1)
]
end
to update-y1end-score
let y1start-score n-values (num-univ * capacity) [-1]
let y1start-income n-values (num-univ * capacity) [0]
set univ-enrollment n-values num-univ [0]
let n 0
let idx-a 0
let idx-b 0
repeat num-univ [
set idx-a (n * capacity)
set idx-b idx-a
let temp students with [actual-place = (n + 1)]
set univ-enrollment replace-item n univ-enrollment count temp ;;To count how many
students are in each university
foreach sort-on [(- score)] temp [
ask ? [
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set y1start-score replace-item idx-b y1start-score (score) ;; make a list of freshmen's
start scores in each school. This list contains all students.
set y1start-income replace-item idx-b y1start-income (income) ;; make a list of
freshmen's incomes in each school. This list contains all students.
]
set idx-b idx-b + 1
]
set n n + 1
]
update-endyear-score y1start-score y1start-income
set y1-income-mean average-income
set y1-income-stdev standard-deviation average-income
set y1end-score end-score
set y1end-income end-income
if dbg-print [
print (word "y1-end enrollment: " univ-enrollment)
print (word "y1-end score average: " average-score)
]
end
to update-y2end-score
update-endyear-score y1end-score y1end-income
set y2end-score end-score
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set y2end-income end-income
if dbg-print [
print (word "y2-end score average: " average-score)
]
end
to update-y3end-score
update-endyear-score y2end-score y2end-income
set y3end-score-ave average-score
set income-mean average-income
set income-stdev standard-deviation average-income
let temp-ave y3end-score-ave
let n 0
repeat num-univ [
if item n temp-ave < 0 [
set temp-ave replace-item n temp-ave 0
]
set n n + 1
]
set y3end-score-stdev standard-deviation temp-ave
if dbg-print [
print (word "y3-end score average: " average-score)
]
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end
to update-dynamic-variables [m]
if m = "Serial dictatorship" [
set average-mismatch-sd mean [misplacement-abs] of students ;show averagemismatch-sd
set sd-mismatch-sd standard-deviation [misplacement-abs] of students
set ave-score-sd ave-score
set min-score-sd min-score
set max-rank-sd max-rank
set income-quartile-sd income-quartile
set mean-quartile-sd mean-quartile
set mean-top10-sd mean-top10
set mean-bottom10-sd mean-bottom10
set max-top10-sd max-top10
set percent-top10-sd percent-top10
set univ-rank-sd univ-rank
set y1end-score-sd y1end-score
set y1end-income-sd y1end-income
set y2end-score-sd y2end-score
set y2end-income-sd y2end-income
set income-mean-sd income-mean
set income-stdev-sd income-stdev

;; to report misplacement-abs
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set y1-income-mean-sd y1-income-mean
set y1-income-stdev-sd y1-income-stdev
set y3end-score-ave-sd y3end-score-ave
set y3end-score-stdev-sd y3end-score-stdev
set univ-enrollment-sd univ-enrollment
;;

set top10-rank-sd top10-rank

]
if m = "Boston mechanism" [
set average-mismatch-bm mean [misplacement-abs] of students ;show averagemismatch-bm
set sd-mismatch-bm standard-deviation [misplacement-abs] of students
set ave-score-bm ave-score
set min-score-bm min-score
set max-rank-bm max-rank
set income-quartile-bm income-quartile
set mean-quartile-bm mean-quartile
set mean-top10-bm mean-top10
set mean-bottom10-bm mean-bottom10
set max-top10-bm max-top10
set percent-top10-bm percent-top10
set univ-rank-bm univ-rank
set y1end-score-bm y1end-score

;; to report misplacement-abs
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set y1end-income-bm y1end-income
set y2end-score-bm y2end-score
set y2end-income-bm y2end-income
set income-mean-bm income-mean
set income-stdev-bm income-stdev
set y1-income-mean-bm y1-income-mean
set y1-income-stdev-bm y1-income-stdev
set y3end-score-ave-bm y3end-score-ave
set y3end-score-stdev-bm y3end-score-stdev
set univ-enrollment-bm univ-enrollment
;;

set top10-rank-bm top10-rank

]
if m = "Deferred acceptance" [
set average-mismatch-da mean [misplacement-abs] of students ;show averagemismatch-da
set sd-mismatch-da standard-deviation [misplacement-abs] of students
set ave-score-da ave-score
set min-score-da min-score
set max-rank-da max-rank
set income-quartile-da income-quartile
set mean-quartile-da mean-quartile
set mean-top10-da mean-top10
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set mean-bottom10-da mean-bottom10
set max-top10-da max-top10
set percent-top10-da percent-top10

;; to report misplacement-abs

set univ-rank-da univ-rank
set y1end-score-da y1end-score
set y1end-income-da y1end-income
set y2end-score-da y2end-score
set y2end-income-da y2end-income
set income-mean-da income-mean
set income-stdev-da income-stdev
set y1-income-mean-da y1-income-mean
set y1-income-stdev-da y1-income-stdev
set y3end-score-ave-da y3end-score-ave
set y3end-score-stdev-da y3end-score-stdev
set univ-enrollment-da univ-enrollment
;;

set top10-rank-da top10-rank

]
if m = "Taipei mechanism" [
set average-mismatch-tm mean [misplacement-abs] of students ;show averagemismatch-tm
set sd-mismatch-tm standard-deviation [misplacement-abs] of students
set ave-score-tm ave-score
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set min-score-tm min-score
set max-rank-tm max-rank
set income-quartile-tm income-quartile
set mean-quartile-tm mean-quartile
set mean-top10-tm mean-top10
set mean-bottom10-tm mean-bottom10
set max-top10-tm max-top10
set percent-top10-tm percent-top10
set univ-rank-tm univ-rank
set y1end-score-tm y1end-score
set y1end-income-tm y1end-income
set y2end-score-tm y2end-score
set y2end-income-tm y2end-income
set income-mean-tm income-mean
set income-stdev-tm income-stdev
set y1-income-mean-tm y1-income-mean
set y1-income-stdev-tm y1-income-stdev
set y3end-score-ave-tm y3end-score-ave
set y3end-score-stdev-tm y3end-score-stdev
set univ-enrollment-tm univ-enrollment
;;
]

set top10-rank-tm top10-rank

;; to report misplacement-abs
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if m = "Chinese parallel mechanism" [
set average-mismatch-cp mean [misplacement-abs] of students ;show averagemismatch-cp
set sd-mismatch-cp standard-deviation [misplacement-abs] of students
set ave-score-cp ave-score
set min-score-cp min-score
set max-rank-cp max-rank
set income-quartile-cp income-quartile
set mean-quartile-cp mean-quartile
set mean-top10-cp mean-top10
set mean-bottom10-cp mean-bottom10
set max-top10-cp max-top10
set percent-top10-cp percent-top10
set univ-rank-cp univ-rank
set y1end-score-cp y1end-score
set y1end-income-cp y1end-income
set y2end-score-cp y2end-score
set y2end-income-cp y2end-income
set income-mean-cp income-mean
set income-stdev-cp income-stdev
set y1-income-mean-cp y1-income-mean
set y1-income-stdev-cp y1-income-stdev

;; to report misplacement-abs
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set y3end-score-ave-cp y3end-score-ave
set y3end-score-stdev-cp y3end-score-stdev
set univ-enrollment-cp univ-enrollment
;;

set top10-rank-cp top10-rank

]
end
to update-begin-variables [m]
if m = "Serial dictatorship" [
;set ave-score ave-score-sd
set univ-rank univ-rank-sd
set min-score min-score-sd
set max-rank max-rank-sd
set y1end-score y1end-score-sd
set y1end-income y1end-income-sd
set y2end-score y2end-score-sd
set y2end-income y2end-income-sd
set y3end-score-ave y3end-score-ave-sd
]
if m = "Boston mechanism" [
;set ave-score ave-score-bm
set univ-rank univ-rank-bm
set min-score min-score-bm
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set max-rank max-rank-bm
set y1end-score y1end-score-bm
set y1end-income y1end-income-bm
set y2end-score y2end-score-bm
set y2end-income y2end-income-bm
set y3end-score-ave y3end-score-ave-bm
]
if m = "Deferred acceptance" [
;set ave-score ave-score-da
set univ-rank univ-rank-da
set min-score min-score-da
set max-rank max-rank-da
set y1end-score y1end-score-da
set y1end-income y1end-income-da
set y2end-score y2end-score-da
set y2end-income y2end-income-da
set y3end-score-ave y3end-score-ave-da
]
if m = "Taipei mechanism" [
;set ave-score ave-score-tm
set univ-rank univ-rank-tm
set min-score min-score-tm
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set max-rank max-rank-tm
set y1end-score y1end-score-tm
set y1end-income y1end-income-tm
set y2end-score y2end-score-tm
set y2end-income y2end-income-tm
set y3end-score-ave y3end-score-ave-tm
]
if m = "Chinese parallel mechanism" [
;set ave-score ave-score-cp
set univ-rank univ-rank-cp
set min-score min-score-cp
set max-rank max-rank-cp
set y1end-score y1end-score-cp
set y1end-income y1end-income-cp
set y2end-score y2end-score-cp
set y2end-income y2end-income-cp
set y3end-score-ave y3end-score-ave-cp
]
end
to write-file-header
if write-mismatch [
write-header-type2 "mismatch.csv" "sd," "bm," "da," "tm," "cp"
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]
if write-sd-mismatch [
write-header-type2 "sd_mismatch.csv" "sd," "bm," "da," "tm," "cp"
]
if write-ave-score [
write-header-type2 "ave_score.csv"
"sd 1,sd 2,sd 3,sd 4,sd 5,sd 6,sd 7,sd 8,sd 9,sd 10,"
"bm 1,bm 2,bm 3,bm 4,bm 5,bm 6,bm 7,bm 8,bm 9,bm 10,"
"da 1,da 2,da 3,da 4,da 5,da 6,da 7,da 8,da 9,da 10,"
"tm 1,tm 2,tm 3,tm 4,tm 5,tm 6,tm 7,tm 8,tm 9,tm 10,"
"cp 1,cp 2,cp 3,cp 4,cp 5,cp 6,cp 7,cp 8,cp 9,cp 10"
]
if write-min-score [
write-header-type2 "min_score.csv"
"sd 1,sd 2,sd 3,sd 4,sd 5,sd 6,sd 7,sd 8,sd 9,sd 10,"
"bm 1,bm 2,bm 3,bm 4,bm 5,bm 6,bm 7,bm 8,bm 9,bm 10,"
"da 1,da 2,da 3,da 4,da 5,da 6,da 7,da 8,da 9,da 10,"
"tm 1,tm 2,tm 3,tm 4,tm 5,tm 6,tm 7,tm 8,tm 9,tm 10,"
"cp 1,cp 2,cp 3,cp 4,cp 5,cp 6,cp 7,cp 8,cp 9,cp 10"
]
if write-mean-quartile-score [
write-header-type2 "mean_quartile_score.csv"

324
"sd 25%,sd 50%,sd 75%,sd 100%,"
"bm 25%,bm 50%,bm 75%,bm 100%,"
"da 25%,da 50%,da 75%,da 100%,"
"tm 25%,tm 50%,tp 75%,tp 100%,"
"cp 25%,cp 50%,cp 75%,cp 100%"
write-header-type2 "income_quartile_score.csv"
"sd 25%,sd 50%,sd 75%,sd 100%,"
"bm 25%,bm 50%,bm 75%,bm 100%,"
"da 25%,da 50%,da 75%,da 100%,"
"tm 25%,tm 50%,tp 75%,tp 100%,"
"cp 25%,cp 50%,cp 75%,cp 100%"
]
if write-mean-top10 [
write-header-type2 "mean_top10.csv" "sd," "bm," "da," "tm," "cp"
write-header-type2 "mean_bottom10.csv" "sd," "bm," "da," "tm," "cp"
]
if write-max-top10 [
write-header-type2 "max_top10.csv" "sd," "bm," "da," "tm," "cp"
]
if write-percent-top10 [
write-header-type2 "percent_top10.csv" "sd," "bm," "da," "tm," "cp"
;;

write-header-type2 "top10_rank.csv" "sd," "bm," "da," "tm," "cp"
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]
if write-univ-rank [
write-header-type2 "univ-rank.csv"
"sd 1,sd 2,sd 3,sd 4,sd 5,sd 6,sd 7,sd 8,sd 9,sd 10,"
"bm 1,bm 2,bm 3,bm 4,bm 5,bm 6,bm 7,bm 8,bm 9,bm 10,"
"da 1,da 2,da 3,da 4,da 5,da 6,da 7,da 8,da 9,da 10,"
"tm 1,tm 2,tm 3,tm 4,tm 5,tm 6,tm 7,tm 8,tm 9,tm 10,"
"cp 1,cp 2,cp 3,cp 4,cp 5,cp 6,cp 7,cp 8,cp 9,cp 10"
write-header-type2 "univ-enrollment.csv"
"sd 1,sd 2,sd 3,sd 4,sd 5,sd 6,sd 7,sd 8,sd 9,sd 10,"
"bm 1,bm 2,bm 3,bm 4,bm 5,bm 6,bm 7,bm 8,bm 9,bm 10,"
"da 1,da 2,da 3,da 4,da 5,da 6,da 7,da 8,da 9,da 10,"
"tm 1,tm 2,tm 3,tm 4,tm 5,tm 6,tm 7,tm 8,tm 9,tm 10,"
"cp 1,cp 2,cp 3,cp 4,cp 5,cp 6,cp 7,cp 8,cp 9,cp 10"
]
if write-senior-ave [
write-header-type2 "senior-ave.csv"
"sd 1,sd 2,sd 3,sd 4,sd 5,sd 6,sd 7,sd 8,sd 9,sd 10,"
"bm 1,bm 2,bm 3,bm 4,bm 5,bm 6,bm 7,bm 8,bm 9,bm 10,"
"da 1,da 2,da 3,da 4,da 5,da 6,da 7,da 8,da 9,da 10,"
"tm 1,tm 2,tm 3,tm 4,tm 5,tm 6,tm 7,tm 8,tm 9,tm 10,"
"cp 1,cp 2,cp 3,cp 4,cp 5,cp 6,cp 7,cp 8,cp 9,cp 10"
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write-header-type2 "senior-stdev.csv" "sd," "bm," "da," "tm," "cp"
write-header-type2 "mean-income.csv"
"sd 1,sd 2,sd 3,sd 4,sd 5,sd 6,sd 7,sd 8,sd 9,sd 10,"
"bm 1,bm 2,bm 3,bm 4,bm 5,bm 6,bm 7,bm 8,bm 9,bm 10,"
"da 1,da 2,da 3,da 4,da 5,da 6,da 7,da 8,da 9,da 10,"
"tm 1,tm 2,tm 3,tm 4,tm 5,tm 6,tm 7,tm 8,tm 9,tm 10,"
"cp 1,cp 2,cp 3,cp 4,cp 5,cp 6,cp 7,cp 8,cp 9,cp 10"
write-header-type2 "stdev-income.csv" "sd," "bm," "da," "tm," "cp"
write-header-type2 "y1-mean-income.csv"
"sd 1,sd 2,sd 3,sd 4,sd 5,sd 6,sd 7,sd 8,sd 9,sd 10,"
"bm 1,bm 2,bm 3,bm 4,bm 5,bm 6,bm 7,bm 8,bm 9,bm 10,"
"da 1,da 2,da 3,da 4,da 5,da 6,da 7,da 8,da 9,da 10,"
"tm 1,tm 2,tm 3,tm 4,tm 5,tm 6,tm 7,tm 8,tm 9,tm 10,"
"cp 1,cp 2,cp 3,cp 4,cp 5,cp 6,cp 7,cp 8,cp 9,cp 10"
write-header-type2 "y1-stdev-income.csv" "sd," "bm," "da," "tm," "cp"
]
end
to write-simulation-data
if write-mismatch [
write-data-type1 "mismatch.csv" average-mismatch-sd average-mismatch-bm averagemismatch-da average-mismatch-tm average-mismatch-cp
]

327
if write-sd-mismatch [
write-data-type1 "sd_mismatch.csv" sd-mismatch-sd sd-mismatch-bm sd-mismatch-da
sd-mismatch-tm sd-mismatch-cp
]
if write-ave-score [
write-data-type2 "ave_score.csv" ave-score-sd ave-score-bm ave-score-da ave-scoretm ave-score-cp
]
if write-min-score [
write-data-type2 "min_score.csv" min-score-sd min-score-bm min-score-da min-scoretm min-score-cp
]
if write-mean-quartile-score [
write-data-type2 "mean_quartile_score.csv" mean-quartile-sd mean-quartile-bm meanquartile-da mean-quartile-tm mean-quartile-cp
write-data-type2 "income_quartile_score.csv" income-quartile-sd income-quartile-bm
income-quartile-da income-quartile-tm income-quartile-cp
]
if write-mean-top10 [
write-data-type1 "mean_top10.csv" mean-top10-sd mean-top10-bm mean-top10-da
mean-top10-tm mean-top10-cp
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write-data-type1 "mean_bottom10.csv" mean-bottom10-sd mean-bottom10-bm meanbottom10-da mean-bottom10-tm mean-bottom10-cp
]
if write-max-top10 [
write-data-type1 "max_top10.csv" max-top10-sd max-top10-bm max-top10-da maxtop10-tm max-top10-cp
]
if write-percent-top10 [
write-data-type1 "percent_top10.csv" percent-top10-sd percent-top10-bm percenttop10-da percent-top10-tm percent-top10-cp
;;

write-data-type1 "top10_rank.csv" top10-rank-sd top10-rank-bm top10-rank-da

top10-rank-tm top10-rank-cp
]
if write-univ-rank [
write-data-type2 "univ-rank.csv" univ-rank-sd univ-rank-bm univ-rank-da univ-ranktm univ-rank-cp
write-data-type2 "univ-enrollment.csv" univ-enrollment-sd univ-enrollment-bm univenrollment-da univ-enrollment-tm univ-enrollment-cp
]
if write-senior-ave [
write-data-type2 "senior-ave.csv" y3end-score-ave-sd y3end-score-ave-bm y3endscore-ave-da y3end-score-ave-tm y3end-score-ave-cp
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write-data-type1 "senior-stdev.csv" y3end-score-stdev-sd y3end-score-stdev-bm
y3end-score-stdev-da y3end-score-stdev-tm y3end-score-stdev-cp
write-data-type2 "mean-income.csv" income-mean-sd income-mean-bm income-meanda income-mean-tm income-mean-cp
write-data-type1 "stdev-income.csv" income-stdev-sd income-stdev-bm income-stdevda income-stdev-tm income-stdev-cp
write-data-type2 "y1-mean-income.csv" y1-income-mean-sd y1-income-mean-bm y1income-mean-da y1-income-mean-tm y1-income-mean-cp
write-data-type1 "y1-stdev-income.csv" y1-income-stdev-sd y1-income-stdev-bm y1income-stdev-da y1-income-stdev-tm y1-income-stdev-cp
]
end

to write-header-type2 [fn c1 c2 c3 c4 c5]
if file-exists? fn and keep_files = FALSE [file-delete fn]
if NOT file-exists? fn [
file-open fn
file-print (word
"run,"
"ticks,"
"scheme,"
"alpha,"
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"capacity,"
"order,"
"choices,"
"choices-2,"
"grant,"
c1
c2
c3
c4
c5
)
file-close
]
end
to write-data-type1 [fn c1 c2 c3 c4 c5]
file-open fn
file-print (word
behaviorspace-run-number
" ," ticks
" ," scheme
" ," alpha
" ," capacity

331
" ," extra-in-order
" ," no-choices
" ," no-choices-2
" ," grant
" ," c1
" ," c2
" ," c3
" ," c4
" ," c5
)
file-close
end
to write-data-type2 [fn c1 c2 c3 c4 c5]
file-open fn
file-print (word
behaviorspace-run-number
" ," ticks
" ," scheme
" ," alpha
" ," capacity
" ," extra-in-order
" ," no-choices
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" ," no-choices-2
" ," grant " ,"
cut-list c1
cut-list c2
cut-list c3
cut-list c4
cut-list c5
)
file-close
end

